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Introduction
Under current international law, the transition to peace after a non- 
international armed conflict (niac) is no longer a matter of the exclusive 
discretion of the conflicting parties within a state. Several international legal 
standards are progressively shaping the ways in which internal peace nego-
tiations are conducted as well as the content of peace agreements.1 These 
standards are represented in legal obligations, principles, and practices 
mainly derived from International Human Rights Law (ihrl), International 
Humanitarian Law (ihl), International Criminal Law (icl), and the United 
Nations (UN) and states practice in peacemaking and peacebuilding.
Colombia provides the most recent and notorious example of a peace 
process and a peace agreement ending a niac conducted under an inter-
national legal frame.2 The 2012– 2016 peace negotiations between the 
Colombian government and the guerilla movement Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (farc) and their final agreement are inter-
nationally considered a model for resolving other conflicts around the 
world.3 The Colombian Peace Agreement4 has been recognized both for its 
 1 Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ in Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law 
of Transition from Conflict to Peace, ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann Kleffner (The Hague: T.M.C. 
Asser Press, 2008), 104. For Sthan: “The substantive components of peace- making are no lon-
ger exclusively determined by the discretion and contractual liberty of the warring factions, 
but are governed by certain norms and standards of international law derived from different 
fields of law and legal practice.”
 2 Even though other peace agreements have been signed around the world after the 2016 
Colombian deal was adopted, they do not have the comprehensive dimension of the 
Colombian one. They are mostly partial or ceasefire agreements, in which an international 
legal dimension is not as large and comprehensive as in the Colombian case. On this point, 
see Escola de Cultura de Pau, Peace Talks in Focus 2019. Report on Trends and Scenarios 
(Barcelona: Icaria, 2019), 27.
 3 See, among others: UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal Meeting on Colombia, 
Chairperson’s Summary of the Discussion, 13 November 2017, available at: http:// www.un.org/ 
es/ peacebuilding/ pdf/ oc/ PBCmeetingonColombia13November2017- Chair’s%20summary 
FINAL.pdf, accessed on 10 June 2018; Jean- Arnault, Chief of the UN Mission in Colombia, 
“Este proceso de paz es un ejemplo para el mundo”: Jean Arnault, available at: caracol.
com.co/ radio/ 2017/ 06/ 27/ nacional/ 1498581031_ 512926.html, accessed on 20 November 
2017; Report of the Secretary- General on the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, Security 
Council, S/ 2018/ 1159, 26 December 2018, para. 91.
 4 The expressions Colombian Peace Agreement, Peace Agreement, Final Agreement, and 
Agreement (with capitalization) will be used interchangeably to refer to the peace agree-
ment signed by the Government of Colombia and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 










comprehensive approach to ending armed violence and addressing struc-
tural causes of the conflict and for its compliance with international law. As 
noted by Huneeus and Urueña:
That agreement, and, indeed, the entire negotiation process, has been 
exceptional in the central role that international law plays. Colombia is 
an intensely legalistic society, with a legal system that has been tradition-
ally open to international law. Moreover, the peace talks are conducted 
in a global legal context that imposes strict legal limits— in particular, 
international criminal law and Inter- American human rights law are of 
constant concern to the negotiators. […] [M] any of the deal’s particular 
choices seemed specifically designed to comply with Colombia’s interna-
tional legal obligations.5
The central role of international law in the Colombian transition is due and 
is expressed in at least two ways. First, several external actors participated 
in the negotiations or they sent messages that influenced the discussions. 
These actors included the UN, the Inter- American System of Human Rights, 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (icc), and the guarantor 
countries. Second, the negotiation and the Agreement not only incorporated 
international legal standards of justice, truth, reparations, and inclusiveness, 
but also used international law and international enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure its compliance.
However, this case also evinces the complexity of the legal regulation of 
transitioning from armed conflict to peace. There is no specific legal regime 
governing such transitions, but a disparate set of applicable provisions 
enshrined by different branches of international law that are not specifically 
designated for that purpose. Thus, these provisions must be interpreted and 
adapted in their application to the specific transitional context. This process 
implies a dual role for the parties involved in the transition as both the subjects 
and creators of law: the apply general existing norms and define, through this 
practice, new ways to interpret and adapt them to the context. As Kreß and 
Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. See Government of Colombia and farc, 
‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 2016, 
especiales.presidencia.gov.co/ Documents/ 20170620- dejacion- armas/ acuerdos/ acuerdo- 
final- ingles.pdf.
 5 Alexandra Huneeus and Rene Urueña, ‘Introduction to Symposium on the Colombian 
Peace Talks and International Law,’ American Journal of International Law 110 ajil Unbound 




Grover wrote, “States in transition apply existing law and, in so doing, contrib-
ute to its refinement.”6
The academic debate on this role of international law in transition has been 
framed under the concept of jus post bellum. This concept has been proposed 
as a normative framework to gather— under a common frame of reference— 
the myriad of international legal considerations applicable to the transition 
from armed conflict to sustainable peace.7 However, the relative novelty of 
the concept, which only entered the international legal scholarship in 2005,8 
is marked by divergent conceptions around its content and scope, and few 
empirical studies have been conducted on it.
Considering the above- presented elements, this study analyzes the role of 
international law in transition from internal armed conflict to peace by using 
the Colombian transition as a case study. Based on this analysis, it discusses 
to what extent this case fits within the scholarly debate on jus post bellum by 
identifying what elements are applicable from theory to practice and what les-
sons can be drawn from the Colombian case toward further developing the 
concept.
This introduction first discusses how transition to peace became a matter of 
international law and how the concept of jus post bellum offers a framework for 
such a debate, examining the state of research on this topic. Then, the intro-
duction discusses the relevance of the Colombian case in assessing the role 
of international law in the transition to peace and why this case is useful to 
attaining a better understanding of the concept of jus post bellum. According 
to these discussions, the introduction reflects on the empirical analysis from 
the perspective of niac  s and the use of a case study. Lastly, this introduction 
will delimitate the purpose, some methodological considerations, and the 
structure of the study.
 6 Claus Kreß and Leena Grover, ‘International Criminal Law Restraints in Peace Talks to End 
Armed Conflicts of a Non- International Character,’ in Law in Peace Negotiations, ed. Morton 
Bergsmo and Pablo Kalmanovitz (Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2010), 46.
 7 Vincent Chetail, ‘Introduction: Post- Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguity and Identity,’ in Post- 
Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, ed. Vincent Chetail (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
1– 33; Vincent Chetail and Oliver Jütersonke, ‘Peacebuilding: A Review of the Academic 
Literature’ (White Paper Series No. 23, Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2015), 5, https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2684002.
 8 As it will be analyzed in Section 2 of this Introduction, the first academic work addressing 
jus post bellum from a legal point of view appeared in 2005, analyzing how the concept could 
frame the application of ihl in the post- occupation context in Iraq: Daniel Thürer and 
Malcom MacLaren, ‘ “Ius Post Bellum” in Iraq: A Challenge to the Applicability and Relevance 
of International Humanitarian Law?,’ in Weltinnenrecht: Liber Amicorum Jost Delbrück, ed. 








1 Transition to Peace as a Matter of International Law
Law plays a fundamental role in the transition from armed conflict to peace. 
Although peace is a politically- oriented goal, legal considerations frame the 
process of negotiating and building peace.9 In particular, international law 
is gaining increasing relevance in domestic transitions to peace. The interna-
tional obligations of states according to ihrl, ihl, and icl are unavoidable 
considerations for negotiating parties when defining their conditions to end 
conflict and achieve peace.10 These obligations serve as a framework outlin-
ing limits, possibilities, and duties that ought to be followed when negotiat-
ing, defining, and implementing measures of transition from armed conflict 
to peace.
The increasing involvement of international law in domestic transitions is 
mainly due to the development of ihrl as a reliable means of protecting indi-
viduals, including from their own state.11 To Cecile Fabre, this phenomenon 
represents a new paradigm in international relations with at least two rules: 
“a) individuals are the fundamental unit of moral concern […], b) whatever 
rights and privileges states have, they have them only in so far as they thereby 
serve individual’s fundamental interests.”12 This argument is reinforced by 
the fact that ihrl has increased its protection of individuals not only by the 
 substantial development of rights but also through the creation of effective 
mechanisms to enforce them internationally.
Regarding this paradigm, Stahn affirms that “The rise of human rights obli-
gations and growing limitations on sovereignty […] have not only changed 
the attitude toward the ending of conflicts, but have also set certain bench-
marks for behavior. The process of peace- making itself has become a domain 
of international attention and regulatory action.”13 Here, one should add also 
the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding as matters of international 
concern. These concepts came to the international policy and legal arena 
since the 1992 UN Secretary- General’s Agenda for Peace.14 Chetail defines 
 9 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 2008, 101.
 10 Philipp Kastner, Legal Normativity in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1.
 11 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 
(New York: Basic Books, 2006), xi.
 12 Cecile Fabre, ‘Cosmopolitanism, Just War Theory and Legitimate Authority,’ International 
Affairs 84, no. 5 (2008): 964.
 13 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 2008, 100– 101.
 14 UN Secretary- General, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (New York: United Nations, 1992); UN 















them as: peacekeeping, meaning the actions aimed to end the immediate vio-
lence and hostilities; peacemaking, involving the peaceful resolution of the 
conflict through negotiation, mediation, or arbitration; and peacebuilding, 
as the process of addressing the root causes of the conflict with a view to 
establishing a sustainable peace.15 From the three concepts, peacemaking 
and peacebuilding are more closely related to the idea of transitioning to sus-
tainable peace.
Peacemaking and peacebuilding processes have received increasing legal 
regulation through UN documents, ihrl, and international jurisprudence,16 
mainly since the early 2000s after the adoption of the icc Statute and differ-
ent UN guidelines on transitional justice.17 This phenomenon is described by 
Christine Bell in the following terms:
Indeed, legal analysis suggests a more pivotal role for international law in 
assisting, and perhaps even acting as catalyst to, the trend towards nego-
tiated settlements in intrastate conflicts.
Throughout the 1980s, a number of legal developments relevant to the 
peace agreement landscape took place and can be argued to have played 
a little- acknowledged role in creating the peace agreement phenome-
non. These legal developments all worked to undo the concept of inter-
national law as the law of states, by opening up the black box of ‘the state’ 
to scrutiny of its internal configurations— traditionally the preserve of 
state sovereignty. In so doing, they increased the scope for international 
law to address intrastate conflict.18
Then, she adds:
The contemporary peace agreement is negotiated in a context where an 
expanding international machinery has a clear mandate in the areas that 
many peace agreements deal with, such as human rights, refugees and dis-
placed persons, independence of the judiciary, policing, and economics. 
 15 Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 1.
 16 Guglielmo Verdirame, ‘What to Make of Jus Post Bellum: A Response to Antonia Chayes,’ 
European Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (2013): 307– 8.
 17 Astri Suhrke, ‘Post- War States: Differentiating Patterns of Peace,’ in Jus Post Bellum: 
Mapping the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens 
Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 270– 72.
 18 Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford: 










Never before have international law and international institutions had 
such an array of tools capable of application to intrastate conflict.19
The expansion of the influence of international law in peacemaking and peace-
building is reflected in a growing number of UN guidelines, reports, and resolutions 
addressing this matter and recommending the observance and incorporation of 
international legal standards in reparations, transitional justice, inclusiveness, 
and the rule of law.20 The General Assembly and the Security Council created 
the UN Peacebuilding Commission21 aimed at providing international support 
to countries in transition, and the Council has intervened in many transitional 
settings— most of them related to niac s— pursuing its fundamental mandate to 
safeguard international peace and security.22
However, as Bell argues, “peace agreement practice is increasingly posing a 
fundamental challenge to the existing international legal order.”23 Despite the 
rising influence of international law in peace processes and peace agreements, 
there is no specific legal regime regulating transition from armed conflict to 
peace, and different branches of law can apply. As such, states and other par-
ties in conflict must interpret and apply relevant international norms accord-
ing to the specific needs and conditions of their own transitional context, but 
with no legal framework given to provide coherence to the matter. Offering 
such a framework is the purpose of jus post bellum.24
 19 Bell, 104.
 20 See, among others: unsc, ‘Resolution 1325 (2000),’ Pub. L. No. S/ res/ 1325 (2000); UN 
Secretary- General, ‘Report of the Secretary- General on the Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post- Conflict Societies’ (New York: UN Security Council, 23 August 
2004); UN Secretary- General, ‘Women, Peace and Security,’ 13 October 2004; UN General 
Assembly, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law,’ Pub. L. No. A / res/ 60/ 147 (2005); UN Secretary- 
General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post- Conflict Societies’ 
(New York: UN Security Council, 12 October 2011); UN Secretary- General, ‘Strengthening 
the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution’ (UN General Assembly, 25 June 2012).
 21 unsc Resolution 1645, S/ res/ 1645(2005), 20 December 2005, and General Assembly 
Resolution 180, A/ res/ 60/ 180, 30 December 2005.
 22 See, for example: unsc Resolution 1127 (1997), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 1127 (1997), Resolution 1383 
(2001), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 1383 (2001), Resolution 1740 (2007), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 1740 (2007), 
Resolution 1464 (2013), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 1464, Resolution 1590 (2005), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 1590 
(2005), Resolution 2259 (2015), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 2259 (2015).
 23 Christine Bell, ‘Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status,’ American Journal of 
International Law 100, no. 2 (2006): 384.














2 A Framework on the Legal Dimension of Transition: Jus Post Bellum
In the same way that the conditions for engaging in war are regulated under a 
legal framework known as jus ad bellum, and the legal regime for conducting 
armed conflict is defined as jus in bello, moral and legal scholarship has pro-
posed the concept of jus post bellum to designate the legal framework appli-
cable to transition from armed conflict to peace. However, while jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello are unified legal regimes, the law applicable to the transition 
from armed conflict to peace is not gathered into a specific legal framework 
but involves a complex interaction between different branches of law and 
between international and national law.
Therefore, the concept of jus post bellum appeared as a space to hold the 
debate around the interaction between law and transition to peace,25 and to 
offer a normative framework for peacemaking and peacebuilding practice. 
Following this logic, Vincent Chetail suggests that:
Jus post bellum can be generally defined as the set of norms applicable at 
the end of an armed conflict— whether internal or international— with 
a view to establishing a sustainable peace. […] [T] he grouping dispa-
rate standards within the same frame of reference underscores the need 
for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to the numerous rules 
governing post- conflict situations. From a systemic perspective, it paves 
the way for a contextualized interpretation— and, by extension, a con-
textualized application— of existing norms in order to better take into 
account the specificities which characterize the difficult transition from 
war to peace.26
This definition addresses different components of the concept: the substance 
of jus post bellum as a set of norms; a temporal scope placed to the end of 
armed conflict; its applicability to both international armed conflicts (iac s) 
and niac s; and its systemic function to group different standards governing 
transition from armed conflict to peace under a common framework, allowing 
their contextualized interpretation and application. However, notwithstand-
ing the comprehensiveness of this definition, the concept is far from reach-
ing consensus, and Easterday, Iverson and Stahn even sustain that “there are 
 25 Inger Österdahl and Esther van Zadel, ‘What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New Wine and 
Old Bottles,’ Journal of Conflict and Security Law 14, no. 2 (2009): 176.







almost as many conceptions of jus post bellum as scholars” working in this 
field.27
Looking at the origin of the concept, Stahn sustains that this tripartite con-
ception of the law of war can be found since St. Agustine (City of God, 410), 
Vitoria, Suarez, Grotius (Laws of War and Peace, 1625) and Kant (Science of 
Right, 1790).28 However, the first systematization of the idea of jus post bellum 
is generally attributed to Kant, who referred to a right to war (jus ad bellum), a 
right in war (jus in bello), and a right after war (jus post bellum).29
Nevertheless, these three elements have not been developed at the same 
level. Both jus ad bellum and jus in bello were largely theorized since the 19th 
century. Then, jus in bello was codified since the 1899 and 1907 The Hague 
Conventions, and jus ad bellum in the 1945 UN Charter provisions on the use 
of force. However, jus post bellum did not receive the same attention neither 
in theory nor in legal codification. For Stahn, this situation is due to at least 
three reasons. First, until the 20th century there was a split conception of 
war or peace without intermediate states of transition from one to other.30 
Second, peace has been traditionally considered as a matter of the discretion 
of states.31 And, third, peace- making has been regarded as a case- by- case issue 
and some legal scholars “even continued to conceive peace- making as an ‘art’ 
rather than a legal paradigm until the 1980s.”32
Having this background, the concept of jus post bellum had only entered 
into the academic debate at the beginning of the 21st century, after the US- 
led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.33 This contemporary discussion on 
jus post bellum has been held within the framework of two disciplines: moral 
 27 Jennifer Easterday, Jens Iverson, and Carsten Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations 
of Jus Post Bellum: An Introduction,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, 
ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 3.
 28 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 2008, 94. The same view is shared 
by Larry May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, and Meionexia,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 16.
 29 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just- War Theorist,’ Leiden Journal of 
International Law 20, no. 3 (2007): 574.; Brian Orend, War and International Justice: A 
Kantian Perspective (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2000). Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 18.
 30 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 2008, 96. On this idea, see also Philip 
Jessup, ‘Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status between Peace and 
War?,’ American Journal of International Law 48, no. 1 (1954): 98– 103.
 31 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 2008, 96.
 32 Stahn, 98.
















philosophy and international law.34 The first has been focused on the moral 
obligation of reparation and reconstruction in the aftermath of a military 
intervention, under the just war theory. On the other hand, international legal 
scholars have tried to identify and articulate the international legal regulation 
applicable to the transition from armed conflict to peace under this concept.35
From the perspective of the just war theory, Orend proposed the first con-
temporary approach to jus post bellum. For him, the “just war theory, as cur-
rently conceived, is incomplete”, and now it is necessary to look at “the justice 
[…] of the move back from war to peace.”36 Then, since 2004, some philos-
ophers used the concept to discuss the moral obligation of reparation and 
reconstruction after a military intervention.
Walzer presented an analysis on different wars around the world under a 
just war perspective; and, when referring to the Iraqi case, he has suggested the 
development of a jus post bellum component within the just war theory.37 Bass 
used the concept to analyze “the justice of a belligerent power’s postwar con-
duct,”38 which Iasiello supported mapping the moral responsibilities of victors 
in war.39 In another perspective, Rigby40 discussed the concept and its impli-
cations in terms of forgiveness and reconciliation. Later, in 2006, DiMeglio41 
continued working on the definition of jus post bellum as part of the just war 
tradition, and Williams and Caldwell insisted on connecting the justness of 
“how we intend to fight and what we intend to do after we have fought.”42
In 2012, Larry May published one of the most influential works on jus post 
bellum, entitled After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective.43 Written under the 
umbrella of the just war theory, this book proposes six normative principles of 
 34 Stahn, 112.
 35 Christine Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria: What’s in a Name?,’ in Jus Post 
Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and 
Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 181.
 36 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ Journal of Social Philosophy 31, no. 1 (2000): 117– 18.
 37 Michael Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 162.
 38 Gary Bass, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2004, 385.
 39 Louis Iasiello, ‘Jus Post Bellum: The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War,’ Naval War 
College Review 57, no. 3– 4 (2004): 33– 52.
 40 Andrew Rigby, ‘Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Jus Post Bellum,’ in Just War Theory: A 
Reapprisal, ed. Mark Evans (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 177– 200.
 41 Richard DiMeglio, ‘The Evolution of the Just War Tradition : Defining Jus Post Bellum,’ 
Military Law Review 186 (2006): 116– 63.
 42 Robert Williams and Dan Caldwell, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of 
Just Peace,’ International Studies Perspectives 7, no. 4 (2006): 309– 20.






















jus post bellum: rebuilding, retribution, restitution, reparation, reconciliation 
and proportionality. Subsequent works have considered this proposal of prin-
ciples as a solid basis to develop the content of jus post bellum.44
From the perspective of international law, Thürer and MacLaren were the 
first authors to address the issue in 2005. In an article, entitled ‘Ius Post Bellum’ 
in Iraq, they analyzed the role of the concept to improve the application of ihl 
in the occupation and post- occupation period in Iraq.45 Similarly, Boon used 
the concept to assess the limits of occupant’s law- making powers,46 which 
Cohen further addressed in 2006 examining the role of international law in 
post- conflict constitution- making.47 The same year, Stahn presented the first 
article exploring jus post bellum in a comprehensive way as a legal category.48
Later, in 2007, under the direction of Stahn, the University of Leiden’s 
Grotius Center for International Legal Studies undertook the Jus Post Bellum 
Project.49 This project was conceived to “investigate whether and how a con-
temporary jus post bellum may facilitate greater fairness and sustainability 
in conflict termination and peacemaking.”50 In ten years, the Project pub-
lished three volumes presenting the most comprehensive contributions to 
the legal understanding of contemporary jus post bellum. The first one, pub-
lished in 2008, Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to 
 44 Easterday, Iverson, and Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations of Jus Post Bellum: 
An Introduction’; Aurel Sari, ‘The Status of Foreign Armed Forces Deployed in Post- 
Conflict Environments: A Search for Basic Principles,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the 
Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 467– 501; Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum and the Justice 
of Peace: Some Preliminary Reflections’ (Final Conference: Jus Post Bellum and the 
Justice of Peace, The Hague, 2016), http:// postconflictjustice.com/ jus- post- bellum- and- 
the- justice- of- peace- some- preliminary- reflections- part- 1- 2/ .
 45 Thürer and MacLaren, ‘ “Ius Post Bellum” in Iraq: A Challenge to the Applicability and 
Relevance of International Humanitarian Law?’
 46 Kristen Boon, ‘Legislative Reform in Post- Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the 
Contemporary Occupant’s Law- Making Powers,’ McGill Law Journal 50, no. 2 (2005): 
285– 326.
 47 Jean Cohen, ‘The Role of International Law in Post- Conflict Constitution- Making: Toward 
a Jus Post Bellum for “Interim Occupations”,’ New York Law School Law Review 51 (2007 
2006): 497– 532.
 48 Carsten Stahn, ‘ “Jus Ad Bellum”, “jus in Bello” … “Jus Post Bellum”?— Rethinking the 
Conception of the Law of Armed Force,’ European Journal of International Law 17, no. 5 
(2006): 921– 43.
 49 This is the website of the Jus Post Bellum Project, where information about its activi-
ties, its team, and its publications can be found: http:// juspostbellum.com/ default.aspx 

















Peace,51 has focused on the foundations, contemporary challenges, and the 
future of the concept. Later, in 2014, they published Jus Post Bellum. Mapping 
the Normative Foundations,52 with a broader analysis on the different dimen-
sions of the concept, its functions, and dilemmas. Finally, in 2017 the Project 
released the work Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to 
Peace: Clarifying Norms, Principles, and Practices,53 in which several scholars 
have addressed the connection between jus post bellum and environmental 
protection. At present, these works represent the most advanced analysis of 
contemporary jus post bellum.54
However, despite the existing contributions, the concept is still fragmented 
and contested. Lewkowicz considers that jus post bellum creates semantic con-
fusions on the law of the use of force,55 and it is just an abstract doctrine with-
out any substantial contribution to peace practice.56 De Brabandere criticizes 
the usefulness of the concept,57 and he even affirms “that certain conceptions 
of jus post bellum pose a danger to some very foundational principles of inter-
national law.”58 In turn, even if Bell admits some usefulness in the concept, 
she has considered it as an aspirational regime for the future, being the cur-
rent normativity applicable to transitions more a question of lex pacificatoria, 
understood as the law of peacemakers.59
 51 Carsten Stahn and Jan Kleffner, eds., Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from 
Conflict to Peace (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008).
 52 Carsten Stahn, Easterday, Jennifer, and Iverson, Jens, eds., Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the 
Normative Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
 53 Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson, and Jennifer Easterday, eds., Environmental Protection 
and Transitions from Conflict to Peace: Clarifying Norms, Principles, and Practices 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
 54 For Bell, Carsten Stahn and the Leiden School have led the contemporary discussion on 
jus post bellum under the perspective of international law. Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex 
Pacificatoria: What’s in a Name?,’ 181.
 55 Gregory Lewkowicz, ‘Présentation. Le Jus Post Bellum: Nouveau Cheval de Troie Pour Le 
Droit Des Conflit Armés?,’ Revue Belge de Droit International 44, no. 1– 2 (2011): 5.
 56 Lewkowicz, ‘Présentation. Le Jus Post Bellum: Nouveau Cheval de Troie Pour Le Droit Des 
Conflit Armés?’
 57 Eric De Brabandere, ‘International Territorial Administrations and Post- Conflict: 
Reflections on the Need of a Jus Post Bellum as Legal Framework,’ Revue Belgue de Droit 
International 44, no. 1– 2 (2011): 69.
 58 Eric De Brabandere, ‘The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in International Law: A Normative 
Critique,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, 
Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 123– 41.
 59 The concept of lex pacificatoria, as related to jus post bellum, will be analyzed in Chapter 1, 






















Those discussions have evidenced the need for further research to clarify 
the concept and its concrete scope. In 2009 Chetail pointed out the impor-
tance “to recognize post- war law as a concept in its own right.”60 In 2012 May 
and Forcehimes considered jus post bellum scholarship as an “emerging field 
[…] still in its formative years”.61 In 2014, Easterday, Iverson, and Stahn argued 
that despite “the expansion of references to jus post bellum in a variety of jour-
nals […], there has been an increase of ambiguity, [instead of] a consolidation 
around a consensus definition.”62 And, in 2017 Iverson sustained that the con-
cept “remains comparatively under- theorized, and frequently referenced with-
out realizing that many authors be talking past each other, meaning different 
things while using the same term.”63
Having this background on the scholarly debate of jus post bellum, this study 
is aimed at offering an empirical analysis of the concept by testing its theoret-
ical development in practice throughout a relevant case study.
3 The Relevance of the Colombian Transition
The Colombian transitional process from armed conflict to peace offers a proper 
test case to assess both the role of international law in transition to peace and the 
viability of jus post bellum as the concept to frame such a role. Several reasons 
explain the relevance of the Colombian transition for this purpose.
First, the 2016 Peace Agreement in Colombia is the most recent comprehen-
sive64 peace deal ending a niac in the world.65 The comprehensiveness of the 
 60 Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 18.
 61 Larry May and Andrew Forcehimes, eds., Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1.
 62 Jens Iverson, Jennifer Easterday, and Carsten Stahn, ‘Epilogue: Jus Post Bellum— Strategic 
Analysis and Future Directions,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, 
ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 547.
 63 Jens Iverson, ‘The Function of Jus Post Bellum in International Law’ (Leiden, Leiden 
University, 2017), 8, https:// openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/ handle/ 1887/ 55949.
 64 According to the Peace Accords Matrix, of the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute 
for International Peace Studies, which offers extensive data on the implementation of 
several peace agreements ending armed conflicts around the work, a peace agreement 
is considered comprehensive when: “(1) the major parties to the conflict were involved 
in the negotiations that led to the written agreement; and (2) the substantive issues 
underlying the conflict were included in the negotiations.” Peace Accords Matrix (Date of 
retrieval: (1/ 16/ 2019), https:// peaceaccords.nd.edu/ about, Kroc Institute for International 
Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.
 65 Up to the end of 2018, peace agreements concluded in other countries after the 2016 














agreement implies both ending the armed conflict between the main oppos-
ing actors and addressing its root causes with a view to establishing lasting 
peace.66 In this sense, the Agreement addresses matters of justice, truth, rep-
aration, socio- economic and political issues related to the causes of the con-
flict, the participation and inclusion of different groups in society, and other 
relevant questions.67
Second, the 2012– 2016 peace process has been designed to integrate and 
apply international legal standards. In the preamble of the Agreement, the 
parties expressly stated their strict respect for the Colombian Constitution 
and for the general principles of international law, ihrl, ihl, and the icc 
Statute.68 Further, the Agreement contains several references to international 
law, incorporating international legal standards applicable to different matters 
of the deal and using international enforcement mechanisms to ensure its 
compliance. The Agreement’s international legal status was affirmed through 
its configuration as a special agreement under ihl and a unilateral declara-
tion by the Colombian State before the UN.69 The process has incorporated 
an inclusive perspective that follows UN Security Council (unsc) Resolution 
1325 (2000) and other legal instruments and guidelines on the participation 
of women, ethnic groups, minorities, victims, and civil society.70 Crucial mat-
ters such as criminal justice for international crimes and reparations to victims 
were defined according to ihrl and icl standards.71 Moreover, a monitoring 
role was assigned to the unsc, which created a special mission for verifying 
the implementation phase.72
address comprehensively the root causes of armed conflict. This is the reason why the 
Colombian agreement can be considered the most recent comprehensive peace deal. On 
this point, see Escola de Cultura de Pau, Peace Talks in Focus 2019. Report on Trends and 
Scenarios, 27.
 66 This purpose of the Agreement is seen from its very title: Government of Colombia and 
farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace.’
 67 The main components of the Agreement will be developed in detail in Chapter 2 of 
the book.
 68 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 1.
 69 Gobierno de Colombia and farc, ‘Comunicado Conjunto No. 69,’ 12 May 2016, http:// 
es.presidencia.gov.co/ noticia/ 160512- Comunicado- Conjunto- numero- 69. A detailed 
analysis on the international legal status of the Peace Agreement is offered in Chapter 2.1.
 70 See Chapter 2, Section 5.
 71 See Chapter 2, Sections 3 and 4.
 72 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 216. The UN mission for verification of disarmament 
and reincorporation was created by unsc Resolutions 2307 (2016) and 2366 (2017). The 

















Third, there was significant international involvement in the peace process 
through foreign support,73 observatory statements by the icc Prosecutor,74 a 
UN Secretary- General Representative, and welcoming messages by the unsc,75 
which monitors the implementation of the Agreement. These actors have 
played a crucial role influencing the peace agreement discussions. Norway, as 
a guarantor of the process, sponsored a group of international legal experts to 
advise the parties on the conformity of the Agreement with international law.76 
During the negotiations, the icc Prosecutor’s Office sent letters and state-
ments to Colombian institutions reminding them of their obligations in the 
prosecution of international crimes.77 In addition, various non- governmental 
organizations (ngo s) openly invoked the international legal obligations of the 
State when negotiating victim’s rights to justice, truth, and reparation.78
 73 Cuba and Norway serve as permanent guarantors. The process has been supported by 
the UN, the EU, the oas, the US, the Vatican, and different foreign and international 
actors. In addition, it should be mentioned the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Colombian 
President Juan Manuel Santos, acknowledging his leaderships and commitment to the 
peace process.
 74 Office of the icc Prosecutor, ‘Statement of icc Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the Conclusion 
of the Peace Negotiations between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia,’ 1 September 2016, https:// www.icc- cpi.int// Pages/ item.aspx-
?name=160901- otp- stat- colombia (accessed on 1 April 2018). On the conclusion of a Final 
Agreement in Colombia, the icc Prosecutor stated: “As a State Party to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, Colombia has recognised that grave crimes threaten the 
peace, security and well- being of the world and stated its determination to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes. I note, 
with satisfaction, that the final text of the peace agreement excludes amnesties and pardons 
for crimes against humanity and war crimes under the Rome Statute […]. I have supported 
Colombia’s efforts to bring an end to the decades- long armed conflict in line with its obliga-
tions under the Rome Statute since the beginning of the negotiations. I will continue to do so 
during the implementation phase in the same spirit.”
 75 UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 2307 (2016),’ Pub. L. No. S/ res/ 2307 (2016); UN Security 
Council, ‘Resolution 2366 (2017),’ Pub. L. No. S/ res/ 2366 (2017) (2017).
 76 Hugo García and Juan David Laverde. Los arquitectos del acuerdo. El Espectador, 26 
September 2015, https:// www.elespectador.com/ noticias/ politica/ los- arquitectos- del 
- acuerdo- articulo- 588936 (accessed on 7 July 2018).
 77 Letter of 26 July 2013, sent by the Prosecutor of the icc to the Colombian Constitutional 
Court. Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia C- 579/ 13 (26 August 2013). para-
graph 3.16.1. Letter of 7 August 2013, sent by the Prosecutor of the icc to the Colombian 
Constitutional Court. Corte Constitucional de Colombia, paragraph 3.16.2.
 78 Prominent international human rights ngo s claimed the consideration of human rights 
standards during the discussion and adoption of transitional justice mechanisms. Among 
them, the Commission of Jurists, the International Center for Transitional Justice, Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International. An analysis on this question takes place in 














Fourth, transition in Colombia has been a complex and prolonged process, 
during which international legal considerations related to peace have been 
present at different moments within the armed conflict. Before the recent 
peace process, the country had developed other domestic mechanisms of tran-
sitional justice (2005)79 and reparation for victims (2011)80 closely inspired by 
international standards. Some authors have even defined the Colombian expe-
rience as a case of transitional justice without transition.81 Because of these 
aspects, the Colombian case is particularly useful for assessing the application 
of jus post bellum during an ongoing armed conflict.
Fifth, Colombia has a legal system particularly receptive to international law, 
in which ihrl and ihl treaties are considered to have the same legal level of 
the Constitution.82 Additionally, as Céspedes points out, the country has relied 
“so much on international norms to understand its own conflict.”83 Regarding 
transitional instruments, this feature has been ensured by an outstanding 
Constitutional Court controlling the domestic legal and constitutional frame-
work under both the Colombian Constitution and international law.84 This con-
dition offers advantageous insights on the relationship between international 
and domestic law, which is a crucial discussion regarding jus post bellum.85
Finally, while international involvement has marked different stages of 
transition in Colombia, the peace efforts have maintained a solid local own-
ership. It can be attributed to, among other reasons, a strong institutional 
system and a vigorous civil society. This situation is almost paradoxical in a 
country living an armed conflict for more than five decades.86 For that reason, 
 79 Congreso de la República de Colombia, ‘Ley 975 (Ley de Justicia y Paz)’ (2005).
 80 Congreso de la República de Colombia, ‘Ley 1448 (Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de 
Tierras)’ (2011).
 81 Rodrigo Uprimny et al., eds., ¿Justicia Transicional Sin Transición? Verdad, Justicia y 
Reparación Para Colombia (Bogota: DeJusticia, 2006).
 82 Constitución Política de Colombia, 1991, Art. 93.
 83 Lina Céspedes- Báez, ‘Gender Panic and the Failure of a Peace Agreement,’ American 
Journal of International Law 110 ajil Unbound Symposium on the Colombian Peace Talks 
and International Law (2016): 183– 87.
 84 The Constitutional Court is playing a fundamental role in the process, since all the legal 
and constitutional instruments developed to implement the agreement have constitu-
tional control. For a view to the main decisions of the Court on the matter, see Corte 
Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia C- 579/ 13; Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 
Sentencia C- 379/ 16 (18 July 2016).
 85 Iverson, Easterday, and Stahn, ‘Epilogue: Jus Post Bellum— Strategic Analysis and Future 
Directions,’ 553.
 86 As noted by Saffon and Uprimny, there is certain ambiguity in the Colombian case, 

















the case offers specific insights on the role of domestic actors voluntarily 
relying on international norms and institutions to resolve their own internal 
armed conflict.87
The above discussion highlights the substantial role of international law 
in Colombia’s domestic transition from armed conflict to peace, in which the 
parties in negotiation and other domestic and international actors have been 
involved in reaching peace under a normative framework seeking not only 
to end the conflict but also to achieve sustainable peace. Said features of the 
Colombian case offer a broad picture of the relevance of this transition in legal 
and policy terms, making this experience an especially insightful case study for 
an empirical analysis of the concept of jus post bellum.
4 Empirical Analysis from the Perspective of niac s
The Colombian transition provides an opportunity to identify how interna-
tional law shapes peacemaking and peacebuilding by analyzing the actors and 
discourses involved in that process, as well as the interaction between legal 
and political considerations and between international and domestic law. 
Moreover, framing such analysis under the concept of jus post bellum offers an 
opportunity to assess how theory works in practice and how practice provides 
new insights for theoretical development.
The 2014 publication of the University of Leiden’s Jus Post Bellum Project 
raised some questions that should guide future research on the topic, acknowl-
edging that today there are “more questions than answers.”88 Some of those 
questions relevant for this study include the following: “Who is the addressee 
of jus post bellum? How does it impact the societies in which it is applied or 
practiced?” “How, exactly, does jus post bellum incorporate, blend, or other-
wise draw on its various legal sources? To what extent is it feasible to contem-
plate further regulation and stocktaking, and what form should it take?” “What 
For them, “In spite of the persistence of the armed conflict and the seriousness of 
the human rights abuses therein produced, Colombian institutions have managed to 
maintain important democratic features.” Maria Saffon and Rodrigo Uprimny, ‘Uses 
and Abuses of Transitional Justice in Colombia,’ in Law in Peace Negotiations, ed. 
Morgen Bergsmo and Pablo Kalmanovitz (Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 
2010), 363.
 87 Chapter 3 will analyze the actors of jus post bellum in Colombia.








would guiding principles include?” And, “How can, or should, jus post bellum 
be adopted and applied by practitioners?”89
Most of these questions will be addressed by this work. Additionally, the 
empirical approach from a case study within a niac context provides new 
ideas to advance elements from theory and practice looking to give concrete 
substance to jus post bellum.
Thus far, few studies have examined concrete cases of transition from a jus 
post bellum perspective. In 2005, Thürer and MacLaren90 used Iraq as a test 
case to examine practical concerns in the application of the law of occupation. 
Their conclusions addressed the concrete responsibilities of post- occupant 
powers, suggesting that rather than reforming occupation law, jus post bellum 
provides a framework for better application of ihl in those contexts. In 2009, 
Labonte91 wrote a comprehensive case study on jus post bellum, examining 
the Afghan context. However, her analysis is conducted exclusively from the 
perspective of the just war theory rather than from the perspective of inter-
national law. She examined to what extent different peacemaking and peace-
building measures adopted in Afghanistan respected jus post bellum principles 
as proportionality, discrimination, reconciliation and restoration, focusing 
on the challenges of non- state actors involved in these processes. In 2011, 
Ryngaert92 assessed the role of icl and jus post bellum in Uganda following 
the country’s peace efforts after its situation was referred to the icc in 2004. 
This study is concentrated on the role of the icc when a country is conduct-
ing internal peace efforts, but it does not offer a systematic analysis in terms 
of jus post bellum. Finally, in 2012, Benson suggested how the development of 
emerging norms for economic reform in post conflict countries, discussing the 
Iraqui case, could be an expression of a rule of jus post bellum,93 though she 
does not assess the very application of the concept. As such, the Colombian 
 89 Iverson, Easterday, and Stahn, 553.
 90 Thürer and MacLaren, ‘ “Ius Post Bellum” in Iraq: A Challenge to the Applicability and 
Relevance of International Humanitarian Law?’
 91 Melissa Labonte, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Peacebuilding and Non- State Actors : Lessons from 
Afghanistan,’ in Ethics, Authority, and War : Non- State Actors and the Just War Tradition, 
ed. Eric Heinze and Brent Steele (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 205– 57.
 92 Cédric Ryngaert and Lauren Gould, ‘International Criminal Justice and Jus Post Bellum: The 
Challenge of ICC Complementarity: A Case- Study of the Situation in Uganda,’ Revue Belge 
de Droit International 44, no. 1– 2 (2011): 91– 124.
 93 Christina Benson, ‘Jus Post Bellum in Iraq: The Development of Emerging Norms for 
Economic Reform in Post Conflict Countries,’ Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business 












peace process represents a useful example with which to examine the con-
cept under a legal empirical perspective, given the relevance of this case as 
discussed previously.
Moreover, using a niac as a case study challenges the current theorization 
on jus post bellum, which has been focused on iac s. Since the end of World 
War ii, niac s have been more common than iac s, and the termination of 
niac s through peace processes has become more popular following the end 
of the Cold War.94 Between 1989 and 2008, only 7 of 124 active armed conflicts 
were interstate,95 and between 1990 and 2007, 646 documents of peace agree-
ments were produced addressing 102 conflicts, of which 91% were niac s.96 
In 2017, 43 peace negotiations were in place around the world, of which 34 
referred to niac s and only 9 to iac s.97 Therefore, while the concept contin-
ues to be more frequently associated with iac s, today we have more cases of 
transitions from niac s to peace from which to extract elements of jus post 
bellum.98
In addition to the above quantitative argument, substantive considerations 
increase the relevance of an analysis of jus post bellum with respect to niac s. 
Negotiating peace in iac s is relatively easier than in niac s. As highlighted 
by Kastner, “Whereas the main goal of state- to- state negotiations aiming to 
end traditional wars is to negotiate a truce and resolve an underlying easily 
identifiable problem, intrastate negotiations must address numerous issues 
and involve a wider range of actors, whose relationships are characterized by 
a higher degree of interdependence.”99 In niac s, the parties ought to address 
matters as complex and diverse as criminal accountability, reparations to vic-
tims, gender and minority issues, the building of civil trust and reconciliation, 
the reestablishment of the rule of law, and the guarantee of civil, political, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of jus 
post bellum in those contexts can provide further clarity on the contours and 
functions of the concept.
 94 Jonathan Tonge, Comparative Peace Processes (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 5– 6.
 95 Charles Kegley and Shannon Blanton, World Politics: Trend and Transformation 
(Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 377– 78.
 96 Bell, On the Law of Peace, 5.
 97 Escola de Cultura de Pau, Peace Talks in Focus 2018. Report on Trends and Scenarios 
(Barcelona: Icaria, 2018), 11– 12.
 98 Kristen Boon, ‘The Application of Jus Post Bellum in Non- International Armed Conflicts,’ 
in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer 
Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 259– 60.














5 Purpose of the Study
Summarizing the above- discussed elements, the study is conceived under 
three premises. First, international law has an increasingly greater role in tran-
sition from armed conflict to peace. Second, the Colombian transition is the 
most recent and comprehensive example of such a role. And third, extensive 
legal scholarship has proposed the concept of jus post bellum to designate the 
normative framework for transition from armed conflict to peace.
In this way, the study aims to answer what role international law plays in 
the transition from armed conflict to peace by using the Colombian transition 
as a case study, and to what extend this experience can be framed under the 
concept of jus post bellum. By addressing this question, the study explores new 
ways to understand the role of international law in transition to peace as well 
as the concrete content and functioning of jus post bellum as the concept fram-
ing such a role.
As examined in the previous sections, it is necessary to understand the role 
of international law in transition under an analytical framework,100 in order to 
seek some coherence around the disparate set of legal considerations applica-
ble to peacemaking and peacebuilding. Additionally, since jus post bellum is 
the framework proposed for said analysis, the current state of research on the 
concept reveals the need for further research, especially from an empirical per-
spective and from the point of view of niac s. For both reasons, as previously 
discussed, the Colombian case offers advantageous elements for the analysis.
The main argument of this book is that the Colombian transition has been 
shaped by different international legal norms, discourses, and practices and 
that the concept of jus post bellum frames such a normative framework. In that 
way, the study will sustain a definition of the concept as a normative frame-
work of principles guiding the contextualized interpretation and applica-
tion of international law— understood in a broad sense as including positive 
and customary norms, legal discourses, and legal practices— to transition to 
peace, showing how it works in practice, what principles and functions can 
be identified, and who are its actors. In that sense, the study will show how 
the theoretical development of the concept mostly matches with practice in 
Colombia, and that practice also challenges some of its components, providing 
new insights to keep developing the theory.
 100 As argued by Kastner, most analysis on the role of legal norms in the resolution of armed 
conflicts have been conducted “in a superficial manner and without grounding such an 






Four considerations should be offered to delineate the methodology of this 
study. First, even if transitions from armed conflict to peace have more politi-
cal features than legal ones, this book is focused on the legal elements shaping 
the political decisions. However, this does not mean that the policy aspects of 
peacemaking and peacebuilding will be neglected. They will be incorporated 
into the analysis of the context and implications of the legal formulas adopted 
in the case study and used to understand the rationale of the principles and 
functions of jus post bellum. Additionally, some aspects of the analysis, such as 
the socioeconomic and political components of transition, should be consid-
ered more so in terms of policy than from a legal perspective.
Second, the concept of jus post bellum is considered from the perspective 
of international law. Though the concept emerged within the just war theory 
and has been inspired by moral considerations on the justness of peace,101 this 
study will consider jus post bellum as referring to the legal norms, discourses, 
and practices governing the transition from armed conflict to peace. This does 
not mean that moral considerations will be excluded from the analysis; rather, 
the study will assume that those moral elements are already incorporated into 
or reflected by international law.
The third consideration concerns what this book understands by interna-
tional law. The study will follow a broad understanding of law encompassing 
not only positive norms but also principles, discourses, and practices with a 
legal dimension. This understanding includes, in addition to conventional and 
customary law, soft law documents such as guidelines and declarations, as 
well as jurisprudential rules and legal principles and discourses built through 
peacemaking and peacebuilding practice.
Fourthly, it is important to mention that while the main emphasis of the 
analysis of the case study is given to the 2016 Peace Agreement and its negotia-
tion process, other mechanisms of transition in Colombia since 2005 will also 
be considered.
With the above considerations in mind, the object of the study will be 
addressed using an inductive and a deductive methodological approach, as well 
as both primary and secondary sources. An inductive approach is necessary 
 101 Following the just war perspective, Larry May affirms that the normative character of 
jus post bellum derives from its moral nature. May, After War Ends. On this line, see also, 
among other authors, Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just- War Theorist’; 
Williams and Caldwell, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of Just Peace’; 





for the examination of the Colombian case in order to determine lessons that 
could bring new insights to the academic debate on the role of international 
law in the transition from armed conflict to peace. At the same time, a deduc-
tive approach will allow the assessment of existing theory on the relationship 
between international law and transition to peace through the framework of 
jus post bellum.
For the empirical analysis of the case study, the official documents related to 
the Colombian transitional process from armed conflict to peace will be con-
sidered, including the agenda of negotiations, rules of procedure, joint com-
muniqués, and the 2016 Peace Agreement. Also included are the constitutional 
and legal domestic framework to implement the Agreement, the legal instru-
ments on transitional justice and reparations existing before the recent peace 
process, and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, which has played 
a fundamental role in interpreting those norms under the Constitution and 
international law. In addition to these primary sources, other relevant interna-
tional instruments such as treaties, jurisprudence, soft law and UN documents 
will be used to identify the legal frameworks.
Finally, secondary sources will be used such as bibliography on the different 
topics of the book, in particular those regarding the concept of jus post bellum, 
as well as the literature on subjects such as socioeconomic and political transi-
tional reforms, criminal justice, reparations, inclusiveness, and the legal nature 
of peace agreements.
7 Structure of the Book
The book is divided into three chapters. The first chapter will explore the con-
ceptual ground of jus post bellum. It will analyze different approaches to a 
definition of the concept, highlighting the challenges to achieving a unified 
understanding of jus post bellum. The chapter will then explore the object 
of jus post bellum, which is generally described as helping to achieve a sus-
tainable peace. Here, the study will discuss what a sustainable peace would 
mean under a legal approach to jus post bellum. In relation to this subject, 
the chapter will explore the question of the principles of jus post bellum, as 
the substantive content of the concept. Finally, the chapter will examine sim-
ilar categories related to the legal framework of transition, discussing how 
the concepts of transitional justice and lex pacificatoria could compete with 
jus post bellum, to then argue that the third term is the most appropriate for 
designating a comprehensive normative framework for the transition from 
armed conflict to peace.
 
22 Introduction
The second chapter will assess how international law is reflected in the 
Colombian transition to peace. The chapter will first offer a general overview 
of the Colombian armed conflict and its transitional process to peace. It will 
then examine different components of transition in Colombia, identifying 
the applicable international legal framework and the way in which it shaped 
the formulas adopted in the country. The chapter will discuss how aspects 
such as the legal status of the peace agreement, socioeconomic and institu-
tional reforms, criminal justice for serious crimes committed during armed 
conflict, reparations, and the inclusive dimension of the peace process were 
significantly influenced by international legal standards. As such, the chapter 
will offer the empirical elements that will then be contrasted, in the third 
chapter, against the conceptual elements of jus post bellum discussed in the 
first chapter.
The third chapter is aimed at connecting the previous two, analyzing what 
elements can be drawn from the Colombian case toward developing a better 
understanding of the concept of jus post bellum. It will address the concep-
tual elements of jus post bellum presented in Chapter 1 and assess them from 
the perspective of the Colombian case examined in Chapter 2. The purpose of 
Chapter 3 is to assess how the Colombian transitional process exemplifies ele-
ments of jus post bellum in practice and to draw conclusions on the potential 
definition, content, operation, actors, and functions of the concept based on 
this case study. As such, this chapter gathers the core of analysis of the study 
and offers new practical insights for the theory of jus post bellum.
Finally, a general conclusion will be presented. It will summarize the three 
chapters of the study. Then, the conclusion will reflect on the main contribu-
tions of the Colombian case to understanding the role of international law in 
transition to peace and the concept of jus post bellum. Lastly, from the perspec-
tive of the empirical analysis conducted by the study, the conclusion will dis-
cuss the challenges and opportunities of bringing jus post bellum from theory 
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 chapter 1
Jus Post Bellum
A Normative Framework for the Transition from Armed Conflict to Peace
This chapter offers the conceptual basis for understanding jus post bellum as 
the normative framework for transition from armed conflict to peace. As pre-
sented in the Introduction, the origin and development of jus post bellum have 
taken place under a moral and a legal perspective.1 While within the just war 
theory the concept is built from the moral perspective of the justness of the 
cause and the termination of the conflict, under international law its purpose 
is to address legal obligations aimed at protecting people’s rights in transition 
to peace.2
This chapter— and the study in general— focuses its analysis on the legal 
dimension of jus post bellum. Though the concept is being discussed in legal schol-
arship for around 15 years,3 there is no agreement on its content and scope as a legal 
concept.4 The discussion has moved from maximalist to minimalist approaches,5 
including authors for whom it seems still premature to consider jus post bellum 
into law.6 In this context, Easterday, Iverson, and Stahn highlight that “there are 
almost as many conceptions of jus post bellum as scholars, within and across 
disciplines.”7
 1 See Introduction, Section 2.
 2 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 2008, 112.
 3 The first works on jus post bellum from a legal perspective were conducted by Thürer and 
MacLaren, ‘ “Ius Post Bellum” in Iraq: A Challenge to the Applicability and Relevance of 
International Humanitarian Law?’; Boon, ‘Legislative Reform in Post- Conflict Zones: Jus 
Post Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant’s Law- Making Powers’; Cohen, ‘The Role of 
International Law in Post- Conflict Constitution- Making: Toward a Jus Post Bellum for “Interim 
Occupations” ’; Stahn, ‘ “Jus Ad Bellum”, “jus in Bello” … “Jus Post Bellum”?— Rethinking the 
Conception of the Law of Armed Force’.
 4 Iverson, ‘The Function of Jus Post Bellum in International Law,’ 8.
 5 Lonneke Peperkamp, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Case of Minimalism versus Maximalism?,’ Ethical 
Perspectives 21, no. 2 (2014): 255– 88.
 6 Gregory Fox, ‘Navigating the Unilateral/ Multilateral Divide,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 229– 58.

















This uncertainty undermines the development of the concept, which can 
also be attributed to the lack of empirical assessment. The only way to move 
forward from the theoretical discussion is to assess the concept in practice. As 
such, this chapter presents the main conceptions of jus post bellum as a legal 
concept across existing literature, addressing the approaches to a definition of 
the concept, its principles, its objective, its relationship with similar concepts, 
and its application in the context of transition from niac s to peace— given 
the character of the case study. Then, the conceptual mapping provided by this 
chapter will be the reference for the empirical assessment of jus post bellum in 
the other two chapters of the study.
1 Approaches to a Definition
Jus post bellum is a polysemous concept.8 The definitions and characteriza-
tions around the concept are diverse. Easterday defines jus post bellum as a 
broad and holistic category that covers four spectrums: “as a body of law, as 
an interpretive framework, as a site of coordination, and as a site of discourse 
or dialogue.”9 For her, jus post bellum should be understood as referring to the 
rules, norms, and principles governing those spectrums in post- conflict with 
the goal of reaching sustainable peace.
In 2016, Stahn classified the existing definitions of jus post bellum under 
three approaches: 1) as a system of norms; 2) as an ordering system; and 3) as an 
interpretative framework.10 This classification is similar to the four spectrums 
identified by Easterday if one considers the second approach as including both 
the spectrums of a site of coordination and a site of discourse or dialogue pro-
posed by her. This section explores each of these approaches as follows.
1.1 A New Legal Regime
This approach is based on the alleged existence of a normative gap in the regu-
lation of transition from armed conflict to peace.11 Its proponents sustain that 
 8 Emmanuel Vianès, ‘Le Jus Post Bellum: Rupture Ou Continuité?,’ Études Internationales, 
2013, 622. Iverson, ‘The Function of Jus Post Bellum in International Law,’ 8.
 9 Jennifer Easterday, ‘Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum,’ in Jus Post 
Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and 
Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 379.
 10 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum and the Justice of Peace: Some Preliminary Reflections.’
 11 Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ 222; Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 2008, 
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such a gap ought to be fulfilled through new legal instruments. There is no dis-
cussion on accepting that jus post bellum does not exist as a defined branch of 
international law, as jus ad bellum and jus in bello do. However, the exponents 
of this approach sustain that jus post bellum should get such a status in inter-
national law. While most of them accept that this regime is based on existing 
norms of international law, all suggest that new norms should be created.
Orend is the main advocate of this approach. In 2000, at the very beginning 
of the contemporary discussion on jus post bellum, he argued the existence of 
a legal gap in the law of armed force.12 For him, this “situation requires rectifi-
cation, ideally through the establishment of international laws of war termina-
tion which are codified and effectively observed.”13 His idea was supported by 
DiMeglio, who considers that such a legal gap represents a risk that the “win-
ner’s justice can prevail,” which may be addressed through a new legal regula-
tion on the matter.14 Later, in 2007, Orend proposed that this regulation should 
be done through a new Geneva Convention on jus post bellum.15
In the same line, Österdahl and van Zandel affirm that “new international 
laws, codified and effectively observed, are necessary in order to tackle the 
problems created by this legal gap in the regulation of post- conflict conduct,”16 
and they suggest that it should be done “through the incorporation of all jus 
post bellum rules in a new Geneva Convention.”17 At this regard, Österdahl 
noted that “the current post- conflict practice would necessarily provide a lot 
of experience and normative ideas that would fuel the negotiations on any 
such comprehensive legal instrument.”18
This conception of jus post bellum is the most ambitious and contested one.19 
Most authors disagree, or doubt that such a codification could be possible.20 
 12 Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective.
 13 Orend, 222.
 14 DiMeglio, ‘The Evolution of the Just War Tradition : Defining Jus Post Bellum,’ 131– 32.
 15 Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just- War Theorist,’ 591.
 16 Österdahl and van Zadel, ‘What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New Wine and Old 
Bottles,’ 182.
 17 Österdahl and van Zadel, 207.
 18 Inger Österdahl, ‘Just War, Just Peace and the “Jus Post Bellum”,’ Nordic Journal of 
International Law 81, no. 3 (2012): 273.
 19 Easterday, Iverson, and Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations of Jus Post Bellum: An 
Introduction,’ 5– 6.
 20 Among other authors, see Frederik Naert, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law in Peace Operations as Parts of a Variable Ius Post Bellum,’ Revue Belge de 
Droit International 44, no. 1– 2 (2011): 26– 37; De Brabandere, ‘The Concept of Jus Post 
Bellum in International Law: A Normative Critique’; Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex 




















And, indeed, codifying jus post bellum into a new convention seems an unlikely 
task, for at least three reasons.
First, a codification of jus post bellum will involve the ordinary political and 
practical challenges of a treaty- making process or the formation of customary 
law.21 It does not seem a likely task in a matter that by its very nature requires 
flexibility and the permanent balance of political and legal considerations, 
where states want to keep their autonomy. Additionally, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding are processes full of ambiguities and contradictions, that by no 
means could be addressed through a “conclusive body of law, i.e., as a (vertical) 
lex specialis.”22 Peace is a political matter, and “the more law specifies peace 
settlement terms, the less the parties are able to negotiate.”23
Second, even if some authors argue the existence of a legal gap, such a gap 
should not be understood as a lack of legal regulation, but of a framework to 
coordinate and to apply existing rules in a contextualized way in transitional 
settings. Transition from armed conflict to peace involves a diversity of matters 
that are already governed by rules belonging to different branches of interna-
tional law.24 The application of any specific rule depends on each context, and 
it is not possible to regulate all of them by a singular branch of law.25 Different 
international norms play a role, even if they were not specifically designed to 
regulate transitions. Thus, the problem is not about lack of law, but how to coor-
dinate and interpret those norms properly in transitional processes.
And third, even if jus post bellum appeared as a systemic adaptation of 
the current divide of the law of armed force,26 it is not possible to conceive 
the concept in the same way as jus ad bellum and jus in bello. These last two 
regimes operate in a top- down logic, where external norms are applied with 
no substantial margin of decision by the parties. On the contrary, in jus post 
bellum the parties take and adapt external norms according to the circum-
stances of their context. If we think, for instance, about jus in bello in niac s, 
 21 De Brabandere, ‘The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in International Law: A Normative 
Critique,’ 136.
 22 Carsten Stahn, ‘The Future of Jus Post Bellum,’ in Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of 
Transition from Conflict to Peace, ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann Kleffner (The Hague: T.M.C. 
Asser Press, 2008), 234. See also Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Law After War,’ Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 8, no. 2 (2007): 241.
 23 Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria: What’s in a Name?,’ 200.
 24 Chetail, ‘Introduction’; Österdahl and van Zadel, ‘What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of 
New Wine and Old Bottles.’
 25 Vianès, ‘Le Jus Post Bellum: Rupture Ou Continuité?,’ 632.
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external imperative rules are required, since some parties in conflict— non- 
state actors— usually do not recognize internal rules and institutions. Thus, to 
ensure the protection of minimum humanitarian standards, an external top- 
down regulation should be imposed without internal margin of appreciation 
or derogation by the parties. For that reason, there is a single jus in bello for all 
kind of niac s, regardless of the causes or dynamics of the conflict. However, 
this is not the nature of jus post bellum. Even if some limits and standards are 
imposed by international law, they must be interpreted and applied in a way 
that allows the search of peace according to the conditions of the specific tran-
sitional context. In that way, jus post bellum involves a permanent bottom- up 
normative process, given by the way in which parties involved in transition 
apply and develop applicable international norms.
1.2 Ordering System of Norms, Practices, and Discourses
The second approach to a definition of jus post bellum recognizes that rather 
than new substantive law, an overarching framework for normative coordi-
nation and dialogue in transition is required. This framework should include 
norms to manage the interplay of applicable rules of international law from 
different legal branches and help to resolve eventual conflicts among them.27
Stahn points out that transition from conflict to peace “requires a multi- 
layered structure, which addresses the sequencing and simultaneous appli-
cation of different bodies of law (including peacetime law or domestic law, 
if needed).”28 This interaction of different branches and levels of law in the 
post- conflict scenario demands an overarching framework providing rules 
of coordination.29 Along this line, Easterday argues that jus post bellum “can 
provide the needed coherence and determinacy in the post- conflict legal 
landscape,”30 serving two functions. First, jus post bellum offers a site of 
coordination, which “provides a space for a common legal language for the 
process of transition from conflict to peace, and a unified mode of interpre-
tation for its different underlying legal frameworks when they are applied 
in post- conflict situations.”31 Second, jus post bellum creates a site of dis-
course and dialogue, which “provides a way to connect different discourses 
dealing with issues of peace and conflict, and can create synergies between 
 27 Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 18.
 28 Stahn, ‘The Future of Jus Post Bellum,’ 234.
 29 Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 18.
 30 Easterday, ‘Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum,’ 385.













disciplines such as international relations, legal anthropology, political sci-
ence, and peace and conflict studies.”32
Sari goes even further and describes jus post bellum “as a normative process 
which envisages the progressive evolution of the legal framework applicable 
to post- conflict situations over a period of time.”33 In this sense, the concept 
should offer elements to identify relevant rules and principles and help to bal-
ance them in a concrete context of transition. Similarly, Vatanparast considers 
jus post bellum as “a concept of mixed utility”, which offers a “conceptual space” 
to hold the debate on the “complexities of warfare and the evolving relation-
ships between law, war, and peace.”34
In a critic to this approach— and to jus post bellum in general— , 
De Brabandere sustains that this view has been justified arguing that jus post 
bellum helps “bringing the existing rules and obligations to the forefront of 
legal discussion and political decision making.”35 However, for him, such a con-
ception would mean that jus post bellum “simply brings together already exist-
ing obligations under a new name,”36 without any “added value from a purely 
legal perspective.”37
Based on the discussed elements, this approach offers important insights 
to understand jus post bellum in systemic terms. The disparate set of rules 
applying in transitional contexts requires some integration. Thus, if jus post 
bellum operates as an overarching system to group those norms and regulate 
their interplay, the concept would provide such an integration and coordi-
nation of norms. However, gathering the norms applicable to the transition 
from armed conflict to peace is a useful step, but it does not offer a legal 
function by itself. The next approach offers complementary elements in that 
direction.
 32 Easterday, 383– 84.
 33 Sari, ‘The Status of Foreign Armed Forces Deployed in Post- Conflict Environments: A 
Search for Basic Principles,’ 482– 83.
 34 Roxana Vatanparast, ‘Waging Peace: Ambiguities, Contradictions, and Problems of a Jus 
Post Bellum Legal Framework,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, 
ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 153.
 35 De Brabandere, ‘The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in International Law: A Normative 
Critique,’ 137.
 36 Eric De Brabandere, ‘The Responsibility for Post- Conflict Reforms: A Critical Assessment 
of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept,’ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 43, no. 1 
(2010): 122.
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1.3 Interpretative Framework
In 2009, Chetail pointed out how jus post bellum serves as a framework for the 
“contextualized interpretation” of existing norms applicable to the transition 
from armed conflict to peace.38 This interpretative approach to the concept 
was then developed by James Gallen,39 defining jus post bellum “as an interpre-
tive framework for international law through the various dimensions of com-
plexity that arise in transitions.”40 For him, “the distinctive value of jus post bel-
lum should be in recognizing that the various norms, regulations, and practices 
relevant to transitions are inter- dependent and mutually re- enforcing and as 
a result can be evaluated and interpreted in a unified fashion.”41 As such, he 
argues that this framework integrates three dimensions of complexity that 
must be addressed in transition: 1) the variety of legal obligations that apply in 
transitions; 2) the international legal status of actors involved in the process; 
and 3) the particularities of each transitional context.42
Although Gallen considers a suitable end the development of a codi-
fication on jus post bellum, he agrees that it would be difficult to achieve.43 
Nevertheless, he points out that “the absence of a conventional jus post bellum 
does not preclude the interpretation of existing international law and policy” 
under a unified framework.44
On this point, even if De Brabandere is skeptical about jus post bellum, he 
admits that this minimalistic approach to the concept as an interpretative 
framework is “theoretically is the most viable.”45 For him, under this perspec-
tive jus post bellum responds to the “need to interpret uniformly the various 
norms, rules, and practices applicable in post- conflict reconstruction,” and 
 38 Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 18.
 39 James Gallen, ‘Jus Post Bellum: An Interpretive Framework,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 58– 79.
 40 Gallen, 59.
 41 Gallen, 59.
 42 Gallen, 61– 65.
 43 In a later article, he admits that in the future jus post bellum could lead to a codification 
into a Geneva Convention or in policy documents. In his words, “jus post bellum may even-
tually lead to concrete changes in existing public international law and find expression in 
a future Geneva Convention or in the policy documents of international organisations. At 
present it may effectively operate as an interpretation of the laws, actors, issues and fields 
relevant to the achievement of a just and sustainable peace after conflict.” James Gallen, 
‘Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum,’ Journal of World Investment & Trade 16, no. 4 (2015): 670.
 44 Gallen, ‘Jus Post Bellum: An Interpretive Framework,’ 69.




















thus it should be seen “as a normative set of principles rather than substantive 
rules.”46 As such, he suggests the identification of existing principles of inter-
national law relevant to transition for interpreting applicable “rules in function 
of the identified overarching principles.”47
Similarly, although Bell has proposed the concept of lex pacificatoria as an 
alternative to jus post bellum,48 her approach is close to the notion of an inter-
pretative framework. She says that the emerging lex is the result of the evolu-
tion of legal understandings on how international law should be applied to 
peace processes and agreements. As such, rather than “regulate negotiations 
outcomes,” this lex sets out normative parameters that offer the elements to 
reach agreements combining the specific needs of justice and peace.49 In her 
words, “this new lex does not operate as a clear new legal regime establishing a 
set of legal obligations but rather as a set of programmatic standards that pro-
vides guidance and, at times, goes further in creating a normative expectation 
as to how the dilemmas of peace settlements can be resolved concomitantly 
with the requirements of international law.”50
This approach is the most accurate in terms of identifying the legal func-
tion of jus post bellum. It does not call for new norms but for a framework 
to interpret the existing norms of international law in a consistent and 
contextualized way in transitional settings.51 This interpretative function is 
required to resolve conflicts between a general legal norm, on the one hand, 
and the specific conditions of post- conflict contexts in which such a norm 
should be applied, on the other. However, this approach takes elements from 
the previous one, since the interpretative function played by jus post bellum 
implies an ordering system or a space of dialogue to combine legal and prac-
tical considerations to achieve the adequate formula for a particular context 
of transition.
As such, combining elements from the last two approaches, an integrative 
definition becomes possible. Jus post bellum can be seen, then, as a normative 
framework ordering norms, discourses, and practices to allow the contextual-
ized interpretation and application of relevant international law to the tran-
sition from armed conflict to sustainable peace. With this idea on mind, the 
study will continue exploring elements from theory and practice in the first 
 46 De Brabandere, 124.
 47 De Brabandere, 137.
 48 Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria: What’s in a Name?,’ 192.
 49 Bell, 205.
 50 Bell, 192.













Jus Post Bellum 31
two chapters, and then it will develop its own approach to the definition and 
content of jus post bellum in Chapter 3 from the perspective of the case study.
2 Principles of Jus Post Bellum
Regardless of their approach to a definition, most authors have proposed dif-
ferent series of principles of jus post bellum. While just war theorists have sug-
gested moral principles informing the conditions to reach a just peace, in legal 
scholarship principles have been proposed with various purposes. Authors 
claiming for the codification of jus post bellum through a new conventional 
instrument suggest principles to develop such a body of law. Authors under-
standing jus post bellum as an ordering framework propose overarching princi-
ples to organize the disparate set of norms applicable to transitional contexts. 
And authors approaching jus post bellum as an interpretative framework argue 
that principles are the tool for interpreting international law in a contextual-
ized way in transitional settings.
For Stahn, the configuration of a jus post bellum framework would allow 
to identify “specific legal principles which serve as guidance in making 
legal policy choices in situations of transitions.”52 To this effect, in one of 
his first works on the topic, he proposed six principles of jus post bellum: 
1) Fairness and inclusiveness of peace settlements; 2) Demise of the concept 
of punishment for aggression; 3) Humanization of reparations and sanc-
tions; 4) Moving from collective to individual responsibility for wrongs com-
mitted during conflict; 5) Combining justice and reconciliation models; and 
6) Fostering people- centered governance.53 Similarly, Orend suggests as jus 
post bellum principles: 1) Rights vindication; 2) Proportionality and public-
ity, 3) Discrimination between leader, soldiers and civilians, 4) Punishment, 
5) Compensation, and 6) Rehabilitation.54
In the context of post- occupation situations, where the concept of jus post 
bellum started its contemporary development, principles related to occupiers’ 
 52 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 2008, 101– 2.
 53 Stahn, ‘ “Jus Ad Bellum”, “jus in Bello” … “Jus Post Bellum”?— Rethinking the Conception of 
the Law of Armed Force,’ 938– 41.
 54 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective,’ in Jus Post Bellum. Towards 
a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace, ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann Kleffner (The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 37– 42. In a previous work, Orend suggested five princi-
ples of jus post bellum: 1) Just cause for termination; 2) Right intention; 3) Public declara-











duties have been proposed. Boon suggests three principles: trusteeship, account-
ability, and proportionality.55 And later, Coady proposed other three: rebuilding 
and reconstruction, punishment and reparations, and the role of occupiers, 
peacemakers and peacekeepers.56
Gallen and De Brabandere, who define jus post bellum as an interpretative 
framework, also suggest their principles. For Gallen, jus post bellum should be 
based on three principles: accountability (individual criminal responsibility 
and state responsibility), stewardship (respect of local ownership), and pro-
portionality.57 In a similar formulation, De Brabandere coincides with those 
principles, that he describes as proportionality, accountability of foreign actors 
(he is focused on post- occupation), and the principle that post- conflict recon-
struction should be for the benefit of the population.58
Just as there is no agreed definition, there is no agreement in terms of jus 
post bellum principles. The above- mentioned principles have been formu-
lated in general ways, in works aimed at discussing conceptual aspects of jus 
post bellum. There is no a systematic analysis on these principles, and each 
author suggests new ones without discussing principles formulated previously. 
Additionally— as common with other aspects of the existing legal scholarship 
on jus post bellum— the principles which have been proposed are mainly 
addressed to iac s. This situation does not correspond to the fact that niac s 
are currently more common than iac s nor to the need to provide greater con-
sistency to the concept of jus post bellum.
In his 2012 book After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective, May developed 
a systematic scheme of six principles of jus post bellum: rebuilding, retribution, 
restitution, reparation, reconciliation, and proportionality.59 These principles 
integrate some of the principles proposed by other authors, and his proposal 
has received significant endorsement by other scholars.60
 55 Boon, ‘Legislative Reform in Post- Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary 
Occupant’s Law- Making Powers’.
 56 Cecil Anthony Coady, ‘The Jus Post Bellum,’ in New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics 
in the Contemporary World, ed. Jessica Wolfendale and Paolo Tripodi (London: Ashgate 
Press, 2011), 49– 66.
 57 Gallen, ‘Jus Post Bellum: An Interpretive Framework’.
 58 De Brabandere, ‘The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in International Law: A Normative 
Critique,’ 137– 38.
 59 May, After War Ends.
 60 Among the authors referring May’s principles as a base to develop jus post bellum, 
see: Easterday, Iverson, and Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations of Jus Post 
Bellum: An Introduction’; Matthew Saul, ‘Creating Popular Governments in Post- Conflicts 
Situations: The Role of International Law,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative 
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For May, these normative principles are the constituent substance of jus 
post bellum. However, since his proposal was conceived under the perspective 
of the just war theory, he considers that the normative character of these prin-
ciples derives not from law but from moral. In his words,
Jus post bellum principles are primarily moral principles that are meant 
to inform decisions about how international law is best to be established 
down the road. Here it is important to note that on this construal, jus 
post bellum principles are not legal principles themselves. Jus post bellum 
principles are normative in that they are moral norms and they tell us 
what should become law. But until there is some lawmaking act, such as 
an international convention (a multilateral treaty), what I will identify 
as jus post bellum principles are primarily moral norms that have strong 
force in our thinking about what norms should be enacted into interna-
tional law. […] In setting out a group of jus post bellum principles I am 
making a plea for them to become instituted, but my arguments in favor 
of having them become legal norms should not be confused with think-
ing that they already have legal status, which they do not.61
Sustaining this idea, in a later article May argues that the proposed set of jus 
post bellum principles is comparable to the content and scope of the Martens 
Clause to The Hague Convention (ii).62 As such, he states that even if jus post 
bellum principles are not yet enshrined in legal instruments, they are the 
embodiment of moral obligations written in the human conscience that dic-
tates the way to proceed in post- conflict settings. In consequence, for him, jus 
University Press, 2014), 447– 66; Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Dina Haynes, ‘The Compatibility 
of Justice for Women with Jus Post Bellum Analysis,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 161– 77; Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum and the Justice 
of Peace: Some Preliminary Reflections’. Iverson, ‘The Function of Jus Post Bellum in 
International Law,’ 8.
 61 May, After War Ends, 5.
 62 May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, and Meionexia,’ 24. On this point, the Martens Clause is for-
mulated in the following terms: “Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, 
the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, population and belligerents remain under the protection 
and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages estab-
lished between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the 
public conscience”. Preamble, Hague Convention (ii) Respecting the Laws and Customs 






post bellum is “a regime of international law that is not strictly speaking lex lata 
but is also more than mere lex ferenda.”63
In the 2014 publication of the Jus Post Bellum Project, its editors acknowledge 
that May’s principles constitute a solid basis for jus post bellum. Nonetheless, 
they point out that “the question remains: (how) are those moral norms 
reflected in international law?”64
Regarding this matter, May’s principles are certainly useful and they offer a 
strong basis to reach a unified approach to the content and scope of jus post 
bellum.65 However, contrary to May’s view on the exclusive moral nature of 
these principles, they already have a basis in international law.66 To this effect, 
through Chapters 2 and 3 the study will explore the legal foundation of the 
principles of jus post bellum in contexts of niac s, and their role in coordinat-
ing, interpreting, and applying international legal obligations in the Colombian 
transition from armed conflict to peace.67 Along this line, Saul argues that we 
need to explore in practice the legal components of jus post bellum following 
May’s principles, to give them “a more concrete form without completely loos-
ing” their inherent flexibility.68
 63 May, 23. Supporting the idea of jus post bellum as being moral, but not having a legal basis, 
see also: Antonia Chayes, ‘Chapter VII½: Is Jus Post Bellum Possible?,’ European Journal of 
International Law 24, no. 1 (2013): 293.
 64 Easterday, Iverson, and Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations of Jus Post Bellum: An 
Introduction,’ 1.
 65 At this point, it is important to clarify that even if this study addresses jus post bellum 
form a legal perspective, as stated before, it does not exclude the reference to elements 
proposed under the just war theory, as they are expressed in international law. In this line, 
Stahn evokes that is “wrong to construe a ‘moral’ and a ‘legal’ jus post bellum in isolation 
from each other. There are important and justified differences between the two. But none 
of them is completely detached from the other”. Stahn, ‘The Future of Jus Post Bellum,’ 232.
 66 In the case of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, their legal principles and rules were originally 
conceived as moral duties, which were later translated into positive and customary legal 
obligations. So, even if the nature of jus post bellum is different, its development was also 
initially grounded in a moral perspective. But, as sustained by Evans, moral principles 
look to “animate the body of law that constitutes ‘legal’ jus post bellum”, Mark Evans, ‘At 
War’s End: Time to Turn to Jus Post Bellum?,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative 
Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 26.
 67 Chapter 2 will offer the legal framework on the main components of the Colombian 
peace agreement. Then, Chapter 3, Section 3, will address the principles of jus post bellum 
as they are viewed in the Colombian transition. However, the legal foundation of those 
principles is referred mainly in Chapter 2.
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Different views support this argument on the legal foundation of jus post bel-
lum principles. Jus post bellum is based on existing principles and rules of interna-
tional law, which are inspired on a liberal view of law centered in the protection 
of the individual and his fundamental rights.69 On this point, Österdahl affirms 
that jus post bellum “could gradually lead to new organizing principles” around 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.70 Similarly, authors as Walzer71 and 
Williams and Caldwell72 coincide sustaining that human rights are the founda-
tion of jus post bellum principles. Even May affirms that these principles are aimed 
at building a just peace, which for him means that “human rights are protected.”73
Considering this background, this study sustains that principles express the 
substantive content of jus post bellum. As such, Chapter 3 will analyze each of 
the principles proposed by May, along with some other principles proposed by 
other authors, assessing how they are reflected in the Colombian case, accord-
ing to the practice analyzed in Chapter 2.74
3 Temporal and Functional Approach to Jus Post Bellum
The very use of the concept of jus post bellum is problematic to refer a mat-
ter that is transitional by nature. Scholars agree that notwithstanding jus post 
bellum is intended to apply to the post- conflict phase, it is not clear how to 
determine when does it occur.75 At this regard, Kennedy considers the term 
 69 For a literature review on the liberal dimension of peacebuilding, see Chetail and 
Jütersonke, ‘Peacebuilding: A Review of the Academic Literature,’ 5– 7. Chetail specifically 
relates this liberal view to the legal foundation of jus post bellum, since he defines jus post 
bellum as the normative framework of peacebuilding: Chetail, ‘Introduction.’
 70 Inger Österdahl, ‘The Gentle Modernizer of the Law of Armed Conflict,’ in Jus Post 
Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and 
Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 209.
 71 Michael Walzer, ‘The Aftermath of War. Reflections on Jus Post Bellum,’ in Ethics Beyond 
War’s End, ed. Eric Patterson (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 43.
 72 Williams and Caldwell, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of Just 
Peace,’ 309.
 73 May, After War Ends, 86. On this line, he asserts that jus post bellum principles look to 
guarantee the human rights of the people affected by the conflict, “as well as the human 
rights of the people of the world.” May, 22.
 74 As previously mentioned, in Chapter 2 the study will offer the legal framework on the 
main components of the Colombian Peace Agreement, which will then be addressed in 
Chapter 3, Section 3, identifying principles of jus post bellum in the Colombian transition.
 75 Vatanparast, ‘Waging Peace: Ambiguities, Contradictions, and Problems of a Jus Post 
Bellum Legal Framework,’ 146; Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 


















post- conflict inadequate, since the process of transition is a series of conti-
nuities where is not possible to determine the end of war or the beginning of 
peace.76
The transition from conflict to peace is a process with no clear starting and 
ending points.77 This problem is common in all jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus 
post bellum,78 since the before, the during, and the after of armed confrontation 
are usually complex and no linear periods. But, the very name of jus post bellum 
implies a temporary dimension. On this point, Stahn admits that “the ‘post’ in 
this equation is a fragile concept.”79
The application of jus post bellum does not depend on the end of the con-
flict or the cessation of the application of jus in bello. Determining the end 
of armed conflicts is a complicated matter under ihl. Article Common 3 and 
Protocol Additional ii do not say anything on this matter, and the main cri-
teria to determine the end of the conflict are: 1) the decreasing intensity of 
the confrontation,80 or, 2) a peace settlement establishing the end of hostili-
ties.81 However, the end of a niac does not imply the automatic cessation of 
the application of humanitarian provisions. Some matters keep being regu-
lated by humanitarian norms when their effects last longer than the end of 
the conflict— such as questions of landmines, displaced persons, or missing 
‘Ending the War Right: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War Tradition,’ Journal of Military 
Ethics 8, no. 1 (2009): 75; Österdahl and van Zadel, ‘What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? 
Of New Wine and Old Bottles,’ 175– 76; Stahn, ‘ “Jus Ad Bellum”, “jus in Bello” … “Jus Post 
Bellum”?— Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force,’ 923.
 76 David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 113– 14.
 77 Jan Kleffner, ‘Towards a Functional Conceptualization of Temporal Scope of Jus Post 
Bellum,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, 
Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 288– 89.
 78 Martin Wählisch, ‘Conflict Termination from a Human Rights Perspective: State 
Transitions, Power- Sharing, and the Definition of the “Post”,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 317.
 79 Stahn, ‘The Future of Jus Post Bellum,’ 233.
 80 For Bartels, “if a niac only starts when organized armed groups are engaged in fighting 
of a certain degree of intensity, then, logically, the armed conflict ends when these two 
criteria are no longer present.” Rogier Bartels, ‘From Jus in Bello to Jus Post Bellum: When 
Do Non- International Armed Conflicts End?,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative 
Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 303.
 81 Gabriella Venturini, ‘The Temporal Scope of Application of the Conventions,’ in The 1949 
Geneva Conventions, ed. Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta, and Marco Sassoli (Oxford: Oxford 
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people.82 As such, Bartels sustains that it is not necessary to wait until jus in 
bello ceases to apply to start applying jus post bellum, and thus both regimes 
could apply simultaneously.83
A more complicated question concerns to the determination of the end of 
applicability. If jus post bellum is a law of transition from armed conflict to 
peace, it could be said that it ceases to apply when there is peace.84 Regarding 
this matter, Kleffner considers that if the purpose of jus post bellum is to estab-
lish sustainable peace, jus post bellum would cease to apply when conflict has 
been addressed to a point in which there is no risk to come back to violence.85 
He says that there are some components of jus post bellum for which it would 
be possible to identify an end, such as criminal proceedings, reparations to vic-
tims, and disarmament and demobilization. Nevertheless, all those processes 
do not happen at the same time.86 The question would be even more difficult 
regarding matters of positive peace.
As such, Kleffner proposes a functional approach to determine the temporal 
scope of jus post bellum, which he sees as a body of law. Since this regime applies 
to transitional environments, “its applicability ratione temporis is equally transi-
tional.”87 Thus, the temporal scope should be regarded in a flexible way, because 
even if some components have a clear end, others last over the time.
Indeed, transitional periods are fluids, and therefore it is difficult— if not 
impossible— to establish a temporal scope.88 On this point, Wählisch argues 
that the “continuum of practical and legal dynamics […] set the ‘post’ into a 
relative state.”89 However, he suggests some criteria to determine the end of 
jus post bellum application through the reestablishment of human rights guar-
antees: completed elections, constitutional amendments, compliance with 
human rights conventional obligations, return of internally displaced per-
sons, etc.90
 82 Venturini, 61; icrc, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2nd edition, 2016, 
para. 850.
 83 Bartels, ‘From Jus in Bello to Jus Post Bellum: When Do Non- International Armed Conflicts 
End?,’ 314.
 84 Kleffner, ‘Towards a Functional Conceptualization of Temporal Scope of Jus Post 
Bellum,’ 293.
 85 Kleffner, 293– 94.
 86 Kleffner, 294– 95.
 87 Kleffner, 295.
 88 Wählisch, ‘Conflict Termination from a Human Rights Perspective: State Transitions, 
Power- Sharing, and the Definition of the “Post”,’ 316.
 89 Wählisch, 318.




















Similarly, other authors consider the question of the temporal scope of jus 
post bellum from a functional angle. Iverson emphasizes that what matters 
“from a jus post bellum perspective is not whether a status of post bellum has 
technically been achieved but rather whether legal norms are being applied 
with post bellum as the goal.”91 Along these lines, May sustains:
We should be flexible on how we regard the ‘post’, mainly in contexts 
where there is not a formal ending of war. […] Jus post bellum refers to 
any principles that govern the mopping up efforts, namely the efforts at 
the end and after the end of war that lead into a position of peace. In this 
way, we don’t have to decide precisely when war ends but only when the 
practices of mopping up begin. It is conceivable that mopping up efforts 
occur even while it is pretty clear that war is still waging, although often 
this will be a very dangerous thing to do.92
The overall discussion on a temporal or a functional approach in the applica-
tion of jus post bellum is closely connected to the meaning given to the concept. 
The question of the temporal scope is particularly relevant under the approach 
to jus post bellum as an independent legal regime. However, if one sees jus post 
bellum under other approaches, the focus shifts to a functional rather than a 
temporal application. In jus post bellum as an ordering system or as an interpre-
tative framework, there is no need to discuss a temporal applicability. Under 
these approaches, jus post bellum plays a role guiding the application of norms 
in the process of transition from armed conflict to peace, but it does not consti-
tute a corpus of norms applicable by itself.
In this way, rather than a legal order with specific ratione temporis applica-
tion, jus post bellum is a framework offering a space to coordinate and apply 
relevant norms to the process of transition from armed conflict to peace. This 
vision conveys a functional and teleological perspective. It means that, instead 
of a temporal frame of application, jus post bellum involves the function and 
the goal of applying law to end armed conflict and build sustainable peace.
On this point, it is relevant the above- quoted May’s idea, arguing that “jus 
post bellum refers to any principles that govern the mopping up efforts […] 
that lead into a position of peace.”93 Therefore, there is no need to determine 
 91 Iverson, Jens, ‘Transitional Justice, Jus Post Bellum and International Criminal Law: 
Differentiating the Usages, History and Dynamics,’ The International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 7 (2013): 426.
 92 May, After War Ends, 3.
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“when war ends but only when the practices of mopping up begin.”94 As such, 
the principles of jus post bellum embody a set of legal standards, practices, 
and discourses guiding the application of law in transitional processes, which 
could occur during the ongoing conflict, through a peace process, or during 
the implementation of a peace agreement. This question is particularly visi-
ble in the Colombian case, where several elements of jus post bellum can be 
identified in the legal regulation of matters like reparation and criminal justice 
during the conflict.95 Similarly, the framework of jus post bellum guided the 
recent peace process in Colombia and its 2016 Peace Agreement even if armed 
conflict continues in the country, since, at least, one rebel group remains in 
hostilities.96
In consequence, there is no need to establish a beginning or an end in the 
application of jus post bellum. This question is rooted in the function played 
by jus post bellum rather than in a temporal sequence.97 As such, the concept 
covers the normative framework guiding the transition from armed conflict 
towards sustainable peace, regardless of the existence of a peace process or the 
effective end of the conflict.
4 The Object of Jus Post Bellum
Determining the goal pursued by jus post bellum is an essential task to develop 
its functional approach. As delineated in the previous sections, regardless of 
the approach to a definition, the concept has been conceived as a norma-
tive framework to guide societies emerging from armed conflict to reach a 
solid peace.
Under the just war theory, the concept is linked to the justness of peace and, 
thus, interconnected and interdependent to jus ad bellum and jus in bello.98 
 94 May, 3.
 95 Different legal transitional instruments in Colombia can be seen as having a jus post bel-
lum approach, even if they were adopted during the ongoing armed conflict, and with no 
peace agreement in mind. See: Congreso de la República de Colombia, Ley 975 (Ley de 
Justicia y Paz), 2005; Congreso de la República de Colombia, Ley 1448 (Ley de Víctimas 
y Restitución de Tierras); Congreso de la República de Colombia, ‘Acto Legislativo 01 de 
2012 (Marco Jurídico Para La Paz)’ (2012).
 96 Despite the broad scope of the 2016 Peace Agreement, another guerrilla goup (the eln) 
remains in hostilities in the country. Chapter 2, Section 0, will offer an overview of the 
Colombian armed conflict.
 97 Iverson, ‘The Function of Jus Post Bellum in International Law,’ 13.















For Orend, one must consider the justice of the resort to war, the justice in the 
conduct of war, and the justice after war.99 In the same way, May suggests that 
“nearly everyone to have written on the subject of war would agree that the 
object of a just war is the achievement of a just and lasting peace.”100 Similarly, 
Walzer sustains that jus post bellum implies to have a look at the justice of war’s 
goals,101 and Lucas even affirms that jus post bellum “includes the demand for a 
right intention to both fight and conclude wars with justice.”102 Lastly, Labonte 
states that for a just war theorist jus post bellum matters because “how war 
ends— including the substantive terms of a negotiated peace agreement— can 
be a key factor in determining its justness.”103
However, such an approach to the objective of jus post bellum is problem-
atic from a legal point of view. The notion of the justness of peace is rooted in 
the moral tradition of the just war theory, and it would be difficult to apply it 
in a legal perspective. Additionally, international law has understood jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum as independent legal frameworks.104 
Contrary to the just war theory’s conception on the linear justness of the three 
regimes, international law sustains that each regime is independent, and must 
be observed regardless of the others. It means that the breach of one of them 
does not imply that the others are consequently broken too.
On this perspective, Vatanparast affirms that “jus post bellum is thought 
to provide a legal framework that can address the underlying causes of con-
flict to prevent relapse into hostilities.”105 Thus, the object of jus post bellum 
goes beyond the end of hostilities and looks at creating long- term peace. As 
such, she sustains that the concept’s goal is “to eliminating the root causes 
of conflict and creating a lasting peace.”106 Stahn shares a similar view, 
arguing that a “modern jus post bellum would be focused on the sustainabil-
ity of peace, rather than on simply brokering an end to violence.”107 This 
 99 Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ 118.
 100 May, After War Ends, 10.
 101 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations.
 102 George Lucas, ‘Jus Ante and Post Bellum. Completing the Circle, Breaking the Circle,’ in 
Ethics Beyond War’s End, ed. Eric Patterson (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 
2012), 60.
 103 Labonte, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Peacebuilding and Non- State Actors : Lessons from Afghanistan,’ 
208.
 104 Stahn, ‘ “Jus Ad Bellum”, “jus in Bello” … “Jus Post Bellum”?— Rethinking the Conception of 
the Law of Armed Force,’ 925.
 105 Vatanparast, ‘Waging Peace: Ambiguities, Contradictions, and Problems of a Jus Post 
Bellum Legal Framework,’ 144.
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perspective is reaffirmed in the 2017 Jus Post Bellum Project’s volume, where 
its editors state that “the concept is inherently liked to the idea of sustain-
able peace.”108
Österdahl affirms that “the purpose of jus post bellum is to achieve a just 
and stable peace based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”109 
Even though she uses the notion of just peace, she grounds her view on legal 
elements. In another article authored by her and by van Zadel, they expose this 
viewpoint in further detail. For them,
The aim of the rules of jus post bellum is to achieve a durable peace by 
helping the state return to its sovereign pre- conflict situation, if such was 
a desirable one measured by standards of international law, or by help-
ing the state achieve an improved version of its pre- conflict situation. 
Ideally, the state should achieve a higher level of human rights protec-
tion, accountability and good governance in the post- conflict phase than 
in the period before the conflict.110
According to the above- discussed elements, one can conclude that the final 
goal of jus post bellum is not simply about ending conflict but about estab-
lishing a qualified and sustainable peace.111 On this matter, the UN General 
Assembly has noted that:
‘Peace’ is understood as meaning sustainable peace.
While the cessation of hostilities, restoration of public security and meet-
ing basic needs are urgent and legitimate expectations of people who 
have been traumatized by armed conflict, sustainable peace requires a 
long- term approach that addresses the structural causes of conflict, and 
promotes sustainable development, rule of law and governance, and 
 108 Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson, and Jennifer Easterday, ‘Introduction: Protection of the 
Environment and Jus Post Bellum: Some Preliminary Reflections,’ in Environmental 
Protection and Transitions from Conflict to Peace: Clarifying Norms, Principles, and Practices, 
ed. Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson, and Jennifer Easterday (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), 7.
 109 Österdahl, ‘The Gentle Modernizer of the Law of Armed Conflict,’ 208.
 110 Österdahl and van Zadel, ‘What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New Wine and Old 
Bottles,’ 179.
 111 Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 18; Iverson, Easterday, and Stahn, ‘Epilogue: Jus Post Bellum— 
Strategic Analysis and Future Directions,’ 548; Boon, ‘The Application of Jus Post Bellum 










respect for human rights, making the recurrence of violent conflict less 
likely.112
In the same view, referring to his guidelines to UN peace envoys, the UN 
Secretary- General noted that his envoys “can assist in brokering agreements in 
conformity with law and in a manner which may provide the basis for lasting 
peace.”113 It involves Galtung’s idea of reaching not only negative but also posi-
tive peace.114 In other words, in this context peace “means long- term peace.”115
In conclusion, the object of jus post bellum must be understood in terms 
of offering a normative framework for societies in transition to establishing a 
sustainable peace, which requires, at least, two conditions. First, addressing 
the root causes of the conflict, which is the only way to promote reconciliation 
and prevent recurrence to violence. Second, observing relevant standards of 
international law, which are essential to ensure the rule of law, human rights, 
governance, and international legitimacy.116
Both conditions can be appreciated in the Colombian transition. A compre-
hensive peace process was conceived for both addressing the root causes of 
the armed conflict and dealing with its consequences in terms of justice, truth, 
and reparation under an international legal framework. Chapter 2 will analyze 
how the root causes and the consequences of armed conflict were addressed 
in Colombia, integrating legal, political, and practical considerations. Then, 
Chapter 3 will discuss how the Colombian experience offers empirical ele-
ments to delineate the object of jus post bellum as presented in this section.
5 Jus Post Bellum and Related Concepts
In addition to the critics around its definition and scope, jus post bellum is 
challenged by the existence of other concepts related to the transition from 
armed conflict to peace. There are several notions associated to transitional 
 112 UN General Assembly, ‘Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice,’ Pub. L. No. A/ 62/ 
885 (2008), ii.1.
 113 United Nations, “press Release: Secretary- General Comments on Guidelines Issued to 
Envoys,” UN Doc. sg/ sm/ 7257 (10 December 1999).
 114 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,’ Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 
(1969): 167– 91.
 115 Chetail and Jütersonke, ‘Peacebuilding: A Review of the Academic Literature,’ 1.
 116 On this question, Kastner sustains that “respecting legal obligations confers legitimacy 
and increases the effectiveness of peace negotiations and eventually of a peace agree-
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processes, though not all of them address the legal dimension of transition. 
For example, peacemaking and peacebuilding define the process of resolving 
armed conflicts and building sustainable peace, and even if such processes 
have received increasing legal regulation they are not legal notions as such.117 
Therefore, this section will only analyze two concepts that, like jus post bel-
lum, have been understood as defining the legal framework of transition to 
peace. One is the concept of transitional justice, which has been extensively 
developed in theory and practice. The other one is lex pacificatoria, proposed 
by Bell118 as an alternative concept to jus post bellum. This section will explore 
both concepts and their similarities and differences with jus post bellum, argu-
ing why this last concept is preferable to the others for the purpose of naming 
the normative framework for the transition from armed conflict to peace.
5.1 Transitional Justice
The concept of transitional justice is rooted in political transitions from author-
itarian regimes to democracy in Southern Europe in the 1970s, Latin America 
in the 1980s, and South Africa and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.119 For Teitel, one of the most authoritative authors on transitional jus-
tice, it “can be defined as the conception of justice associated with periods 
of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdo-
ings of repressive predecessor regimes.”120 Developing this concept, the 2004 
Report of the UN Secretary- General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 
in Conflict and Post- Conflict Societies defines transitional justice as:
[…] the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a soci-
ety’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large- scale past abuses, in 
order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. 
These may include both judicial and non- judicial mechanisms, with dif-
fering levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual 
 117 Chetail, for example, defines jus post bellum as the law of peacebuilding, which implies 
that peacebuilding embodies the practice of building peace, and jus post bellum desig-
nates the norms applicable to such a process. See Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 17.
 118 Bell, On the Law of Peace.
 119 Mark Freeman and Drazan Djukic, ‘Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice,’ in Jus Post 
Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace, ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann 
Kleffner (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 213– 14; Iverson, Jens, ‘Transitional Justice, 
Jus Post Bellum and International Criminal Law: Differentiating the Usages, History and 
Dynamics,’ 415.











prosecutions, reparations, truth- seeking, institutional reform, vetting 
and dismissals, or a combination thereof.121
Both definitions are related to the measures adopted by a society for dealing 
with past abuses, which can occur both in contexts of armed conflict or repres-
sive political regimes. As such, transitional justice is a special form of justice for 
contexts of transition, ensuring individual criminal responsibility, reparations, 
truth, and institutional reforms, with a view to prosecute those responsible for 
abuses, offer a redress to victims, and prevent new abuses to occur. This view 
is shared with jus post bellum. However, even though both concepts relate to 
transitional contexts and have some common purposes, they are substantially 
different for at least three reasons.
First, the simplest difference between both concepts is that while transi-
tional justice refers to both contexts of transition from dictatorship to democ-
racy and from armed conflict to peace,122 jus post bellum only applies to the 
last scenario. Here, we have that transitional justice emerges as a concept 
during the transitions from dictatorship to democracy from the 1970s,123 
whereas “the post- Cold War questions of transformative occupation, peace-
building, and international territorial administration set the frame for jus post 
bellum.”124
Second, as showed in the definition above, transitional justice is focused on 
how a society deals with past human rights violations. In turn, jus post bellum 
is a broader concept and refers to the general transition from conflict to peace, 
going beyond human rights abuses. As Iverson states,
 121 UN Secretary- General, ‘Report of the Secretary- General on the Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post- Conflict Societies,’ para. 8.
 122 On this point, Porter highlights that the academic study of transitional justice began with 
the transitions from dictatorship to democracy in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, East Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Poland, Spain, Uruguay, and South Africa. Its reference to contexts of 
armed conflict takes place in drc, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Timor- Leste, and Uganda. 
Elisabeth Porter, Connecting Peace, Justice and Reconciliation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2015), 10.
 123 Teitel points out that the origins of transitional justice can be traced to wwi, but it becomes 
an international issue since the Allied- run Nuremberg trials in 1945. Then, it was in the last 
decades of the 20th century that transitional justice took its contemporary form. See Ruti 
G. Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 49– 56.
 124 Jens Iverson, ‘Contrasting the Normative and Historical Foundations of Transitional 
Justice and Jus Post Bellum: Outlining the Matrix of Definitions in Comparative 
Perspective,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, 
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The substantive emphasis of jus post bellum is broader than human rights 
violations. It also clearly includes, inter alia, violation of the laws of armed 
conflict, the rights and privileges that spring from the laws of armed con-
flict, environmental law (including legal access to natural resources and reg-
ulating the toxic remnants of war), state responsibility outside the realm of 
human rights, recognition of states and governments, laws and norms appli-
cable to peace treaties and peace agreements, peacekeeping, occupation, 
and post- conflict peacebuilding— laws that directly or through interpreta-
tion regulate and enable the transition to a just and sustainable peace.125
The third difference is referred to the content of both concepts. Transitional 
justice designates “the ways countries emerging from periods of conflict and 
repression address large- scale or systematic human rights violations so numer-
ous and so serious that the normal justice system will not be able to provide 
an adequate response.”126 In other words, transitional justice does not pretend 
to be a substantive framework, but the term to designate the specific model of 
justice adopted by a given society to deal with its past abuses.127 Conversely, 
jus post bellum is conceived as a set of norms or principles guiding the inter-
pretation and application of law in contexts of transition from armed conflict 
to peace.128 It means, jus post bellum looks at offering a substantial framework 
for guiding transitions.
Notwithstanding their different scope of application, authors like Teitel 
consider the concept of jus post bellum vague and unnecessary, arguing that 
transitional justice already cover the matters that jus post bellum is intended 
to frame.129 Additionally, she affirms that jus post bellum is basically concerned 
with the restoration of the status quo ante, whereas transitional justice is more 
comprehensive to deal with the expectations and needs emerging in periods 
of transition.130 On this point, it is worth to mention that, as Walzer131 and 
 125 Iverson, 86.
 126 International Center for Transitional Justice, What is Transitional Justice? Available 
at: https:// www.ictj.org/ about/ transitional- justice (accessed on 1 April 2018).
 127 Kai Ambos, ‘The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice,’ in Building a Future on Peace 
and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Conflict Resolution and Development: The 
Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, ed. Kai Ambos, Judith Large, and Marieke 
Wierda (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 21.
 128 May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, and Meionexia,’ 25.
 129 Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice, 143.
 130 Ruti Teitel, ‘Rethinking Jus Post Bellum in an Age of Global Transitional Justice: Engaging 
with Michael Walzer and Larry May,’ European Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 
(2013): 336.















Orend132 point out, even though a certain status ante should be restored at the 
end of armed conflict, just post bellum goes beyond, recognizing that some-
times the ante situation was precisely the very cause of conflict, and then it 
must be changed.
Contrary to Teitel’s critics, jus post bellum is a broader concept, in which tran-
sitional justice can be integrated. Transitional justice has a concrete and lim-
ited scope, regarding the treatment of human rights past abuses,133 whereas jus 
post bellum is addressed to the overall restoration and construction of peace. 
Regarding this question, Turgis warns about the risk of broadening the concept 
of transitional justice. For her,
[…] it can be dangerous to broaden the scope of the objectives of transi-
tional justice to extremely ambitious and varied aspirations, going from 
peace building to economic development. It is obviously a good thing if 
transitional justice can facilitate and promote other ambitions of a par-
ticular society. But transitional justice should not be used and thought 
of as a kind of magic wand […] The risk of broadening the meaning of 
the concept is to dilute it and turning it into something meaningless 
[…] The core element of transitional justice is here: offering a “toolbox” 
filled with elements designed to deal with the violation of human rights 
from a predecessor regime to form the basis of an order to prevent their 
reoccurrence.134
In this way, having the elements discussed above, one can conclude that tran-
sitional justice and jus post bellum are two different and related concepts, 
which do not exclude each other. Transitional justice is a more developed 
field in theory and practice, but its aim does not comprise all the aspects of 
transition to peace. In this way, having jus post bellum the intention to cover 
transition to peace in a comprehensive way, transitional justice can be one of 
 132 Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ 122.
 133 At this point, Kastner affirms that “Transitional justice is thus part of a bigger normative 
picture.” In that sense, even if he does not use the concept of jus post bellum, he consid-
ers transitional justice only as a part of the normative framework on transition to peace, 
which he refers as much broader. Kastner, Legal Normativity in the Resolution of Internal 
Armed Conflict, 21.
 134 Noémi Turgis, ‘What Is Transitional Justice?,’ International Journal of Rule of Law, 
Transitional Justice and Human Rights 1 (2010): 14. In this line, Iverson even sustains that the 
concept of jus post bellum should help transitional justice scholars to “refocus their field.” 
Iverson, ‘Contrasting the Normative and Historical Foundations of Transitional Justice 
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its components.135 Among the different matters involved in transition from 
armed conflict to peace, the treatment of human rights violations occurred 
during the conflict is an essential aspect for establishing a sustainable peace. 
That is the role for transitional justice. However, other aspects must be consid-
ered as well, as those related to the root causes of the conflict, the legal status 
of peace deals, the participation of different actors in peace talks, and environ-
mental issues, for example. To frame all these aspects of transition to peace jus 
post bellum is a more capacious concept.
5.2 Lex Pacificatoria
The concept of lex pacificatoria was proposed in 2008 by Bell136 as an alterna-
tive to jus post bellum.137 She takes the parallel of the lex mercatoria, to refer 
to an emerging law of peacemakers as a set of legal practices, rather than a 
legal regime. For her, legal practices around peacemaking suggest a developing 
law that would be better captured by the term lex pacificatoria. In her words, 
lex pacificatoria is the outcome of the “interaction of both state and nonstate 
actors involved in the transition process, who respond to legal norms and try to 
craft solutions that comply with them in creative ways so as to respond to the 
distinctive dilemmas of peace- making.”138
Contrasting lex pacificatoria to jus post bellum, Bell sustains that currently 
this lex is a matter of lege ferenda, “whose natural trajectory would seem to be 
toward a more established lex lata in the form of a fully worked out body of law 
capable of regulating transitions from conflict.” In that sense, she suggests that 
“we might, from this perspective, view the lex pacificatoria as lex ferenda and 
jus post bellum as its possible future as imagined new lex lata.”139 Then, she sees 
jus post bellum rather as a “discursive project or a way of understanding the 
practical pressures which push for a distinctive normative revision.”140
 135 On this idea, see Freeman and Djukic, ‘Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice,’ 226; 
Österdahl and van Zadel, ‘What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New Wine and Old 
Bottles,’ 193.
 136 Bell, On the Law of Peace.
 137 Christine Bell explicitly presents lex pacificatoria “as an alternative to jus post bellum.” 
Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria: What’s in a Name?,’ 192.
 138 Christine Bell, ‘Lex Pacificatoria Colombiana: Colombia’s Peace Accord in Comparative 
Perspective,’ American Journal of International Law 110 ajil Unbound Symposium on the 
Colombian Peace Talks and International Law (2016): 165.
 139 Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria: What’s in a Name?,’ 193.
 140 Christine Bell, ‘Post- Conflict Accountability and the Reshaping of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law,’ in International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights 















Unlike jus post bellum, the concept of lex pacificatoria has had a very lim-
ited treatment in academic scholarship. Bell has devoted several works to its 
conceptualization,141 and even to its application to the Colombian case.142 
However, few authors have discussed the notion of lex pacificatoria.143
Additionally, the main difference between the two concepts appears when 
jus post bellum is viewed by Bell as “a new coherent distinctive legal regime,”144 
which, as argued above, is neither possible nor desirable. But if one looks at the 
other approaches to a definition of jus post bellum discussed in this chapter, 
there is no substantial difference with the concept of lex pacificatoria. Indeed, 
the understanding of jus post bellum as an ordering system, or a space of dia-
logue, or as an interpretative framework is connected to the view of lex pacif-
icatoria as a developing set of practices on how the parties transiting from an 
armed conflict use legal norms to address their practical dilemmas of peace.145 
Therefore, both jus post bellum and lex pacificatoria frame the context of actors 
dealing with legal obligations in their search for peace, in a dynamic where 
their peace efforts are shaped by law and their peacemaking practice creates 
new legal norms.
Finally, one could say that while jus post bellum is more focused on the norma-
tive framework applicable to transition, lex pacificatoria is mainly concerned with 
the practice of peacemakers when applying such a framework. Nevertheless, if 
one understands jus post bellum as an interactional framework, where norms and 
practice of actors involved in transition apply and create law at the same time, 
then, there is no real difference between jus post bellum and lex pacificatoria. In 
consequence, being jus post bellum the most developed concept, adding a new 
name to designate the same phenomenon seems unnecessary and it does not 
help to reaching common ways to understand the complex interaction between 
law and transition from armed conflict to peace.
 141 Bell, On the Law of Peace; Christine Bell, ‘The “New Law” of Transitional Justice,’ in 
Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Conflict Resolution 
and Development: The Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, ed. Kai Ambos, 
Judith Large, and Marieke Wierda (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 105– 26; Christine Bell, ‘Peace 
Settlements and International Law: From Lex Pacificatoria to Jus Post Bellum,’ in Research 
Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law. Jus Ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Jus 
Post Bellum, ed. Nigel White and Christian Henderson (499– 546: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2013); Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria: What’s in a Name?’
 142 Bell, ‘Lex Pacificatoria Colombiana: Colombia’s Peace Accord in Comparative Perspective.’
 143 Kreß and Grover, ‘International Criminal Law Restraints in Peace Talks to End Armed 
Conflicts of a Non- International Character,’ 44.
 144 Bell, ‘Lex Pacificatoria Colombiana: Colombia’s Peace Accord in Comparative 
Perspective,’ 165.
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6 Jus Post Bellum in Non- international Armed Conflicts
Although the concept of jus post bellum emerged within the context of tran-
sition from iac s to peace, today there is a general opinion regarding its appli-
cability to transition from niac s.146 However, few works have specifically 
analyzed the particular conditions of jus post bellum in contexts of internal 
transition.147 Examining existing academic scholarship, only two articles are 
specifically devoted to assessing the application of the concept in niac s.148
In one article, Bartels discusses the temporal scope of jus in bello and jus post 
bellum, seeking to determine when do niac s end, and whether both regimes 
apply simultaneously.149 Nonetheless, this contribution does not offer a sys-
tematic analysis of jus post bellum in niac s, but only the temporal dimension 
of the concept regarding the end of internal conflicts.
In the second article, Boon has proposed the most specific analysis on 
the application of jus post bellum in niac s that can be found in current aca-
demic scholarship in the field.150 She departs from minimizing the distinction 
 146 See generally Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 2008, 106; Österdahl and 
van Zadel, ‘What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New Wine and Old Bottles,’ 179; Bartels, 
‘From Jus in Bello to Jus Post Bellum: When Do Non- International Armed Conflicts End?’; 
Boon, ‘The Application of Jus Post Bellum in Non- International Armed Conflicts’; Chetail, 
‘Introduction,’ 18; Dieter Fleck, ‘Legal Protection of the Environment. The Double Challenge 
of Non- International Armed Conflict and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding,’ in Environmental 
Protection and Transitions from Conflict to Peace: Clarifying Norms, Principles, and 
Practices, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson, and Jennifer Easterday (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 203– 19; Matthew Gillett, ‘Eco- Struggles: Using International 
Criminal Law to Protect the Environment During and After Non- International Armed 
Conflict,’ in Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to Peace: Clarifying 
Norms, Principles, and Practices, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson, and Jennifer Easterday 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 221– 22.
 147 To highlight the specificities of making peace in contexts of niac s, Stahn even uses the 
expression “jus post bellum internum”. Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 
2008, 106.
 148 Bartels, ‘From Jus in Bello to Jus Post Bellum: When Do Non- International Armed Conflicts 
End?’; Boon, ‘The Application of Jus Post Bellum in Non- International Armed Conflicts.’ 
Even if in the Jus Post Bellum Project’s 2017 volume two articles address matters related 
to niac s, they do not analyze the application of jus post bellum as such on those con-
texts, but the legal framework for the protection of environment in contexts of niac s. 
These two works are: Fleck, Gillet (2017) Fleck, ‘Legal Protection of the Environment. The 
Double Challenge of Non- International Armed Conflict and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding’; 
Gillett, ‘Eco- Struggles: Using International Criminal Law to Protect the Environment 
During and After Non- International Armed Conflict.’
 149 Bartels, ‘From Jus in Bello to Jus Post Bellum: When Do Non- International Armed 
Conflicts End?’













between international and non- international armed conflicts,151 based on 
three reasons. First, many ihl norms have been qualified as customary rules 
applicable to both types of conflict. Second, the development of international 
criminal justice “has blurred the relevance of the international/ internal divide” 
extending the protection of individuals at all levels. And third, the application 
of ihrl to internal conflicts is convergent with its application to iac s.152 With 
these arguments, Boon suggests “the creation of a unified set of jus post bellum 
principles that would apply regardless of the nature of the conflict.”153
However, she admits that a unified jus post bellum can be problematic 
regarding matters which are highly dependent on internal political conditions. 
In this sense, she points out:
I make the case for a set of jus post bellum principles applicable to NIAC s 
which would coincide with those applicable in IAC s in areas governed 
by international humanitarian law, criminal law, and human rights, but 
which would differ with regards to rebuilding, reconstruction, and con-
stitutional design. I argue that a narrower set of principles in these latter 
domains will improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of jus post bellum 
in the long run, and is justified by the principle of ‘bounded discretion.’154
In other words, Boon proposes two levels of jus post bellum principles in the 
context of niac s. A first set of principles is related to maters governed by 
ihrl, ihl, and icl, which would be common for iac s and niac s. A second set 
of principles would be specific for niac s, regarding matters as reconstruction 
and political and institutional design, in which societies emerging from armed 
conflict need further leeway to find formulas according to their own dynamics. 
To apply this second set of principles she proposes the concept of “bounded 
discretion.”
For her, the “bounded discretion” implies that jus post bellum should sup-
port the development of transitional instruments and structures under an 
 151 In the same way, Hofmann and Rapillard sustain that “The distinction between interna-
tional armed conflict and niac has blurred over time. Nowadays, not only states, but also 
armed groups are considered to be holders of rights and obligations in internal conflict sit-
uations.” Ursign Hofmann and Pascal Rapillard, ‘Post- Conflict Mine Action: Environment 
and Law,’ in Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to Peace: Clarifying 
Norms, Principles, and Practices, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson, and Jennifer Easterday 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 413.
 152 Boon, ‘The Application of Jus Post Bellum in Non- International Armed Conflicts,’ 262– 63.
 153 Boon, 265.
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international legal framework but leaving to local stakeholders the margin 
to define matters which are predominantly of domestic interest. In turn, the 
bounded discretion approach is supported by two principles: subsidiarity and 
margin of appreciation.155 The principle of subsidiarity implies that jus post 
bellum should prefer local formulas regarding social, economic, and political 
issues, and it would limit its role to offering general guidance under interna-
tional standards. In the same line, the margin of appreciation refers to the 
state’s level of autonomy to interpret its international legal obligations accord-
ing to its domestic context.156
Considering the elements of this discussion, jus post bellum is clearly rele-
vant to transition from niac s to peace, and empirical research is required to 
identify how the theorical developments of the concept— even if addressed 
mostly to iac s— are reflected or contested by the practice of internal tran-
sitions. As delineated since the Introduction, current armed conflicts in the 
world are mostly niac s, and most of peace processes and agreements are 
related to this kind of conflicts.157 Then, there are more practice on legal con-
siderations around peacemaking and peacebuilding regarding niac s than 
iac s to empirically assess jus post bellum.
On this point, translating the concept of jus post bellum to niac s is a conse-
quence of the increasing application of international legal elements to internal 
transitions, and not an assimilation of the automatic application of the three 
components of the law of armed force to both iac s and niac s (because, for 
instance, jus ad bellum is not considered as applicable to niac s). Then, through 
the analysis of the Colombian case as a concrete transition from a niac, in the 
next chapters we will see a normative framework based on international law 
guiding legal and political decisions in the process of ending armed conflict 
and building sustainable peace, which is the object of jus post bellum.
7 Conclusions
This chapter was devoted to the conceptual foundations of jus post bellum. 
Notwithstanding there is not consensual definition, three approaches have 
been proposed to understand the concept: 1) as a new legal regime; 2) as an 
ordering system; and 3) as an interpretative framework. The first approach has 
 155 Boon, 266.
 156 Boon, 266– 267.
 157 Escola de Cultura de Pau, Peace Talks in Focus 2018. Report on Trends and Scenarios, 11– 12. 










been questioned by several authors, and such a conception of jus post bellum 
does not seem viable. However, the other two approaches offer useful ele-
ments for defining the content and scope of the concept, and they will be used 
as such in the next chapters of the book.
The notion of principles and the functional approach towards establishing 
sustainable peace helped to demarcate the object of jus post bellum. Such an 
object could be defined as offering a normative framework of principles guid-
ing the transition from armed conflict to sustainable peace. In turn, sustainable 
peace has been conceived as composed by at least two conditions: address-
ing the root causes of the conflict, and observing international standards on 
human rights, ihl, and icl. These elements define the rationale of jus post 
bellum and how it offers a more comprehensive legal framework for transition 
to peace than related concepts like lex pacificatoria and transitional justice.
Finally, jus post bellum, although mostly conceived from the perspective of 
iac s, is equally applicable to transition from niac s. Regarding internal tran-
sition, the principles of jus post bellum require higher flexibility to address 
matters that are typically dependent on the specific political conditions of 
the context. Here, Boon suggests two levels of principles. First, principles 
dealing with violations of human rights and ihl, where international law pro-
vides more exigent standards. Second, principles regarding matters as recon-
struction and institutional design, where international law only can provide 
general guidelines, leaving domestic actors enough leeway to adopt their 
own approaches. Based on this assumption, the next chapters assess how jus 
post bellum is relevant and applicable to niac s, through the analysis of the 
Colombian case.
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 chapter 2
International Law in the Colombian Transition
Colombia has assigned a central role to international law in its transition 
from armed conflict to peace. Even though this question became more visi-
ble since the recent peace process and the 2016 Peace Agreement concluded 
in the country, international law has been present in all the previous transi-
tional mechanisms that Colombia has adopted since 2005. Colombia has a 
legal system widely receptive to international law, with a Constitution attrib-
uting to ihrl and ihl treaties duly ratified by the country the same nor-
mative level as the constitutional order.1 This feature has been particularly 
relevant regarding the political and legal discussions on armed conflict and 
transition to peace in the country.
As such, this chapter examines how international law is reflected in transi-
tion in Colombia. The focus is given to the 2012– 2016 peace process and the 2016 
Final Agreement, but the analysis also incorporates elements from the previous 
transitional mechanisms designed in the country. The purpose of the chapter 
is to show how international law has shaped transition in Colombia, seeking 
empirical elements to assess how this case can be framed under jus post bellum. 
For that, Chapter 3 will overlap the conceptual framework offered in Chapter 1 
with the practice exposed in this Chapter 2, to suggest how jus post bellum can 
be understood and applied from the perspective of the case study.
The chapter departs from offering a general overview of the Colombian 
armed conflict and its transition to peace. Such a background is important to 
better understand the complexities of this conflict, its root causes and dynam-
ics, the different attempts to reach peace, and the challenges to implement an 
ambitious peace deal while armed conflict still persists in the country. Then, 
the chapter analyzes the main aspects in which international law has shaped 
the Colombian transition: the legal nature of the peace agreement, socioeco-
nomic and political reforms, criminal justice, reparations, and inclusiveness. 
In each component, the chapter identifies the international legal framework 
relevant to the respective matter— including legal norms, legal discourses, and 
legal practices— , and then it analyzes how such a framework was applied in 
Colombia. On this point, it is important to clarify that even if the Colombian 
transition has involved several matters relevant to jus post bellum, the selection 







of topics in this chapter is focused on the components in which the influence 
of international law is more specific and visible.
0 A General Overview of the Colombian Armed Conflict and Its 
Transition to Peace
This section summarizes the general elements to understand the origin, actors, 
and evolution of the Colombian armed conflict, as well as the main instru-
ments and processes aimed at reaching peace in the country.
0.1 Origin and Evolution of the Armed Conflict
Since its independence and the configuration of the Republic in 1819, Colombia 
was politically divided into two traditional parties: liberals and conservatives. 
Both parties fought for power in different ways, leading to an intensive violent 
period known as The Thousand Days War (1899– 1902).2 Peace was agreed upon, 
but violence reappeared after several hegemonic conservative governments. 
In 1948 the presidential candidate by the Liberal Party was assassinated, which 
triggered a new civil war known as La Violencia. It lasted until 1958. That year, 
a settlement was reached between the Liberal and the Conservative Party, in 
which they agreed to alternate power for 16 years.3
Beyond those agreements among the two traditional parties, many peo-
ple— mostly peasants and social leaders— did not feel represented by such a 
political system. Thus, some peasants organized movements demanding land 
access and rural development programs. Those demands were ignored by the 
government, who saw them as a communist threat in the global context of 
the Cold War. Repressive measures were the response, and organized peasants, 
together with communist militants, founded the left- wing guerrilla Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (farc) in 1964, and later the Ejército 
de Liberación Nacional (eln) the same year. Both groups— though different 
ideological approaches— claimed the use of arms to defend themselves from 
governmental repression and seek social justice under a communist thought.
The two guerrillas gained rapid expansion across the country, and other small 
guerilla groups appeared in the following two decades, owing a combination 
 2 See generally, Marco Palacios, Entre la legitimidad y la violencia: Colombia 1875– 1994, 
(Bogota: Banco de la Republica, 1995).
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of popular support and unsuccessful governmental strategies to reach a solu-
tion. In that scenario, in the early 1980s, some landowners organized them-
selves in a self- defense strategy against the guerrillas, which had used extor-
tion and kidnaping as their main source of income. That process led to the 
conformation of paramilitary groups, gathered under the Autodefensas Unidas 
de Colombia (auc) in the 1990s.4 They received illegal support by different 
state agents, which intensified the armed confrontation around the country. 
Simultaneously, Colombia was experiencing an unprecedented growth in drug 
production and trafficking, which carried out alliances between traffickers and 
armed groups, adding new complexities to the armed conflict.
In 1991 a new Constitution was adopted, following peace negotiations 
with small guerrilla groups which appeared during the 1970s and 1980s. It 
opened democracy and gave people better mechanisms to protect their rights. 
However, in the mid- 1990s, the lucrative traffic of illegal drugs and the struggle 
over territorial control intensified armed confrontation between the farc and 
the eln by one side, and the State and the paramilitary groups by the other. 
Several war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed by all actors, 
and Colombia entered the path of a failed state.5
A hope of peace appeared in 1998. A peace process with the farc started, 
but four years later it failed after the guerrilla committed several abuses 
during the negotiations. In 2002 a new government initiated the most inten-
sive military offensive against the guerrilla. At the time, a process for the 
demobilization of the paramilitary groups was implemented between 2003 
and 2005, under a scheme of submission to the State in exchange for socio- 
economic and legal benefits. It brought a significant decrease in the armed 
confrontation.
However, after ten years of military offensive, the guerrillas were reduced 
but not defeated. In 2012 a new peace process started with the farc, still the 
largest and oldest armed group in Colombia.6 After four years of negotiations, 
 4 See generally Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Paramilitarismo. Balance de la 
Contribución del CNMH al Esclarecimiento Histórico, (Bogotá, Centro Nacional de Memoria 
Histórica, 2018).
 5 Gregoy Lobo, “Colombia, from Failing State to a Second Independence: The Politics and the 
Price”, International Journal of Cultural Studies 16, no. 4 (2012): 351– 366.
 6 Gobierno de Colombia and farc, ‘ Acuerdo General Para La Terminación Del Conflicto 
y La Construcción de Una Paz Estable y Duradera,’ 26 August 2012, http:// www.altocomi-
sionadoparalapaz.gov.co/ procesos- y- conversaciones/ acuerdo- general/ Paginas/ inicio.aspx 








a Final Peace Agreement was reached in 2016. Nevertheless, the other guerrilla 
group, the eln, remains active, with low military capacity and several unsuc-
cessful negotiations attempts.7
More than five decades of armed conflict have left millions of victims in 
Colombia. In 2011 the Unified Victim’s Registry was created.8 This tool regis-
ters victims who suffered any damage during the armed conflict since the 1st 
January 1985. Up to April 2019, 8.803.836 victims are registered,9 which rep-
resents the 18% of the current Colombian population.10 Most victims were 
affected by internal displacement (7.478.723), followed by homicide (269.650) 
and enforced disappearance (47.560).11
0.2 Transitional Legal Mechanisms in the Ongoing Conflict
During its protracted armed conflict, Colombia has developed several legal and 
constitutional instruments to protect and redress victims, to facilitate peace 
negotiations, and to reintegrate members of armed groups into civilian life. In 
1997 a legal framework was adopted for assisting victims of internal displace-
ment.12 It was later complemented by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court,13 offering not only humanitarian and socio- economic assistance but 
seeking also reparations and durable solutions. In 2005 the Justice and Peace 
Law14 created a system of transitional justice for the demobilization of para-
military groups, in talks with the government since 2003. The system was 
framed within the ordinary Colombian jurisdiction, offering to former fighters 
a trial with alternative punishment (5– 8 years in prison) in exchange for their 
contribution to peace.
 7 Julia Zulver, ¿Verá Colombia un acuerdo de paz con el ELN en 2019?, Open Democracy, 7 
January 2019, https:// www.opendemocracy.net/ es/ democraciaabierta- es/ ver- colombia- 
un- acuerdo- de- paz- con- el- eln- / (accessed on 10 April 2019).
 8 Congreso de la República de Colombia, Ley 1448 (Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras) 
Art. 154.
 9 Registro Único de Víctimas, https:// www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/ es/ registro- unico- de- 
victimas- ruv/ 37394 (accessed on 1 April 2019).
 10 The total population of Colombia up to May 2019 is estimated in 48.2 million people. 
Source: http:// www.dane.gov.co/ index.php/ estadisticas- por- tema/ demografia- y- poblacion/ 
censo- nacional- de- poblacion- y- vivenda- 2018/ cuantos- somos/ (accessed on 5 May 2019).
 11 Registro Único de Víctimas, https:// www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/ es/ registro- unico- de- 
victimas- ruv/ 37394 (accessed on 1 April 2019).
 12 Congreso de la República de Colombia, ‘Ley 387’ (1997).
 13 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia T- 025/ 04 (2004).
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Finally, and despite the ongoing armed conflict, in 2011 Colombia adopted 
the Law 1448,15 known as Law of Victims and Land Restitution. Following inter-
national standards on reparation, this law set up an ambitious system to reg-
ister all the victims of armed conflict since 1985 and to offer a comprehensive 
set of measures of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and 
guarantees of non- repetition.
0.3 Peace Process and Final Agreement (2012– 2016)
The recent peace process with the farc represents the most important attempt 
to achieve peace in Colombia. It advanced a negotiation scheme aimed not 
only at ending the armed conflict but also to address its root causes. After four 
years of negotiations16 in Havana, Cuba, the parties signed a final agreement 
on 26 August 2016, which was later rejected in a plebiscite.17 After a renegotia-
tion following the requests of the main opposing leaders, a new agreement was 
reached on 24 November 2016, which was then approved by the Colombian 
Congress.18
The Agreement addresses six issues: 1) Rural development, improving land 
access and the productive capacities of peasants; 2) Political participation, 
expanding the democratic spectrum to new actors, including the former guer-
rilla; 3) End of the conflict, involving the laying down of arms and reintegration 
issues; 4) Solution to the problem of illicit drugs, as one of the fuels of the con-
flict; 5) Victims and transitional justice, establishing a comprehensive system 
of justice, truth, and reparation; and 6) An implementation and verification 
system with international support.
1 The Legal Status of the Peace Agreement
Since peace negotiations and peace agreements have become a highly “norma-
tized” process,19 determining the legal status of the resulting deal has been a 
 15 Congreso de la República de Colombia, Ley 1448 (Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de 
Tierras).
 16 Although the process took four years, the peace negotiations in Colombia are considered 
the fastest moving peace talks in the world. Escola de Cultura de Pau, Yearbook of Peace 
Processes 2015, ed. Vicenç Fisas (Barcelona: Icaria, 2015), 9.
 17 bbc News, Colombia referendum: Voters reject Farc peace deal, 3 October 2016, https:// 
www.bbc.com/ news/ world- latin- america- 37537252 (accessed on 10 April 2019).
 18 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace.’














matter of utmost importance. If the agreement is not seen as legally binding, 
the parties’ confidence can be affected to the point that reaching an accord 
becomes difficult. This question is especially relevant in negotiations following 
niac s. In such negotiations, the non- state actors are invariably concerned that 
the government will use its law- making powers to modify its commitments 
during the implementation phase.
In the Colombian case, such a concern was held by both the government 
and the farc. Even if the government was committed to the implementa-
tion of the agreement during negotiation, there was a risk that a new gov-
ernment, the Congress or the Constitutional Court could modify what was 
agreed upon.
As such, the discussion on the legal nature of the peace agreement in 
Colombia was almost as central to the negotiation as those focused on sub-
stantial issues. The debate progressed from the intention to promote a new 
constitution integrating the peace deal to the idea of forming the agreement 
as an international legal document. The first option was rejected by the gov-
ernment, which insisted on adopting a deal under the existing constitutional 
framework. The farc accepted such a position but remained apprehensive 
about the legal nature of the agreement. Subsequently, the idea of lending 
some form of international legal character to the accord prevailed as a means 
to guarantee that the State would not be able to amend it under domestic 
law.
In a joint communiqué issued on 12 May 2016, the parties announced a for-
mula to grant legal certainty to the Final Agreement and guarantee compliance 
to it under both domestic and international law. The formula included two 
elements rooted in international law. First, declaring the Final Agreement as a 
special agreement in terms of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 
Second, the formula involved a unilateral declaration by the Colombian State 
before the UN requesting that the Final Agreement be annexed to the unsc 
Resolution 2261 (2016), which established a monitoring mission for the imple-
mentation of the peace agreement in Colombia.
Having said elements, this section is divided into three parts. The first 
part will focus on the discussion of the domestic or international legal 
status of internal peace agreements. The second part will present the two 
mechanisms agreed upon in Colombia to lend the peace agreement inter-
national legal value. The third part will analyze the potential effects of the 
use of international law to enhance the legal certainty of the peace deal in 
Colombia.
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1.1 The Discussion on the Domestic or International Legal Status of 
Internal Peace Agreements
The legal- looking20 structure and language used in peace agreements show the 
parties’ intention to consider them as legally binding documents.21 However, 
as a rule, these agreements are political documents that must be translated 
into a legal form for their implementation.22 Nevertheless, internal peace 
agreements “do not easily fit within traditional international or domestic legal 
categories,” because they entail a mix of state and non- state actors, and a com-
bination of matters belonging to national and international spheres.23
In the case of agreements following niac s, their legal status is typically 
given by domestic law in the form of a new constitution24 or through constitu-
tional amendments or new laws.25 However, as Kastner highlights,
Peace agreements can be understood as hybrid instruments between a 
state and nonstate actors to deal with a domestic situation, but which 
are often internationalized through references to international law. Such 
internationalization brings the agreement into the sphere of interna-
tional legal norms and arguably confers additional legitimacy.26
 20 Peace agreements are not legal documents in their own but their writing normally has a 
legal style.
 21 Bell, ‘Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status,’ 378.
 22 Colin Harvey, ‘On Law, Politics and Contemporary Constitutionalism,’ Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal 26, no. 4 (2002): 999. Regarding the Colombian Peace Agreement, 
the Constitutional Court considered it as a mere political document (Sentence C- 379/ 
2016). Even the Court refrained from deciding a constitutionality action concerning the 
Peace Agreement, arguing that such a document does not have any normative, but only 
political character. Sentence C- 171/ 2017.
 23 Arist von Hehn, The Internal Implementation of Peace Agreements after Violent Intrastate 
Conflict (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), 50– 51.
 24 For example, South Africa, where the 1993 accord was written to serve as an “interim 
constitution” until the accord could be legally ratified as part of a final constitution. 
Peace Accords Matrix, https:// peaceaccords.nd.edu/ provision/ ratification- mechanism- 
interim- constitution- accord, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of 
Notre Dame.
 25 For example, the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement, in which it as agreed that if 
majorities were reached in the referendums on the agreement, “the Governments will 
then introduce and support, in their respective Parliaments, such legislation as may be 
necessary to give effect to all aspects of this agreement.” Peace Accords Matrix, https:// 
peaceaccords.nd.edu/ provision/ ratification- mechanism- northern- ireland- good- friday- 
agreement, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.

















In legal terms, this internationalization of internal peace agreements aims 
to protect the agreements from substantial variations during the domestic 
process of translating them into constitutional or legal forms. Indeed, when 
discussing the legal norms to implementing a deal, opposition groups could 
press the government or other actors to backtrack on commitments. To 
address these difficulties, Bell suggests that peace agreements “tend to include 
substantive reform of legislative and constitutional processes and institutions 
that make international law a key reference point and give international actors 
a role in what are normally domestic institutions.”27 However, it is not clear 
if such internationalization make an internal peace agreement to become an 
international legal instrument.
Article 2.1(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (vclt) 
defines a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States in 
written form and governed by international law.”28 In this line, Article 2.1(a) 
of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations29 extends 
the same definition to agreements concluded between states and interna-
tional organizations or among these organizations. In these terms, agreements 
reached between a state and a non- state actor are not considered treaties.
However, Article 3 of both conventions specifies that the fact that they 
do not apply to agreements outside of the definition provided by Article 2.1 
does not affect the legal value of those agreements. In particular, Article 3 of 
the 1986 Convention states that the fact that it does not apply “(i) to inter-
national agreements to which one or more States, one or more international 
organizations and one or more subjects of international law other than States 
or organizations are parties; […] shall not affect: (a) the legal force of such 
agreements; (b) the application to them of any of the rules set forth in the 
present Convention to which they would be subject under international law 
independently of the Convention.” (emphasis added).30
In consequence, both conventions make clear that in addition to treaties, 
other international agreements can exist. Given this, and considering that 
 27 Bell, ‘Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status,’ 405.
 28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).
 29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 
or between International Organizations (1986). This Convention is not yet into force, as 
it has not reached the minimum of 35 state’s ratifications established to this effect by its 
Article 85.
 30 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 
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there is no legal definition for an international agreement other than a treaty, 
a systematic reading of both conventions could offer a solution. The conven-
tional definitions of a treaty have three elements in common: first, the par-
ties possess international legal subjectivity; second, the agreement should be 
governed by international law; and third, the agreement has a written form. 
This last condition is a formal one, and it does not entail major analytical 
challenges. However, the other two are substantial, and they could determine 
whether an agreement should be considered an international one even if it is 
beyond the scope of the Vienna Conventions.
By this logic, an agreement concluded between a state and a non- state 
armed group— as is the case with a peace agreement ending a niac— could 
be considered an international agreement, even though it is outside the scope 
of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties.31 The two substantial con-
ditions discussed above would be present in an internal peace agreement. 
On the first condition, as pointed out by Bell, in relation to peace agreements 
signed by armed opposition groups, those groups “can be argued to be ‘sub-
jects of international law’— based on international law’s recognition of such 
groups, in particular through humanitarian law.”32 On the second condition, 
Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions allows the conclusion of 
special agreements with or between non- state armed groups in a niac, which 
will be governed by that international regime.
An analysis of these two elements in an internal peace agreement can be 
found in a 2004 decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in which the 
Court denied the international legal nature of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement. 
On the one hand, the Court affirmed that even if “there is now no doubt that 
[Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions] is binding on States and 
insurgents alike and that insurgents are subject to international humanitar-
ian law […] [t] hat fact, however, does not by itself invest [a non- state armed 
group] with international personality under international law.”33 On the other 
hand, the Court stated that even though the Lomé Agreement put an end to 
an armed conflict and was welcomed by the international community acting 
 31 Bell, On the Law of Peace, 129; Laura Betancur, ‘The Legal Status of the Colombian Peace 
Agreement,’ American Journal of International Law 110 ajil Unbound Symposium on the 
Colombian Peace Talks and International Law (2016): 189.
 32 Bell, On the Law of Peace, 130. This subjectivity is generally recognized, despite the fact 
that governments have always tried to exclude non- state armed groups from international 
law. See generally, Andrew Clapham, ‘Non- State Actors,’ in Post- Conflict Peacebuilding : A 
Lexicon, ed. Vincent Chetail (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 201.
 33 Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and 








through the unsc, the agreement itself “created neither rights nor obligations 
capable of being regulated by international law.”34
Nevertheless, in contrast to the position held by the Court, a different con-
clusion could be deducted from an analysis of the matter under ihl. Regarding 
the legal capacity of non- state armed actors to subscribe to international 
agreements, Bell points out that international legal subjectivity is different 
from international legal personality.35 While the latter implies full capacity 
to exercise rights and obligations at an international level, the notion of legal 
subjectivity is limited. In this regard, as long as ihl recognizes the rights and 
duties of non- state armed groups, they enjoy international legal subjectivity 
under this regime. At the same time, as analyzed in the next part of this sec-
tion, special agreements concluded by the parties in a niac under Common 
Article 3 of Geneva Conventions are indeed governed by ihl.
Therefore, a peace agreement ending a niac could potentially be consid-
ered an international legal accord and as such governed by international law. 
This question will be analyzed based on the Colombian case.
1.2 Formulas of Normative Internationalization of the Colombian Peace 
Agreement
As previously noted, even before a final agreement was reached, parties in 
Colombia defined two formulas aimed at giving international legal value to 
the resulting peace agreement: one, considering the Agreement as a special 
agreement under ihl; the other, making a unilateral declaration by the State 
expressing its international commitment to comply the peace deal. This item 
analyzes each of them.
1.2.1 The Peace Agreement as a Special Agreement under ihl
The first and most important mechanism used by the parties to give interna-
tional legal status to the Peace Agreement in Colombia was to subscribe it as 
a special agreement under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. To 
do so, the parties agreed, even before the final deal was reached,36 in a formula 
 34 Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Appeals Chamber, paragraph 42. para. 42. In a critic 
to this decision, Cassese points out that there was no need for the Court to discuss the 
domestic or international legal status of the agreement, but just to analyze the case 
regarding the prohibition on amnesties for international crimes. See Antonio Cassese, 
‘The Special Court and International Law The Decision Concerning the Lomé Agreement 
Amnesty,’ Journal of International Criminal Justice 2, no. 4 (2004): 1130– 40.
 35 Bell, On the Law of Peace, 135.
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that the Congress translated into a transitory article in the Constitution to qual-
ify the Final Peace Agreement as a “Special Agreement in terms of Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.”37 In addition, the amendment stated 
that once signed and entered into force, the Final Agreement would be part of 
the “constitutional block.”38
This formula has important consequences under Colombian constitutional 
law. According to article 93 of the National Constitution, ihrl and ihl instru-
ments duly ratified by Colombia prevail in the domestic order. This norm has 
been interpreted by the Constitutional Court as meaning that those norms 
have the same normative level as the Constitution itself and, in this way, form 
a constitutional block.39 With this understanding, the constitutional amend-
ment made explicit that the Final Agreement would have the same internal 
legal status as ihrl and ihl treaties.
This constitutional provision was strongly criticized by some sectors in 
Colombia through two main arguments. Critics argued that the ihl’s mech-
anism of special agreements is reserved for strictly humanitarian issues and 
cannot be invoked for a document referring to various economic, political, 
and social matters. Other critics argued that a peace agreement cannot have 
the same internal legal status that the Constitution devotes to international 
human rights and ihl treaties.
Disregarding those critics, the parties subscribed the agreement signed on 
24 August 2016 in the terms referred to above. However, after the agreement 
was rejected by a plebiscite a few weeks later, a renegotiation process took 
place, during which the opposing actors asked for a modification on this point.
The new Final Agreement reached on 24 November 2016 retained the 
formula of the special agreement in terms of Common Article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions but added that it would be “to the effects of its interna-
tional validity.”40 In this line, a copy of the Agreement was sent to the Swiss 
Federal Council as depositary of the Geneva Conventions.41
Because of this limitation on the scope of the formula of the Special 
Agreement, a new constitutional amendment was adopted to substitute the 
 37 Congreso de la República de Colombia, Acto Legislativo 01 de 2016.
 38 Ibid.
 39 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia C- 574 de 1992.
 40 The parties stated in the Preamble of the Agreement that it was subscribed “as a Special 
Agreement pursuant to Article 3, common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as per its 
international standing.” Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the 
Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 5.












previous one. This time, the reform introduced a transitory article to the 
Constitution stating that the contents of the Final Agreement “related to 
norms of international humanitarian law and fundamental rights […] will be 
compulsory parameters of interpretation and a referent for the development 
and validity of the norms and laws developing and implementing the Final 
Agreement.”42 Additionally, it established that all the organs of the State must 
act according to what was agreed on, “preserving the contents, commitments, 
the spirit, and the principles of the Final Agreement.”43
This new formula has two dimensions. For international effects, the parties 
considered the Final Agreement a special agreement under ihl. Domestically, 
the Final Agreement is no longer considered to have the same constitutional 
effect of ihrl and ihl treaties, but the elements related to ihl and fundamen-
tal rights are considered a parameter for the validity of the normative develop-
ment of the Agreement.
To analyze this question, it is important to note that the mechanism 
of special agreements is enshrined by Common Article 3 to 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and applicable to niac s. The final part of this Article is worded 
as follows: “The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into 
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of 
the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not 
affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.”
This norm was conceived when niac s were uncommon and unregulated by 
international law. Thus, in principle, special agreements were aimed at spread-
ing the application of Geneva Conventions to niac s beyond the minimum 
regulation of Common Article 3. In this sense, the 1952 icrc Commentary on 
Geneva Convention i stated that “Although the only provisions which the indi-
vidual Parties are bound to apply unilaterally are those contained in Article 3, 
they are nevertheless under an obligation to try to bring about a fuller applica-
tion of the Convention by means of a bilateral agreement.”44
Nevertheless, in the Colombian context the mechanism of special agree-
ments “was used with a much broader objective: to increase legal certainty for 
the parties by reinforcing the deal’s domestic and international effects.”45 Such 
a use of the mechanism by the parties in Colombia raises two questions. First, 
 42 Congreso de la República de Colombia, Acto Legislativo 02 de 2017. Available at: http:// 
es.presidencia.gov.co/ normativa/ normativa/ ACTO%20LEGISLATIVO%20N°%2002%20
DE%2011%20DE%20MAYO%20DE%202017.pdf
 43 Ibid.
 44 icrc, Commentary I Geneva Convention, (Geneva, 1952), 59.
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what is the international normative character of special agreements? Second, 
can peace agreements be considered special agreements in terms of Common 
Article 3?
In 1995, assessing the constitutionality of Additional Protocol ii as 
adopted by Colombia, the Constitutional Court referred to Common Article 
3’s mechanism of special agreements. The Court stated that those agree-
ments are not, stricto sensu, treaties, as they are not established between 
subjects of public international law. However, the Court admitted that they 
are a valid legal mechanism to protect the victims of war, to foster con-
sensus and increase reciprocal trust among the enemies for the pursuit of 
peace.46
On this point, as discussed above, special agreements are not treaties in 
terms of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties. Since 
special agreements are formed between parties in a niac, at least one of those 
parties lacks the legal capacity to subscribe to treaties. Nevertheless, as dis-
cussed above, there are international agreements other than treaties, as long 
as they are subscribed by subjects of international law and susceptible to being 
regulated by this law. It is at this point where special agreements have interna-
tional legal value.
As previously stated, non- state armed groups are subjects of ihl, a regime 
under which they are not only bound to respecting existing humanitarian 
rules but also allowed to create new ones through special agreements. In other 
words, non- state actors have a norm- creating power with respect to ihl,47 
though this fact does not give them any specific legal status.48
Additionally, as pointed out by Vierucci, since the notion and the content 
of special agreements are given by treaties of an international character (e.g., 
Geneva Conventions), the obligations they stipulate should also be regarded 
as international.49 Thus it can be concluded that as long as special agreements 
create mutual obligations for the parties in a niac in terms of Common Article 
3 and are binding for the parties under Geneva Conventions, these Agreements 
 46 Corte Constitucional de Colombia. Sentencia C- 225/ 95 (18 May 1995), para. 17.
 47 Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging 
Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law,’ Yale Journal of 
International Law 13, no. 1 (2012): 108.
 48 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘The Addressees of Common Article 3,’ in The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. A Commentary, ed. Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta, and Marco Sassòli 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 426.
 49 Luisa Vierucci, ‘Applicability of the Conventions by Means of Ad Hoc Agreements,’ in The 
1949 Geneva Conventions. A Commentary, ed. Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta, and Marco 










should therefore have the same international legal value as the rest of their ihl 
obligations.
In this sense, special agreements face the same challenges related to enforce-
ability as other ihl norms. On this topic, Heffes and Kotlik consider that as 
long as the parties assign greater legitimacy to the obligations created by them-
selves acting under international law, there are better “chances of voluntary 
compliance in the first place,” at the time that the parties can create their own 
ad hoc enforceability mechanisms in the agreement.50 Vierucci endorses this 
idea. However, she also mentions enforcement mechanisms through individ-
ual criminal responsibility (since the deal becomes a rule of ihl that could be 
considered a standard by a national or international court ruling over a war 
crime)51 and state responsibility (since the special agreement creates interna-
tional obligations for the state).52
Likewise, in discussing whether a peace agreement can be considered a spe-
cial agreement, the answer is affirmative among the icrc and the few scholars 
that have seized the matter. For Heffes and Kotlik, “ceasefire agreements and 
peace agreements could also be included within this category inasmuch as they 
bring into force humanitarian provisions, since they are concluded by the par-
ties to the conflict.”53 Heffes and Kotlik support this idea based on the fact that 
many peace agreements include humanitarian provisions such as the return of 
displaced people, the location of landmines, the search of disappeared people, 
and other measures responding to the purpose of special agreements.
Along the same lines, in its 2016 Commentary on Geneva Convention i, 
the icrc proposed a broad understanding of the content and form of special 
agreements as enshrined by Common Article 3. In such a case, there would be 
no need to name the agreement as a special agreement. For the icrc, “What 
counts is that the provisions brought into force between the Parties serve to 
protect the victims of armed conflict.”54 On this point, the icrc specifically 
stated that:
 50 Ezequiel Heffes and Marcos Kotlik, ‘Special Agreements as a Means of Enhancing 
Compliance with IHL in Non- International Armed Conflicts: An Inquiry into the 
Governing Legal Regime,’ International Review of the Red Cross 96, no. 895/ 896 (2014): 1222.
 51 See also Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 28– 30; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non- State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 297. They note 
how special agreements create legally binding obligations for state and non- state actors 
that could give rise to individual international criminal responsibility.
 52 Vierucci, ‘Applicability of the Conventions by Means of Ad Hoc Agreements,’ 518– 20.
 53 Heffes and Kotlik, ‘Special Agreements as a Means of Enhancing Compliance with IHL in 
Non- International Armed Conflicts: An Inquiry into the Governing Legal Regime,’ 1197.
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A peace agreement, ceasefire or other accord may also constitute a 
special agreement for the purposes of common Article 3, or a means 
to implement common Article 3, if it contains clauses that bring into 
existence further obligations drawn from the Geneva Conventions and/ 
or their Additional Protocols. In this respect, it should be recalled that 
‘peace agreements’ concluded with a view to bringing an end to hostili-
ties may contain provisions drawn from other humanitarian law treaties, 
such as the granting of an amnesty for fighters who have carried out their 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war, the release of 
all captured persons, or a commitment to search for the missing. If they 
contain provisions drawn from humanitarian law, or if they implement 
humanitarian law obligations already incumbent on the Parties, such 
agreements, or the relevant provisions as the case may be, may constitute 
special agreements under common Article 3. This is particularly import-
ant given that hostilities do not always come to an end with the conclu-
sion of a peace agreement.55
According to these terms, the icrc explicitly recognizes a broad scope to spe-
cial agreements that can also include peace agreements. Even if the Colombian 
Peace Agreement is the first one in which the parties expressly claimed it to 
be regarded as a special agreement under Common Article 3, the icrc has 
considered other peace deals to have the same character.56 In these cases, 
the defining element of a special agreement is its inclusion of provisions gov-
erned by ihl, as in the case of amnesties and the search of missing people, 
for example. Based on this criterion, the Final Peace Agreement concluded by 
the Colombian government and the farc in 2016 can be indeed considered a 
special agreement in terms of Common Article 3 to 1949 Geneva Conventions.
1.2.2 The Peace Agreement as a Document of the UN Security Council
The second mechanism aimed at giving international legal character to the 
Colombian Peace Agreement was its incorporation into a unsc resolution. 
The parties agreed that the President of the Republic would make a unilat-
eral declaration before the UN Secretary- General to request him to welcome 
 55 icrc, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2nd edition, 2016, para. 850.
 56 The icrc mentions here the Cotonou Agreement on Liberia (1993), icrc, Commentary 
on the First Geneva Convention, n. 803. Heffes and Kotlick also include the example of 
the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement between the government of Angola and unita, Heffes 
and Kotlik, ‘Special Agreements as a Means of Enhancing Compliance with IHL in Non- 







the Peace Agreement and add it as an annex to unsc Resolution 2261 (2016) 
in order to give it the character of an “official document of the Security 
Council.”57
unsc resolutions have been used to internationalize internal peace agree-
ments in several cases. In general, the Security Council has shown support 
for internal peace agreements in cases where the UN had participated in the 
negotiation process. Examples include peace processes and agreements in 
Angola,58 Afghanistan,59 Nepal,60 Ivory Coast,61 Sudan,62 and Libya.63 In these 
cases, the Council endorsed or welcomed the agreement, encouraged the par-
ties to cooperate toward its implementation, and created or extended the man-
date of UN military or political missions in the respective country.
In the Colombian case, the Security Council has adopted several resolutions 
regarding the peace agreement. First, Resolution 2261 (2016) established a 12- 
month “political mission of unarmed international observers, responsible for 
the monitoring and verification of the laying down of arms.”64 Then, Resolution 
2307 (2016) welcomed the Final Agreement reached on 24 August 2016 (which 
was later rejected by popular vote) and approved the deployment of the 
 57 Gobierno de Colombia and farc, ‘Comunicado Conjunto No. 69.’
 58 unsc Resolution 1127 (1997), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 1127 (1997).
 59 unsc Resolution 1383 (2001), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 1383 (2001). It “Endorses the Agreement on 
provisional arrangements in Afghanistan” concluded by the participants in the UN Talks 
on Afghanistan held in Bonn in December 2001. In this case, the negotiations were con-
ducted under UN support, and the unsc had previous resolutions and interventions on 
the matter.
 60 unsc Resolution 1740 (2007), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 1740 (2007), “Welcoming the signing on 
21 November by the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement” and established a UN Political Mission in Nepal 
(unmin).
 61 unsc Resolution 1464 (2013), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 1464. It “Endorses the agreement signed 
by the Ivorian political forces in Linas- Marcoussis on 24 January 2003.” A Conference of 
Heads of Stated on Côte d’Ivore was held in Paris right after the Agreement was con-
cluded. This Conference was hosted by France, who, as permanent member of the unsc 
sent an official letter to the Council submitting the peace agreement itself and the con-
clusions of the Conference of Heads of State in which they asked this endorsement.
 62 unsc Resolution 1590 (2005), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 1590 (2005), “Welcoming the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan (gos) and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army (splm/ a) in Nairobi, Kenya on 9 January 
2005” and establishes a UN Mission in Sudan (unmis) (with military component).
 63 unsc Resolution 2259 (2015), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 2259 (2015). It “Welcomes the signature on 
17 December 2015 of the Libyan Political Agreement of Skhira”, and “Endorses the Rome 
Communiqué of 13 December 2015 to support the Government of National Accord as the 
sole legitimate government of Libya.”












International Law in the Colombian Transition 69
political monitoring mission created by Resolution 2261.65 Later, Resolution 
2366 (2017) welcomed the new Final Agreement signed on 24 November 2016 
and established a new Verification Mission to monitor the reintegration pro-
cess and the implementation of the Agreement.66 Finally, through Resolutions 
2377 (2017), 2381 (2017), 2435 (2018), and 2487 (2019) the Council defined oper-
ational aspects of the Verification Mission and expanded and renewed its 
mandate.
Additionally, as agreed in the Joint Communiqué No. 69, on 24 March 2017 
Colombia deposited a letter before the UN Secretary- General in which the 
President of the Republic, after thanking the Organization for its support to 
the peace process, stated: “I would also like to officially express the Colombian 
Government’s good faith through a unilateral State declaration, and herewith 
submit the full text of the Final Agreement.”67
For some authors, unsc resolutions lend international legal force to the 
agreements they support. For Bell, “Security Council resolutions can be used to 
bring the force of law to peace agreement commitments, establishing mecha-
nisms for monitoring compliance that stand independently of the status of the 
agreement itself, which nevertheless forms their raison d’être.”68 Roucounas 
further affirms that through its incorporation in a Security Council resolution, 
the peace agreement becomes “an act of the international organization and 
operates as such towards the parties and towards the international community 
as a whole.”69
An illustrative case for this discussion is given by the peace agreement 
between the Government of Angola and União Nacional para a Independência 
Total de Angola (unita). Under UN mediation, the parties signed two docu-
ments that were circulated as UN documents. unita failed to accomplish its 
obligations and consequently reactivated the risk of violence. In reaction, by 
Resolution 1127 (1997), the Security Council demanded unita to immediately 
implement its obligations under the peace agreement, invoking Chapter vii of 
the UN Charter.70 Analyzing this case, Kooijmans argued:
 65 UN Security Council, Resolution 2307 (2016).
 66 UN Security Council, Resolution 2366 (2017).
 67 UN Secretary- General, ‘Letter Dated 29 March 2017 from the Secretary- General Addressed 
to the President of the Security Council,’ 29 March 2017, https:// colombia.unmissions.org/ 
sites/ default/ files/ s- 2017- 272_ e.pdf Annex i.
 68 Bell, ‘Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status,’ 394.
 69 Emmanuel Roucounas, ‘Peace Agreements as Instruments for the Resolution of Intrastate 
Conflicts,’ in Conflict Resolution: New Approaches and Methods, by unesco (Paris: 
unesco, 2000), 120– 21.














The fact that [the agreement] is concluded between a government and an 
insurrectionist party does not in itself detract from its international char-
acter. The United Nations as an organization of states has been deeply 
involved in the conflict, peace keeping forces have been deployed, the 
Secretary- General through his Special Representative has continuously 
mediated. If a settlement is reached which is co- signed by the Secretary- 
General’s Representative, the non- state entity must be assumed not only 
to have committed itself to its counterpart, the Government but also to 
the United Nations.71
However, in opposition to Kooijmans’ opinion, the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
concluded that in this case the “action taken by the Security Council upon fail-
ure of a party to implement the peace agreement derives from Chapter vii 
of the UN Charter and not from the peace agreement.”72 Indeed, the Security 
Council deemed that “the resulting situation in Angola constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security in the region” and cited this as the reason by 
which it acted “under Chapter vii of the Charter of the United Nations.”73 As 
such, the enforceability of the obligations agreed upon by the parties did not 
derive from the agreement itself but from the UN Charter. Nonetheless, the 
peace agreement was used by the Security Council as a reference to determine 
unita’s noncompliance.
The Security Council’s endorsement of a peace agreement therefore does 
not by itself lend international legal value to such a deal. However, its endorse-
ment has at least two important consequences. First, on a political level, the 
Council’s seizing of the agreement and involvement in its implementation— 
as in the case of Colombia through monitoring missions— raise international 
attention and can add pressure toward compliance. Second, on a legal level, 
in the case of a failure to meet the agreement obligations that raises a threat 
to international peace and security, the deal could be used as a parameter to 
determine obligations and eventual responsibilities before the Council acting 
under Chapter vii of the Charter.
Finally, the unilateral declaration made by the Colombian President at the 
time of depositing the Final Agreement before the Secretary- General requires 
 71 P.H. Kooijmans, ‘The Security Council and Non- State Entities as Parties to Conflicts,’ in 
International Law: Theory and Practice : Essays in Honour of Eric Suy, ed. Eric Suy and 
Karell Wellens (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), 338.
 72 Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and 
Brima Bazzy Kamara, paragraph 39.
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a special mention. In accordance with the Guiding Principles Applicable 
to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, 
which was adopted by the International Law Commission (ilc) in 2006, a 
public declaration made at the international level by the Head of State, Head 
of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which the will to be bound 
is expressed clearly and specifically, creates international legal obligations. 
The binding character of such a declaration is based on good faith, and other 
interested states “are entitled to require that such obligations be respected.”74 
According to these terms, independent of the annexation of the Agreement 
to a unsc Resolution, the unilateral declaration made by the President on 
behalf of the State generates international legal obligations for Colombia. The 
Agreement therefore also attained international legal character by this means.
1.3 Consequences of the Peace Agreement’s International Legal Status
Despite the parties’ intention to give the Peace Agreement legal certainty 
through its legal internationalization, the terms by which it was delimitated 
following the plebiscite reduced the domestic effects of such a formula. As 
noted above, in Colombia duly ratified international treaties regarding ihrl 
and ihl have the same normative level as the Constitution, forming a consti-
tutional block. However, the terms of Article 93 of the Colombian Constitution 
make clear that such a status is reserved to treaties stricto sensu.75 As such, even 
if the Peace Agreement can be considered an international agreement, as per 
the above analysis, it does not have the character of a treaty under the vclt. 
Legally, this is the reason why the first formula proposed by the Government 
and the farc incorporating the agreement into the constitutional block was 
problematic. In contrast, the Final Agreement did not invoke such a constitu-
tional feature but rather the status of special agreement for the purposes of “its 
international validity.”76
The international character of the Peace Agreement as a special agreement 
therefore does not imply per se any legal constraint to its domestic modifi-
cation. The legal certainty of the Final Agreement ultimately depends on the 
constitutional reforms introduced to protect it. To this effect, as mentioned 
above, a constitutional amendment was adopted stating that all organs of the 
 74 International Law Commission, Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations 
of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, 2006.
 75 Constitución Política de Colombia, Art. 93.
 76 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 









State must act according to what was agreed on, “preserving the contents, com-
mitments, the spirit and the principles of the Final Agreement,” and that this 
provision will be in force for three presidential terms.77
Additionally, the same amendment included a provision according to which 
the contents of the Agreement related to the norms of ihl and fundamental 
rights “will be compulsory parameters of interpretation and a referent for the 
development and validity of the norms and laws developing and implement-
ing the Final Agreement.”78 Even if this provision did not give the Agreement 
an international effect at the domestic level, its content related to ihl and 
human rights became a parameter by which to interpret and develop the 
peace agreement.79 For all the above reasons, Bell considers the Colombian 
Peace Agreement to be something “ ‘hybrid’ between international and consti-
tutional law.”80
Nonetheless, at the international level, the international legal status of the 
Peace Agreement can have important political and legal effects. In political 
terms, defining the peace deal as an international agreement increases the 
“reputation costs” for the parties involved in the case of non- compliance.81 
In the Colombian case, the unsc resolutions regarding the agreement have 
played a significant role, as the agreement has received the attention of the 
highest global body responsible for international peace and security. Though 
this cost could be higher for the State, the farc also want to preserve the 
implicit degree of reputation and recognition attached to the legal status of 
the Peace Agreement.82
In legal terms, the international legal character of the Peace Agreement 
could have at least three consequences. First, the unilateral declaration made 
by the President on behalf of the Colombian State before the UN generated 
 77 Congreso de la República de Colombia, Acto Legislativo 02 de 2017, available at: http:// 
es.presidencia.gov.co/ normativa/ normativa/ ACTO%20LEGISLATIVO%20N°%2002%20
DE%2011%20DE%20MAYO%20DE%202017.pdf.
 78 Ibid.
 79 This formula could capture the notion of “trans- textuality”, proposed by Roucounas, 
according to which as peace agreements generally include obligations already enshrined 
by international law instruments, they will also become internationally binding. 
Roucounas, ‘Peace Agreements as Instruments for the Resolution of Intrastate Conflicts,’ 
120– 21.
 80 Bell, ‘Lex Pacificatoria Colombiana: Colombia’s Peace Accord in Comparative 
Perspective,’ 169.
 81 Bell, On the Law of Peace, 139.
 82 On the idea of the costs and benefits of the legal status of the peace agreement for non- 
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legal obligations in terms of the Guiding Principles proposed by the ilc 
in 2006. To that effect, any interested state— for instance, the guarantor 
countries— could invoke international obligations contracted by Colombia in 
the Peace Agreement. An announcement made in 2018 by the new political 
party that emerged from the transition of the farc to civilian life is illustra-
tive of this point: the party asked the UN to request an International Court of 
Justice’s advisory opinion on the scope and effects of the unilateral declara-
tion made by the President of the Republic in March 2017 regarding the Peace 
Agreement.83 Even though this request has not been followed, it shows the 
potential legal effects of such a unilateral declaration.
Second, as the special agreement constitutes a norm of ihl, the Agreement 
could eventually be considered as a parameter before the icc in the case that 
a war crime was under its examination, and the commission of such a crime 
would have any relation with the agreement. This possibility is rare but theo-
retically conceivable.
Third, as a more likely consequence, the Peace Agreement can become a 
parameter by which to examine the State’s responsibility before human rights 
bodies and courts. Regarding this point, von Hehn notes that “by including the 
applicability of human rights conventions in the peace package, countries also 
attract monitoring by the respective treaty bodies, enabling additional scru-
tiny of the implementation process outside of the main negotiations.”84 Along 
same lines, Verucci suggests that since a special agreement is an international 
norm, it could be used, for example, to evaluate a state under the Universal 
Periodic Review.85
With respect to this third consequence, a concrete example of the use of a 
peace agreement as a parameter by international bodies is given by the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights. In the El Mozote case, the Court claimed 
that “when analyzing the compatibility of the Law of General Amnesty for 
the Consolidation of Peace with the international obligations arising from 
the American Convention and its application to the case,” it is also neces-
sary to consider “the provisions of Protocol ii Additional to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, as well as of the specific terms in which it was agreed to end 
hostilities, which put an end to the conflict in El Salvador and, in particular, of 
 83 Caracol Radio. (2018). Farc pedirá opinión jurídica a la cij para implementación de 
los Acuerdos de Paz. Available at http:// caracol.com.co/ radio/ 2018/ 01/ 14/ nacional/ 
1515906848_ 061576.html (accessed on 20 February 2019).
 84 von Hehn, The Internal Implementation of Peace Agreements after Violent Intrastate 
Conflict, 57.








Chapter 1 (“Armed Forces”), section 5 (“End to impunity ”), of the Peace Accord 
of January 16, 1992.”86 In this case, the Court used a domestic peace agreement 
as a parameter by which to evaluate the state’s responsibility under ihrl.
2 Socioeconomic and Political Reforms
As presented in Chapter 1, the object of jus post bellum is not only about end-
ing armed conflict but building sustainable peace. Regarding niac s, both 
purposes usually demand socioeconomic and political reforms. First, ending 
armed conflict requires social, economic, and political measures for the rein-
tegration of former fighters. Second, building sustainable peace involves both 
socioeconomic and institutional recovery from the damages caused by armed 
conflict, as well as addressing the root causes of confrontation, which are com-
monly related to socioeconomic and political matters. All those questions are 
present in the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement.
This chapter departed from presenting a general overview of the Colombian 
armed conflict. As seen, the origin of armed conflict in the country was deeply 
related to socioeconomic and political reasons. Guerrilla groups have invoked 
land concentration, rural poverty, and political exclusion as the original causes 
of the conflict.87 Additionally, the protracted confrontation brought other 
related elements such as the impact of forced displacement, landmines, and 
war economies— e.g. crops of illicit use. All those factors had to be addressed 
in a comprehensive way if parties wanted to negotiate a serious and lasting 
peace. And they did it.
This section is aimed at exploring how socioeconomic and political reforms 
adopted for transition in Colombia reveal legal and policy considerations 
responding to a framework of jus post bellum. Unlike the other sections of this 
chapter, which mainly assume a legal perspective, this one addresses policy 
aspects of peacebuilding related to removing the root causes of conflict and 
building a sustainable peace.
For that, the section presents the general international legal and policy 
framework applicable to socioeconomic and political reforms in transition. 
Then, it examines how those reforms are addressed in the Colombian Peace 
Agreement, broaching issues such as land access and rural development, 
 86 Inter- American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and nearby 
places v. El Salvador, Judgement of 25 October 2012 (2012), para. 284.
 87 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
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environmental protection, demining, the problem of crops of illicit use, and 
the reintegration of former fighters.
2.1 Legal and Policy Framework on Socioeconomic and Political Reforms 
for Transition to Peace
Armed conflict affects social and economic development, deteriorates the 
environment, breaks social coexistence, and undermines democratic mecha-
nisms and institutions. Moreover, in contexts of niac s some of those prob-
lems existed before armed conflict started and, in most cases, they were the 
very cause of confrontation.
Therefore, addressing the root causes of armed conflict and building 
 conditions for sustainable peace in transition from niac s implies removing 
structural factors of exclusion and inequalities. As pointed out by Chetail, 
peacebuilding entails the responsibility “to free individuals not only from ‘fear’ 
but also from ‘need’.”88 As such, “the concept of post- conflict peacebuilding 
is inextricably linked to the notion of a ‘positive peace’ describing a situation 
which is not only characterized by the absence of hostiles but by many other 
political, economic and social accomplishments.”89
This aim of positive peace involves several social, economic, and political 
measures, all of which entail legal considerations. As Schaller argues, “the 
establishment of conditions for a positive and durable peace is also insepara-
bly linked to effectively guaranteeing human rights.”90 In other words, building 
positive peace beyond the end of armed confrontation requires human rights- 
based reforms addressing matters as poverty, marginalization, development, 
and democratic participation.
Different international legal instruments enshrine provisions applicable to 
socioeconomic and political reform in transitional contexts, under a human 
rights perspective. In general terms, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (iccpr) establishes the state’s obligation to ensure to all peo-
ple under its jurisdiction the full enjoyment of their civil and political rights. It 
mainly includes, for the purpose of this section, the right to political and social 
participation.91 Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
 88 Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 8.
 89 Christian Schaller, ‘Towards an International Legal Framework for Post- Conflict 
Peacebuilding,’ Research Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs 3 
(2009): 15.
 90 Schaller, 15.
 91 ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,’ Pub. L. No. General Assembly 











Cultural Rights (icescr) enshrines the state’s obligation to ensure the enjoy-
ment of all economic, social, and cultural rights, and to adopt all appropriate 
means for that purpose.92 Analogous provisions can be found in other regional 
human rights instruments.93
Regarding soft law documents, there are several instruments related to 
social, economic, and cultural rights relevant to the context of peacemaking 
and peacebuilding. The UN Declaration on the Right to Development estab-
lishes that “The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue 
of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, 
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, 
in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.”94 
Additionally, it disposes that “Appropriate economic and social reforms should 
be carried out with a view to eradicating all social injustices.”95
The UN Declaration on the Right to Peace underlines the positive dimen-
sion of peace as involving “mutual understanding, cooperation, and socioeco-
nomic development,” and for such a purpose recalls “the world commitment 
to eradicate poverty and to promote sustained economic growth, sustainable 
development and global prosperity for all, and the need to reduce inequalities 
within and among countries.”96 In this line, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development states that “There can be no sustainable development without 
peace and no peace without sustainable development.”97
More recently, the 2018 UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other 
People Working in Rural Areas98 addressed the states’ obligations under ihrl 
to ensure all human rights to people living in rural areas. This instrument is 
very revalent regarding peacemaking and peacebuilding in the contexts of 
niacs, because of the special impact of armed conflict in the rural areas. At 
this regard, the Declaration states the right of peasants and rural people to 
 92 ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,’ Pub. L. No. General 
Assembly Resolution 2200A (xxi), (1966) Art. 2- 3.
 93 ‘European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ 
(1950); ‘American Convention on Human Rights’ (1969).
 94 UN General Assembly, ‘Declaration on the Right to Development,’ Pub. L. No. A/ res/ 41/ 
128 (1986) Art. 1.1.
 95 UN General Assembly Art. 8.1.
 96 UN General Assembly, ‘Declaration on the Right to Peace,’ Pub. L. No. A/ hrc/ res/ 32/ 28 
(2016), 2– 3.
 97 UN General Assembly, ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development,’ Pub. L. No. A/ res/ 70/ 1 (2015), 3.
 98 UN General Assembly, ‘Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working 
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have and “an adequate standard of living”99 and to live in conditions of “peace 
and dignity.”100
In terms of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (ddr), several 
UN documents provide policy and legal considerations relevant to jus post 
bellum. UN reports and resolutions have consistently stressed on ddr “as a 
key element of stabilization in post- conflict situations to facilitate a society’s 
transition from conflict to development;”101 the need to assume a comprehen-
sive view of ddr programs102 and to integrate them to other components of 
the peacebuilding framework;103 and the adoption of differential consider-
ations on ddr regarding women and children fighters.104 In addition, the UN 
approach to ddr identifies several ihl and ihrl provisions as applicable to 
ddr, mainly regarding civil and political rights, promoting access to educa-
tion, health, employment and other economic, social, and cultural rights with-
out discrimination, and the duty to ensure special protection to women and 
children in all circumstances.105
According to such a general framework, different socioeconomic and insti-
tutional aspects must be addressed in transition to establishing a sustainable 
peace. For instance, reforms aimed at creating socioeconomic development 
are fundamental for employing former fighters and providing them with an 
alternative livelihood (a fundamental condition for an effective reintegra-
tion),106 as well as for building conditions of wellbeing for the population, 
which can facilitate social integration and long- term stability. Similarly, insti-
tutional reforms aimed at empowering excluded groups and broadening civic 
and political participation are fundamental to reestablish civic trust, peaceful 
coexistence, and reconciliation.
Likewise, environmental protection is a fundamental dimension of peace-
building.107 Armed conflict usually impacts the environment, which is also 
 99 UN General Assembly Art. 17.1.
 100 UN General Assembly Art. 24.1.
 101 Secretary- General’s report on The Role of UN Peacekeeping in Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration, S/ 2000/ 101, of 11 February 2000, paras. 2 and 8.
 102 Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/ prst/ 2000/ 10, of 23 March 2000.
 103 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, A/ 55/ 305; S/ 2000/ 809, of 21 August 2000.
 104 Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security; and Resolutions 
1379 (2001), 1460 (2003) and 1539 (2004) on Children in Armed Conflict.
 105 United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center, The 
UN Approach to ddr, 2006, pp. 18– 19.
 106 Achim Wennmann, ‘Economic Provisions in Peace Agreements and Sustainable 
Peacebuilding,’ Négotiations 1, no. 11 (2009): 46.
 107 Carsten Stahn, ‘R2P and Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Polycentric Approach,’ in Jus Post 




















irregularly exploited as a means to finance armed hostilities in the context of 
niac s.108 The environmental degradation caused by those situations can exac-
erbate violence, especially in contexts “where large parts of the population 
depend on land and renewable resources for their livelihood.”109 This situation 
imperils reconciliation and affects the conditions for effective post- conflict 
economic reconstruction.110 For these reasons, “environmental protection and 
the sustainable management of resources are important pathways to consoli-
date peace and promote long- term development.”111
Finally, mine action is another critical element in post conflict transi-
tion and post- conflict reconstruction.112 In countries seriously affected by 
minefields during armed conflict, demining is a crucial element to restore 
livelihoods and contribute to peacebuilding.113 It facilitates the reintegra-
tion of former fighters (when employed as deminers, for instance) and the 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons, promotes coopera-
tion and confidence- building, and improves safety, security, and economic 
revitalization.114
All the above components of the post- conflict socioeconomic and political 
reconstruction have a legal base, mainly under ihrl and ihl, in addition to 
several UN and soft law documents related to the rights to peace and develop-
ment, and to peacebuilding in general. In the next item, we will see how such 
an international legal framework shaped transitional formulas in Colombia on 
this matter.
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2.2 Socioeconomic and Political Reforms in the Colombian Peace 
Agreement
The very name of the Final Agreement to End Armed Conflict and Build a Stable 
and Lasting Peace raises the parties’ determination to address the root causes 
of the armed conflict, as a condition to build a sustainable peace in Colombia. 
In its introduction, the Agreement declares its rights- based approach, and its 
goal to contribute to greater territorial integration and greater social inclusion, 
as well as to strengthening democracy, bringing institutions to all over around 
the country, and ensuring that all the ideas can be expressed with full guar-
antees via politics and social conflicts can be resolved through institutional 
channels.115 In this way, the Agreement states as its final aim the full realization 
of all human rights for all people,116 and it considers itself as a guarantee of 
non- recurrence of violations of human rights.117
That explicit utterance of the rights- based approach to building sustain-
able peace is complemented with reiterated references to ihrl along the 
Agreement.118 The parties explicitly defined a commitment to make effective 
all human rights, according to the Colombian Constitution, to the iccpr, the 
icescr, and the other ihrl treaties ratified by Colombia.119 As such, they 
openly attributed a role to international legal norms and standards to govern 
matters highly dependent on domestic political and practical considerations.
Having the elements presented above, the following are the main aspects 
referred to socioeconomic and political matters in the Colombian Peace 
Agreement.
First, the first chapter of the Peace Agreement is devoted to a comprehensive 
rural reform. This chapter understands rural problems in Colombia as a root 
cause of armed conflict, and the need to implement a comprehensive reform 
as a condition to build a sustainable peace. On this topic, the Agreement 
includes development programs for the structural transformation of the coun-
tryside, promoting an equitable relationship between rural and urban areas.120 
It includes an ambitious program of rural infrastructure, connectivity, health, 
 115 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 6.
 116 Government of Colombia and farc, 2.
 117 Government of Colombia and farc, 132.
 118 The Agreement contains 14 specific references to ihrl. See Government of Colombia and 
farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace.’
 119 Government of Colombia and farc, 190.















education, housing, cooperative economy, income generation, progressive 
realization of the right to food, and land access.
Second, linked to rural development programs, the Agreement makes sev-
eral references to environmental protection in the context of peacebuilding. 
In its preamble, the Agreement envisions a society in which peace allows to 
achieve sustainable development, protection of the environment, natural 
resources, and biodiversity.121 Then, it offers special land access and other 
benefits for peasants, rural victims, and communities who work to protect the 
environment, substitute crops of illicit use, and improve food production.122 
Additionally, the deal calls for the protection of areas of special environmental 
interest with the participation of rural communities, looking for a sustainable 
development, in which the Agreement emphasizes on the special contribution 
of small- scale farmer and indigenous and Afro- descendent communities.123
Third, since political exclusion was at the heart of the root causes of armed 
conflict, in the same way as for the rural reform the parties dedicated a full 
chapter of the Agreement to political participation and democratic opening. 
Here, the parties agreed on rights and guarantees for the exercise of political 
opposition; a comprehensive security system for the exercise of politics; dem-
ocratic mechanisms for citizen participation; guarantees for reconciliation, 
coexistence, and non- stigmatization; awareness- raising campaigns for non- 
discrimination, pluralism, and the free debate of ideas; promoting greater par-
ticipation in politics among the most excluded social sectors; and the political 
participation of former members of the guerrilla.124 This chapter also estab-
lishes a National Political Pact, aimed at reaching a commitment that arms will 
never again be used in politics and never again will violent organizations such 
as paramilitarism be promoted.125
Fourth, the Agreement contains a detailed and technical chapter on the end-
ing of armed conflict, in which it describes the procedure for the laying down 
of arms and the socioeconomic and political reintegration of former fighters. 
It includes social, educational, and employment programs for demobilized 
persons, with special support for programs related to environmental conser-
vation and demining.126 Additionally, the Agreement established the creation 
of a new political party in which former guerrilla leaders could promote the 
 121 Government of Colombia and farc, 3– 4.
 122 Government of Colombia and farc, 15.
 123 Government of Colombia and farc, 11.
 124 Government of Colombia and farc, 37– 55.
 125 Government of Colombia and farc, 80.













International Law in the Colombian Transition 81
ideas they previously defended by arms.127 On this point, it is important to 
mention that the guerrilla did not accept the use of the expressions disarma-
ment and demobilization, as they saw them as a kind of capitulation. Instead, 
the Agreement systematically uses the expressions of laying down of arms, and 
social, political, and economic reintegration.
Fifth, since crops of illicit use and drug- trafficking became one of the main 
fuels of armed violence in the last decades in Colombia, the parties in nego-
tiation dedicated a full chapter of the Agreement to this matter. They created 
a comprehensive program for substitution of crops used for illicit purposes, 
integrated to the comprehensive rural reform. The deal looks at promoting 
community- based plans and alternative agrarian development, ensuring eco-
nomic and social rights.128 Additionally, the Agreement promotes a human 
rights and public health- based approach to the problem of drugs, and the 
development of an international conference under the auspices of the UN to 
assess the policy counter drugs and discuss new approaches to the matter.
Sixth, being the farc the main responsible of mine contamination in 
Colombia,129 the Agreement establishes the cooperation of former guerrilla 
members with demining, and the State’s commitment to clean the territory 
from landmines. Demining is presented as a condition for a safe return of inter-
nally displaced people and for rural development and substitution of crops of 
illicit use. Contribution to demining is among the possible restorative sanc-
tions to be imposed to former fighters by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.
In addition to those measures, the Agreement contains several references 
to economic, social, and cultural rights, the reparation for their violation,130 
and a Truth Commission’s mandate to elucidate the impact of armed conflict 
over economic, social, and cultural rights.131 The Agreement also states that 
 127 Government of Colombia and farc, 69.
 128 Government of Colombia and farc, 106.
 129 Colombia has the 15th position on extent of mine- contaminated land in the world up 
to the end of 2016, and the farc were considered the main producer of antipersonnel 
landmines in Colombia until the signature of the Peace Agreement. See International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines. Landmine Monitor 2017, available at https:// reliefweb.int/ 
sites/ reliefweb.int/ files/ resources/ Landmine_ Monitor_ 2017_ Embargoed.pdf (accessed 
on 4 February 2019).
 130 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 125.
 131 Government of Colombia and farc, 134. On this role of truth commissions addressing 
economic, social and cultural rights, see Lisa Laplante, ‘Transitional Justice and Peace 
Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a 













all its socioeconomic and political measures seek the non- recurrence of the 
conflict and ensuring human rights for all. It indicates that the rural reform 
looks for the “guarantee of rights, including economic, social, cultural and 
environmental rights of the rural population,” which “contributes to their 
well- being and quality of life.”132 As for the political reform, the Agreement 
seeks “the exercise of political rights, the promotion of a democratic culture 
and of human rights and guarantees for reconciliation, coexistence, toler-
ance, non- stigmatization, and the guarantees for the mobilization and social 
protest.”133 Finally, the Agreement refers to actions related to resolve the 
problem of drugs of illicit use as a way “to contribute to overcoming the con-
ditions of poverty, marginalization and weak institutional presence” in the 
rural areas.134
As such, the Colombian Peace Agreement assumed a solid human rights- 
based approach to socioeconomic and political reforms aimed at building 
peace. In many cases the deal explicitly refers to ihrl obligations and, in 
the others, it involves substantial human rights issues, even though they 
are not necessarily expressed in the logic of international human rights 
instruments.135 However, the most important element for the purpose of 
this analysis is the fact that the parties understood the need to address the 
root causes of the conflict and to create socioeconomic and political con-
ditions for building sustainable peace, and that they did so acknowledging 
and invoking international human rights obligations. As such, the parties 
used an international frame of reference to design their specific approach, 
according to the conditions of their context, offering insights on the impor-
tance of a human rights- based approach to development and reconstruction 
in peacebuilding. These considerations offer elements to see the Colombian 
case as involving a principle of jus post bellum on reconstruction and trans-
formation of the conditions for sustainable peace, as Chapter 3 will further 
analyze.
 132 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 199.
 133 Government of Colombia and farc, 199.
 134 Government of Colombia and farc, 198.
 135 On this point, Kastner sustains that “even though many agreements that do not explic-
itly refer to human rights deal, in their substance, with human rights issues. Provisions 
on power sharing, the electoral system and institutional reform, and access to natural 
resources typically address questions of injustice and inequality, without necessarily 
using the language and logic of international human rights instruments.” Kastner, Legal 
Normativity in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflict, 43. See also Christine Bell, Peace 
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3 Criminal Justice
The most visible influence of international law in peacemaking is related to 
criminal responsibility for serious crimes committed during armed conflict. 
Traditionally, most peace negotiations had concluded with general amnesties 
for people responsible for such crimes. Then, South Africa introduced an inter-
nationally accepted mechanism of conditional amnesties to reach truth and 
reconciliation, with no criminal sanctions. However, since the paradigmatic 
development of icl during the 1990s, this matter has progressively changed. 
Today, full amnesties are prohibited for crimes under international law, and 
conditional amnesties do not have any clear framework. This context car-
ries out big challenges for countries emerging from internal armed conflicts 
through peace negotiations.
Colombia has assumed different approaches on this matter. During peace 
negotiations conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, blanket amnesties 
were granted to demobilized members of guerrillas. After the intensification 
of armed conflict during late 1990s and early 2000s, a demobilization process 
was agreed with paramilitary groups who accepted their submission to jus-
tice in exchange for lenient punishments. This model, created in 2005, looked 
at conciliating the international exigencies of justice with the practical needs 
of a negotiated demobilization. Now, after the 2012– 2016 peace process with 
the farc, a comprehensive model of transitional justice was agreed on by 
the parties, combining amnesties, criminal responsibility, and alternative 
punishments.
The 2016 Peace Agreement explicitly states that its transitional justice 
model is aimed at accomplishing the State’s international obligations under 
ihl, ihrl, and icl,136 satisfying the victims’ rights to truth, justice, and rep-
aration. For that, a Special Jurisdiction for Peace was created to try armed 
conflict- related crimes under international and domestic law, when amnesty 
is not possible. However, the system adopts a restorative perspective and, in 
exchange of the accused’s contribution to truth and reparation, sentences will 
determine alternative punishments primarily aimed at repairing victims and 
building peace.
This model of criminal responsibility has been welcomed by the icc. The 
Court’s Prosecutor “note[d] , with satisfaction, that the final text of the peace 
agreement excludes amnesties and pardons for crimes against humanity and 
 136 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 





war crimes under the Rome Statute.”137 Similarly, the President of the Court 
affirmed that the Colombian transitional justice model shows that peace and 
justice are not incompatible.138
Considering said elements, this section is divided into three parts. The first part 
presents the legal framework on amnesties at the end of niac s and the duty to 
prosecute international crimes. The second part addresses the discussion on con-
ciliating the needs of peace and the requirements of justice in transitional settings. 
And the third part explains the Colombian approach to criminal responsibility in 
a negotiated transition by observing applicable international legal standards.
3.1 Legal Framework on Amnesties and Criminal Responsibility
Both amnesty and criminal prosecution have international legal foundation. 
Amnesties are part of the instruments envisaged by ihl for the exit of armed 
conflict, but they cannot be used to evade the international legal obligation 
to prosecute serious crimes committed during armed conflict, which is a duty 
under ihl, ihrl, and icl. As such, this item presents the legal framework on 
both amnesties and criminal responsibility for serious crimes, to then analyze 
its application in transition from armed conflict to peace and its application in 
the Colombian case.
3.1.1 Amnesties at the End of niac s
Since the xviii century, Kant stated that “the very concept of peace entails 
the idea of amnesty.”139 This notion has prevailed in most peace agreements 
ending armed conflicts in the following two centuries.
Regarding niac s, Article 6(5) of 1977 Additional Protocol ii to 1949 Geneva 
Conventions states that: “At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power 
shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have 
participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons 
related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.” The icrc 
considers this provision as a customary rule.140
 137 Office of the icc Prosecutor, ‘Statement of icc Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the 
Conclusion of the Peace Negotiations between the Government of Colombia and 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’.
 138 ‘La Presidenta de La cpi: “Colombia Demuestra Que Paz y Justicia No Son Incompatibles”,’ 
Agencia EFE, 1 July 2017, https:// www.efe.com/ efe/ america/ portada/ la- presidenta- de- cpi- 
colombia- demuestra- que- paz- y- justicia- no- son- incompatibles/ 20000064- 3313655.
 139 Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysic of Morals, 1797, § 58, quoted by Ambos, ‘The Legal Framework 
of Transitional Justice,’ 27.
 140 Jean- Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
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Analyzing the rationale behind such a provision, Kreß and Grover point out 
that the norm looks at offering “an incentive for non- State fighters to conduct 
the hostilities in accordance with the law of non- international armed con-
flict.”141 Broomhall suggests that this provision “is intended primarily to dis-
courage the prosecution under ordinary criminal law.”142 In a different view, 
Mégret affirms that encouraging amnesties for rebels goes beyond a human-
itarian purpose and it raises “the difficult legal question of which rebellions 
more generally conform to a sort of non- state jus ad bellum, and would reward 
those that do.”143
Nonetheless, in a more functional perspective, amnesties play a fundamen-
tal role in peacemaking. In its 1987 Commentary on Additional Protocol ii, the 
icrc considered that the object of this provision on amnesties “is to encourage 
gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to reestablishing normal rela-
tions in the life of a nation which has been divided.”144 Certainly, fighters who 
know that they will face a criminal “retribution will often consider that they 
have nothing to lose and fight to the end.”145 Thus, in contexts of niac s waiver 
of punishment may be essential to restore peace and facilitate reconcilia-
tion.146 As such, amnesties are mainly an incentive for rebels to agree to peace.
Pursuing that objective, the international community has encouraged and 
supported amnesties in several transitions from niac s around the world.147 
In cases such as South Africa, Angola, Croatia, and Afghanistan the UN 
Security Council and the General Assembly explicitly called governments to 
grant amnesties or welcomed those that were agreed by the parties through 
 141 Kreß and Grover, ‘International Criminal Law Restraints in Peace Talks to End Armed 
Conflicts of a Non- International Character,’ 49.
 142 Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between 
Sovereignity and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 96.
 143 Fédéric Mégret, ‘Should Rebels Be Amnestied?,’ in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative 
Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 539.
 144 icrc, Commentary of 1987 on Protocol Additional II (Geneva, 1987), para. 4618.
 145 Charles Garraway, ‘The Relevance of Jus Post Bellum: A Practitioner’s Perspective,’ ed. 
Carsten Stahn and Jann Kleffner (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 159.
 146 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 89.
 147 Michael Scharf, ‘The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation 
to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes,’ Law and Contemporary Problems 59, no. 4 (1996): 41. 
On this line, Jeffery describes the essentially political functional purpose of amnesties 
Renée Jeffery, Amnesties, Accountability, and Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of 
















legislation or peace agreements.148 In none of these cases the international 
community asked for conditions or limitations for those amnesties.
However, the UN approach to amnesties changed right after the conclu-
sion of the 1998 icc Statute. In 1999 the Lomé Peace Agreement in Sierra 
Leone included an unconditional and complete amnesty for the rebels.149 
The agreement was signed by international witnesses, including the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary- General, who appended a disclosure stat-
ing that the UN would understand the amnesty provision contained in the 
agreement as not applicable to international crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.150 After a resumption of hostilities, and mediating a 
request from the government to the UN, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was 
set up in 2002 to try people responsible for international crimes committed 
during the armed conflict.151
On this point, the icrc highlights that even though Article 6(5) of Additional 
Protocol ii does not mention any exclusion, the provision “could not be con-
strued to enable war criminals, or those guilty of crimes against humanity, to 
evade punishment.”152 As such, the customary rule on amnesties at the end of 
 148 See UN Security Council Resolutions 473 (1980), 1055 (1996), 1064 (1996), 1120 (1997); UN 
General Assembly Resolutions 47/ 141 (1992), 48/ 152 (1993), 49/ 207 (1994).
 149 Art. ix.3 of the 19 May 1999 Lomé Agreement: “To consolidate the peace and promote 
the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that 
no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the ruf, ex- afrc, ex- sla 
or cdf in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members 
of those organizations.” Available at Peace Accords Matrix, https:// peaceaccords.nd.edu/ 
provision/ amnesty- lom- peace- agreement.
 150 In his Seventh Report on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, the Secretary- General 
stated that “I instructed my special representative to sing the agreement with the explicit 
proviso that the United Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty and pardon 
in article ix of the agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of humanitarian law” Seventh 
Report of the Secretary- General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leona, 
Security Council, UN Doc. S/ 1999/ 836, 30 July 1999, para. 7. For a discussion on this UN 
disclosure see William Schabas, ‘Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,’ University of California Davis 
Journal of International Law and Policy 11 (2004): 145– 169; Simon Chesterman, ‘Rough 
Justice: Establishing the Rule of Law in Post- Conflict Territories,’ Ohio State Journal on 
Dispute Resolution 20, no. 1 (2005): 69– 98.
 151 UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000), UN. Doc. S/ res/ 1315 (2000).
 152 Henckaerts and Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume 
I: Rules, 612. The icrc endorses this opinion noting that it was expressed by the urss 
delegation during the Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption of the Additional 
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niac s must be in harmony with the customary duty to prosecute crimes pro-
hibited under international law,153 as the following items show.
3.1.2 The Duty to Prosecute International Crimes
Current international law has established a state’s duty to prosecute serious 
violations of human rights and ihl. This obligation is explicitly enshrined by 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions,154 the 1948 Genocide Convention,155 the 1984 
Convention against Torture,156 and the 2006 Convention against Enforced 
Disappearance.157 According to these conventions, states parties have the 
international obligation to bring to justice people under their jurisdiction who 
have committed conducts prohibited by those instruments.
The rationale behind this duty is that international crimes constitute 
offenses to humanity, and their prosecution is a matter of international con-
cern to prevent impunity on those conducts.158 As such, the unsc created the 
 153 Henckaerts and Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume 
I: Rules. Rules 158 and 159. At this point, Rule 159 explicitly includes the exception: “At the 
end of hostilities, the authorities in power must endeavor to grant the broadest possible 
amnesty to persons who have participated in a non- international armed conflict, or those 
deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, with the exception of 
persons suspected of, accused of or sentenced for war crimes.”
 154 First Geneva Convention, Article 49; Second Geneva Convention, Article 50; Third Geneva 
Convention, Article 129; Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 146.
 155 ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ (1948). Articles 
1 and 7.
 156 ‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment,’ Pub. L. No. General Assembly Resolution 39/ 46 (1984). Article 7. At this 
point, the Committee against Torture has expressly affirmed the incompatibility of 
amnesty laws for acts of torture with the obligations enshrined by the Convention. See 
Conclusions and Recommendations Azerbaijan, A/ 55/ 44, para. 69 (17 November 1999); 
Peru, A/ 55/ 44, para. 61 (15 November 1999).
 157 ‘International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance’ 
(2006). Articles 6, 7 and 11.
 158 Grant Niemann, ‘International Criminal Law Sentencing Objectives,’ in Criminal Justice 
in International Society, ed. Willem de Lint, Marinella Marmo, and Nerida Chazal 
(New York: Routledge, 2014), 135. In this line, talking about crimes against human-
ity, the icty stated that: “Crimes against humanity are serious acts of violence which 
harm human beings by striking what is most essential to them: their life, liberty, phys-
ical welfare, health, and dignity. They are inhumane acts that by their extent and grav-
ity go beyond the limits tolerable to the international community, which must perforce 
demand their punishment. But crimes against humanity also transcend the individual 
because when the individual is assaulted, humanity comes under attack and is negated. 
It is therefore the concept of humanity as victim which essentially characterises crimes 
against humanity.” icty, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. it- 96- 














International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia159 and for Rwanda160 
to prosecute international crimes committed in those contexts. Later, this idea 
was codified in a permanent way in the 1998 Statute of the icc, to ensure that 
when the involved state does not prosecute international crimes, an interna-
tional court will assume such a task.
Connecting this duty of prosecution with the prohibition to grant amnes-
ties for serious violations of human rights and ihl has been a contribution of 
the jurisprudence of international human rights courts and bodies, which have 
considered such a prohibition as a part of the states’ positive obligations under 
ihrl. Since 1992, the Inter- American System of Human Rights has developed 
a solid jurisprudence on the prohibition of domestic amnesties for serious 
crimes.161 The Inter- American Commission on Human Rights has consistently 
concluded that laws granting amnesties for serious violations of human rights 
are incompatible with the Inter- American human rights instruments, deciding 
cases on Argentina,162 Chile,163 El Salvador,164 Peru,165 and Uruguay— where 
 159 UN Security Council. Resolution 823(1993), Pub. L. No. S/ res/ 827.
 160 UN Security Council. Resolution 955(1994), Pub. L. No. S/ res/ 955.
 161 As du Bois- Pedain highlights, this jurisprudence constitutes a “regional development that 
is reflected not only in the jurisprudence of treaty bodies under the American Convention 
of Human Rights, but also in decisions of the higher courts and in constitutional docu-
ments in the region that invalidate amnesty law for serious human rights violations.” Antje 
du Bois- Pedain, Transitional Amnesty in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 316. In the same line, taking about Latin America, Roht- Arriaza says: “Even if 
the evidence worldwide is more ambiguous, a rejection of amnesty seems to be the over-
whelming trend in this region.” Naomi Roht- Arriaza, ‘After Amnesties Are Gone: Latin 
American National Courts and the New Contours of the Fight against Impunity,’ Human 
Rights Quarterly 37 (2015): 344.
 162 Inter- American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 28/ 92, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 
10.240, 10.262, 10.309 and 10.311 (Argentina), 2 October 1992.
 163 Inter- American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 34/ 96, Cases 11.228, 11.229, 
11.231 and 11.282 (Chile), Report No. 36/ 96, Case 10.843, 15 October 1996, para. 105 (Chile), 
15 October 1996; Report No. 25/ 98, Cases 11.505, 11.532, 11.541, 11.546, 11.549, 11.569, 11.572, 
11.573, 11.585, 11.595, 11.562, 11.567 and 11.705 (Chile), 7 April 1998, para. 101.
 164 Inter- American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 26/ 92, Case 10.287, Las Hojas 
Massacre (El Salvador), 24 September 1992; Report No. 1/ 99, Case 10.480 Lucio Parada 
and Others (El Salvador), 27 January 1999 (In this case the Commission expressly rejected 
the application of amnesty for violations of ihl, referring that the provision on amnesty 
enshrined by Art. 6(5) of Additional Protocol i does not apply for violation of the laws 
of war, see para. 115- 116); Report No. 136/ 99, Case 10.448, Ignacio Ellacuria S.J. and Others 
(El Salvador), 22 December 1999; Report No. 37/ 00, Case 11.481, Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo 
Romero (El Salvador), 13 April 2000.
 165 Inter- American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 1/ 96, Case 10.559, Chumbivilcas 
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the law on amnesty was even previously declared constitutional by the 
Uruguayan Supreme Court and approved by a national referendum.166 In all 
those cases, the Commission recommended to the respective states to adopt 
all necessary measures to clarify the facts and identify those responsible for 
human rights violations, reversing amnesty and pardon laws.
In 1998, the Inter- American Court of Human Rights defined impunity 
as “the total lack of investigation, prosecution, capture, trial and conviction 
of those responsible for violations of the rights protected by the American 
Convention,” and reiterated the correspondent obligation of states to combat 
it by all legal means at their disposal.167 Following this jurisprudence, in 2001 
the Court concluded that an amnesty law precludes the “access to justice and 
prevents the victims and their next of kin from knowing the truth and receiv-
ing the corresponding reparation.”168 As such, the Court decided that “the said 
laws lack legal effect and may not continue to obstruct the investigation of the 
grounds on which this case is based or the identification and punishment of 
those responsible, nor can they have the same or a similar impact with regard 
to other cases that have occurred.”169 These decisions had domestic impacts 
and led states to derogate amnesty laws and prosecute former political and 
military leaders responsible for human rights abuses in Latin America.170
Although previous decisions on the matter were referred to post- dictatorial 
amnesties, in 2012 the Inter- American Court held the same view regarding 
amnesties after niac s. In the case Massacres of El Mozote the Court considered 
that even though Additional Protocol ii contemplates amnesties at the end of 
armed conflict, they cannot be applied to international crimes, as El Salvador 
October 1997, para. 46- 47; Report No. 42/ 97, Case 10.521, Angel Escobar Jurador (Peru), 19 
February 1998, para. 32- 33.
 166 Inter- American Commission on Human Rights, Report 29/ 92, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 
10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374 and 10.375 (Uruguay), 2 October 1992.
 167 Inter- American Court of Human Rights, Paniagua Morales et al. Case, Judgment of 8 
March 1998 (1998), para. 133.
 168 Inter- American Court of Human Rights, Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgement 25 November 
2003 (2003), para. 43.
 169 Inter- American Court of Human Rights, Judgement 25 November 2003 paragraph 44.
 170 Some examples include Argentina (La Nacion, Diputados derogó la obediencia debida, 
25 March 1998, https:// www.lanacion.com.ar/ politica/ diputados- derogo- la- obediencia- 
debida- nid91500, accessed on 10 March 2017); Chile (Publico, Chile deroga el decreto 
ley de amnistía aprobado por la dictadura, 12 September 2014, https:// www.publico.es/ 
internacional/ chile- deroga- decreto- ley- amnistia.html, accessed on 10 March 2017); El 
Salvador (El Nuevo Herald, Supremo salvadoreño deroga Ley de Amnistía, 10 July 2016, 
https:// www.elnuevoherald.com/ noticias/ mundo/ america- latina/ article89949847.html, 












did through a law of amnesty.171 Similarly, the Human Rights Committee, in its 
concluding observations on Lebanon, expressed its concern for the amnesty 
granted to civilian and military personnel for human rights violations occurred 
during the civil war. For the Committee, “[s] uch a sweeping amnesty may pre-
vent the appropriate investigation and punishment of the perpetrators of past 
human rights violations, undermine efforts to establish respect for human 
rights, and constitute an impediment to efforts undertaken to consolidate 
democracy.”172 This position was developed in General Comments 20173 and 
31,174 where the Committee affirmed that failure to bring to justice perpetra-
tors of human rights violations constitutes a separate breach of the iccpr.
Owing to the consistent development of this obligation, the icrc has iden-
tified the obligation to prosecute war crimes as a customary norm,175 which 
has been extended to crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity.176 
Cassese even sustains that “international rules prohibiting and criminalizing a 
conduct that amounts to the most serious international crimes are peremptory 
in nature.”177
These conventional, jurisprudential, and customary elements have there-
fore raised a prohibition to grant amnesties for international crimes in peace 
agreements. In his 2004 Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, 
the UN Secretary- General recommended: “that peace agreements and Security 
Council resolutions and mandates: […] (c) Reject any endorsement of amnesty 
for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, […] [and] ensure that 
 171 Inter- American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and nearby 
places v. El Salvador, Judgement of 25 October 2012 paragraphs 283– 296, para. 283- 296.
 172 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Lebanon, ccpr/ C/ 79/ Add.78, 5 
May 1997, para. 12.
 173 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: Article 7 iccpr (Prohibition 
of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) (10 March 
1992): “Some States have granted amnesty in respect of acts of torture. Amnesties are gen-
erally incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom 
from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that thy do not occur in the future,” 
para. 15.
 174 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ccpr/ C/ 21/ Rev.1/ Add. 13 (2004): “As 
with failure to investigate, failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could 
in and of itself give raise to a separate breach of the Covenant,” para. 18.
 175 Henckaerts and Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume 
I: Rules. Rule 158.
 176 Kreß and Grover, ‘International Criminal Law Restraints in Peace Talks to End Armed 
Conflicts of a Non- International Character,’ 47.
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no such amnesty previously granted is a bar to prosecution before any United 
Nations- created or assisted court.”178 This report reaffirmed the Secretary- 
General’s disclosure regarding the 1999 Sierra Leone’s Peace Agreement. 
Developing this notion, the 2005 UN Updated Set of Principles to Combat 
Impunity reiterated that: “[e] ven when intended to establish conditions con-
ducive to a peace agreement or to foster national reconciliation, amnesty can-
not benefit the perpetrators of serious crimes under international law.”179
3.2 Conciliating Peace and Justice in Peace Negotiations
From the legal framework presented above, we can conclude that both amnes-
ties at the end of niac s and criminal accountability for international crimes 
are normatively supported and required in peace negotiations.180 On the one 
hand, to negotiate peace some level of amnesty is necessary. On the other hand, 
to protect the rule of law and victim’s rights, justice must be ensured for serious 
violations of human rights and ihl. Conciliating this tension in a negotiated 
transition from armed conflict to peace is a central challenge in niac s.181
On this topic, the 2008 Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice noted 
how the fight against impunity became a principle of international law that “has 
changed the parameters for the pursuit of peace.”182 However, the Declaration 
highlights that peace and justice must be complementary, and the “question 
can never be whether to pursue justice, but rather when and how.” In a sim-
ilar view, former UN Secretary- General Ban Ki- Moon pointed out in 2009 
that: “the debate on how to ‘reconcile’ peace and justice or how to ‘sequence’ 
them has lasted more than a decade. Today, we have achieved a conceptual 
 178 UN Secretary- General, ‘Report of the Secretary- General on the Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post- Conflict Societies,’ para. 64.
 179 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity,’ Pub. L. No. E/ cn.4/ 
2005/ 102/ Add.1 (2005). Principle 24. On this line, Kulkarni presents an overview into the 
recent developments on criminal justice for conflict- related violations, noting that impu-
nity continues to weaken due to a growing acceptance of the duty of states to prosecute 
international crimes, and the consideration of amnesties for such crimes as not legally 
valid. Anupma Kulkarni, ‘Criminal Justice for Conflict- Related Violations. Developments 
during 2014,’ in Peace and Conflict 2016, ed. David Backer, Ravi Bhavnani, and Paul Huth 
(New York: Routledge, 2016), 192– 209.
 180 Bell, On the Law of Peace, 241.
 181 Negotiated transitions face many constraints. This book is mainly focused on the nor-
mative and political aspects to be considered. For an overview on other constraints 
influencing transitions, see Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 188– 215.













breakthrough: the debate is no longer between peace and justice but between 
peace and what kind of justice.”183
Defining the levels and conditions of justice is a serious challenge in nego-
tiated transitions. In a peace process ending a niac, four basic premises must 
be considered when deciding how to deal with crimes committed during the 
conflict. First, parties in negotiation, even if responsible for serious crimes, will 
hardly accept prison as a result of their talks.184 Second, even if a state wanted 
to pursue all the crimes committed during the conflict, their dimension gener-
ally exceeds its prosecutorial capacities.185 Third, amnesties are a fundamen-
tal legal instrument in transition, but at the current state of international law 
they only can be granted for offenses other than international crimes. Four, the 
multiplicity of actors and factors involved in a niac makes retributive justice 
insufficient for the needs of political and social reconciliation.
On this point, we could differentiate two levels of amnesty. For people 
involved in minor crimes related to armed conflict, full and unconditional 
amnesty is allowed. But in other cases, in principle, amnesties could only be 
admitted if they are conditioned to revealing truth and cooperating with rep-
aration and reconciliation.186 That was the South African approach, where 
 183 Ban Ki- Moon, ‘Secretary- General’s Remarks on the 60th Anniversary of the Geneva 
Conventions’ (Ministerial Working Session hosted by the Government of Switzerland 
to mark the 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, Geneva, 26 September 
2009), https:// www.un.org/ sg/ en/ content/ sg/ statement/ 2009- 09- 26/ secretary- generals 
- remarks- ministerial- working- session- hosted (accessed on 15 June 2018).
 184 Goldstone notes how negotiations would had been impossible in South Africa if those 
responsible for the apartheid had been expected to go to prison. Richard Goldstone, ‘Past 
Human Rights Violations: Truth Commissions and Amnesties or Prosecutions,’ Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2000): 168.
 185 In this line, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission notes that even if it 
would be desirable to prosecute perpetrators of serious human rights abuses, “amnes-
ties should not be excluded entirely from the mechanisms available to those attempting 
to negotiate a cessation of hostilities after periods of brutal armed conflict. Disallowing 
amnesty in all cases would be to deny the reality of violent conflict and the urgent need 
to bring such strife and suffering to an end.” Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Reports, vol. 3B, Chapter 6, “The trc and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 
p. 365, para. 11.
 186 As noted by Braithwaite, “there is no objection in principle to amnesties following wars, so 
long as they are amnesties that contribute to the ending of war, so long as all stakeholders 
are given a voice in the amnesty negotiations, so long as those who benefit from amnes-
ties are willing to show public remorse for their crimes and to commit to service to the 
new nation and its people to repair some of the harm they have done.” John Braithwaite, 
Restorative Justice & [and] Responsive Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
203. In the same line, the Transitional Justice Institute notes that “opinio juris from 
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amnesties were internationally admitted because of their contribution to con-
tain and prevent future human rights violations,187 and to achieve full disclo-
sure of all relevant facts.188
Following that experience, several transitional processes around the world 
have incorporated truth commissions to deal with past human rights viola-
tions, granting amnesties in exchange of contributing to truth and reconcil-
iation.189 This practice is grounded on the concept of restorative justice,190 
which proposes a comprehensive approach to justice aimed at restoring the 
relationships between the perpetrator, the victim, and the society, instead of 
just punishing the first.191 At the time that consensus around the complemen-
tarity between peace and justice has been achieved, most authors agree that 
in post- conflict contexts judicial responses are insufficient.192 As Freeman and 
established, explicit and categorical customary prohibition of amnesties for international 
crimes;” and they are legitimate when offenders are required to contribute to truth, repa-
ration, and reconciliation. Transitional Justice Institute, The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty 
and Accountability (Belfast: University of Ulster, 2013), 12.
 187 du Bois- Pedain, Transitional Amnesty in South Africa, 335.
 188 Henckaerts and Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume 
I: Rules. Rule 159.
 189 Kerry Clamp, Restorative Justice in Transition (London: Routledge, 2014), 71.
 190 Porter points out that if the purpose is to achieve peace, restorative justice seems 
more adequate than retributive justice. This is the approach we should follow if the 
idea is to “give priority to victims in need of healing” and “building or restoring recon-
ciled relationships” Elisabeth Porter, Peacebuilding: Women in International Perspective 
(London: Routledge, 2007), 20. In this line, Orozco Abad notes that in contexts of hori-
zontal violence– where different actors are responsible of causing the violence, as it is the 
case of Colombia– , restorative mechanisms must prevail. Iván Orozco Abad, Sobre Los 
Límites de La Conciencia Humanitaria: Dilemas de La Paz y La Justicia En América Latina 
(Bogotá: Temis, 2005).
 191 Rachel Kerr and Eirin Mobekk, Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability after War 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007); Porter, Connecting Peace, Justice and Reconciliation, 14. Ambos, 
‘The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice,’ 23. On the idea of retributive justice as 
opposed to the needs of peace in transitional contexts, May notes that “Justice and peace 
are often discussed as opposed to each other. But the debate can be cashed out in terms 
of justice alone […]. The justice that is sometimes opposed to peace is retributive justice.” 
Larry May, ‘Reparation, Restitution, and Transitional Justice,’ in Morality, Jus Post Bellum, 
and International Law, ed. Larry May and Andrew Forcehimes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 39.
 192 As noted by Goldstone, “One must not expect too much from justice, for justice is merely 
one aspect of many- faceted approach needed to secure enduring peace in the transitional 
society.” Richard Goldstone, ‘Justice as a Tool for Peace- Making: Truth Commissions and 
International Criminal Tribunals,’ New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 28, no. 3 (1996): 486. See also Sanam Anderlini, Women Building Peace: What They 













Djukic argue, “transitional justice is about the pursuit of a responsible form of 
justice that takes into account the parallel need for peace, democracy, security, 
and economic growth, precisely in order to deliver a form of justice worthy of 
the appellation.”193 Pursuing this broad set of goals, criminal retribution has 
generally been excluded from peace agreements.
Some authors argue that conditional amnesties could even play the func-
tion of punishment, when they are aimed at contributing to reconciliation, 
restoration of the rule of law,194 and creating a public record of past abuses.195 
For Mallinder, practice shows that international courts’ rejection to amnesties 
has “focused on automatic, unconditional amnesties that aimed to prevent 
investigations into human rights violations,” but it does not refer to conditional 
amnesties.196
However, at the current development of international law, the admissibility 
of conditional amnesties for serious crimes is not clear. A blanket amnesty will 
never satisfy the complementarity test before the icc.197 But it seems that, at 
present, not even a conditional amnesty will do so. In a letter sent in 2013 to the 
Colombian Constitutional Court during the exam of an amendment on transi-
tional justice, the icc Prosecutor affirmed that if a suspension of the criminal 
sanction implies that the most responsible for serious crimes do not spend time 
in prison, it would not satisfy the requirements of the icc Statute.198 Two years 
later, in a more moderated position, the icc Deputy Prosecutor affirmed in a 
 193 Freeman and Djukic, ‘Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice,’ 216.
 194 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 54.
 195 du Bois- Pedain, Transitional Amnesty in South Africa, 322.
 196 Louise Mallinder, ‘Can Amnesties and International Justice Be Reconciled?,’ International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 1 (2007): 228. In another view on this point, Jeffery notes 
that generally amnesties have been overturned, circumvented or annulled in contexts 
where such a decision does not represent a risk to bring back conflict. Jeffery, Amnesties, 
Accountability, and Human Rights, 169.
 197 Kreß and Grover, ‘International Criminal Law Restraints in Peace Talks to End Armed 
Conflicts of a Non- International Character,’ 70.
 198 Prosecutor of the icc. Letter of 26 July 2013. Constitutional Court, of 26 July 2013, para. 
3.16.1: “En vista de que la suspensión de una pena de prisión significa que el acusado no 
pase tiempo encarcelado, deseo aconsejarle que esta sería manifiestamente inadecuada 
en el caso de quienes parecen ser los máximos responsables por la comisión de crímenes 
de guerra y comisión de lesa humanidad. Una decisión de suspender las penas de cárcel de 
estas personas podría sugerir que los procesos se llevaran a cabo, o bien con el propósito 
de sustraer a las personas de que se trate de su responsabilidad penal, de conformidad con 
los artículos 17(2)(a) y 20(3)(a) o alternativamente que los procesos hayan sido instruidos 
de manera que, dadas las circunstancias, fueren incompatibles con la intención de someter 
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conference in Colombia that in contexts of negotiated transitions alternative 
sentences could be applied. In this case, the complementarity test must con-
sider, among other elements, “the type and degree of restrictions on liberty.”199
Hence, even though the 2015 Deputy Prosecutor’s position is softer than the 
2013 Prosecutor’s letter, both reflect that, in their opinion, an effective sanction 
is required by the icc Statute, even mediating a peace negotiation. And, while 
for the Deputy Prosecutor prison time is not an indispensable punishment 
in transitional contexts, effective restrictions on liberty must be applied. As 
a result, those elements would mean that conditional amnesties, even if sub-
mitted to their recipients’ contribution to truth and reparation, are no longer 
enough to satisfy the duty to prosecute international crimes.
In summary, according to the elements discussed above, rather than 
conditional amnesties current icl would only admit alternative sanc-
tions, conditioned on offenders contributing to truth, reparation, and 
reconciliation in transitional contexts.200 Additionally, even if those 
sanctions assume a restorative approach, they would necessarily imply a 
restriction of liberty. And, to do so, a judicial process is required. In other 
words, regarding serious international crimes the practice of conditional 
amnesties generally granted through truth commissions would no longer 
be possible. A judicial process would be needed, in which a sentence is 
pronounced establishing restrictions on liberty— though not necessarily 
prison— in addition to restorative measures. This approach was adopted 
in Colombia, as the following item shows.
3.3 The Colombian Approach: A Negotiated System of Criminal Justice
During the late 1980s and early 1990s Colombia held peace negotiations with 
guerrilla groups who accepted demobilization in exchange for amnesties and 
political participation.201 At that time, as the general practice around the 
 199 James Stewart, Deputy icc Prosecutor, ‘Transitional Justice in Colombia and the Role of 
the International Criminal Court,’ 13 May 2015, 13, https:// www.icc- cpi.int/ iccdocs/ otp/ 
otp- stat- 13- 05- 2015- ENG.pdf (accessed on 8 February 2018).
 200 See on alternative sanctions Roht- Arriaza, ‘After Amnesties Are Gone: Latin American 
National Courts and the New Contours of the Fight against Impunity,’ 344; Louise 
Mallinder, ‘The End of Amnesty or Regional Overreach? Interpreting the Erosion of 
South America’s Amnesty Laws,’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65, no. 3 
(2016): 649.
 201 To have a look into these processes, see Marc Chernick, ‘Negotiating Peace amid Multiple 
Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts 
in Colombia,’ in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia Arnson 









world, amnesties were unconditional, regardless of the nature or scope of the 
crimes committed by their beneficiaries.
A new demobilization process with paramilitary groups occurred in 2003. 
By then, Colombia was already part of the icc Statute, which, in combination 
with a consistent Inter- American jurisprudence against impunity, put pres-
sure on the government to ensure higher criminal accountability. As a result, 
the 2005 Peace and Justice Law was adopted establishing a system of crimi-
nal responsibility with lenient prison sanctions in exchange for contributing 
to peace.
During the 2012– 2016 peace negotiations between the government and 
the farc guerrilla, the discussion on criminal justice was a complex matter. 
The icl framework, the Inter- American jurisprudence on human rights, the 
precedent of the Justice and Peace Law, the political character of the guerrilla, 
and the active role played by the Office of the icc Prosecutor and by national 
and international ngo s, led to an unprecedented and sophisticated system of 
criminal justice, set as a part of a comprehensive framework for truth, justice, 
and reparation.
This item will present a general overview into the precedent of the Justice 
and Peace Law, and then it will present the system of criminal justice set up by 
the 2016 Peace Agreement.
3.3.1 The Precedent of the Justice and Peace Law
Unlike the political character of the negotiations with the guerrilla in Colombia, 
the process involving paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2005 was basi-
cally a deal for demobilization in exchange for judicial and socio- economic 
benefits.202 There was no discussion on the causes of conflict, or political, eco-
nomic, and social reforms. At that time, the government in office did not even 
recognize the existence of an armed conflict in Colombia but just a terrorist 
threat against the State.203
Designing a legal framework for this process, in August 2003 the govern-
ment presented to the Congress a law project on alternative penalties.204 It 
 202 Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Acuerdo de Santa Fe de Ralito para Contribuir a la Paz 
de Colombia, 15 July 2003, http:// www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/ acuerdos/ 
 acuerdos_ t/ jul_ 15_ 03.htm, accessed on 20 April 2017.
 203 Hernando Salazar, “Colombia decide si reconoce la existencia de un conflicto armado,” BBC 
Mundo, (11 May 2011), available at: http:// www.bbc.com/ mundo/ noticias/ 2011/ 05/ 110511_ 
colombia_ impliaciones_ reconocimiento_ conflicto_ armado_ jrg (accessed on 6 August 2017).
 204 Congreso de la República de Colombia, Gaceta Oficial, Proyecto de Ley Estatutaria 85 de 
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was not the outcome of a negotiation among the parties— the government 
and the paramilitaries— but an instrument proposed by the government to 
facilitate demobilization. The project established the conditional suspension 
of penalties to members of armed groups participating in peace talks by the 
discretional decision of the President of the Republic, on the condition of con-
tributing to victims’ reparation and informing changes of residence. There was 
no real mechanism of accountability but an incentive for demobilization. In 
Saffon and Uprimny’s words, the project “consisted in a concession of legal 
pardons to all armed actors who accepted to demobilize, and was based on the 
restorative idea that criminal punishment did not contribute and could even 
become an obstacle for achieving reconciliation.”205
Said project was largely criticized by human rights national and interna-
tional organizations, which denounced it as an impunity bill.206 As a result, the 
government withdrew the project from Congress.207
A new initiative was promoted by some congresspeople gathering views 
from academia, victims, and human rights sectors.208 The new called Justice 
and Peace Law project “passed from one of absolute rejection of criminal pun-
ishment and total silence on victim’s rights to an admission of the importance 
of achieving equilibrium between peace needs and justice requirements.”209 
This law was approved in 2005,210 and later passed the Constitutional Court’s 
control, which balanced the law with constitutional and international 
standards.211
The Law created a system of criminal trial for demobilized not eligible for 
amnesty. The process included investigation, trial, and sentences according 
to ordinary criminal law, with penalties that could amount up to 60 years 
in prison. But because of the accused’s contribution to peace, the sentence 
included an alternative punishment of prison between a minimum of 5 and a 
 205 Saffon and Uprimny, ‘Uses and Abuses of Transitional Justice in Colombia,’ 366.
 206 For a comprehensive analysis on the project of alternative penalties and the main legal 
critics to it, see Catalina Botero, La Ley de Alternatividad Penal y Justicia Transicional 
(Bogota: DeJusticia, 2004).
 207 Verdad Abierta, Procesos de Justicia y Paz, https:// verdadabierta.com/ la- historia/ 
 periodo4/ justicia- y- paz (accessed on 10 February 2016).
 208 Pablo Kalmanovitz, ‘Introduction: Law and Politics in the Colombian Negotiations 
with Paramilitary Groups,’ in Law in Peace Negotiations, ed. Morten Bergsmo and Pablo 
Kalmanovitz (Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2010), 4– 5.
 209 Saffon and Uprimny, ‘Uses and Abuses of Transitional Justice in Colombia,’ 366.
 210 Congreso de la República de Colombia, ‘Ley 975 (Ley de Justicia y Paz)’ (2005).
















maximum of 8 years in prison.212 Thus, instead of conditional amnesties, the 
Law created a system of conditional reduced penalties.
From a total of 24.640 people demobilized under the process, 3.666 were 
submitted to this Law. At the end of 2015 more than 50.000 crimes had been 
admitted, but only 33 sentences had been pronounced in 10 years.213 However, 
beyond the practical difficulties during the implementation of the Law, schol-
ars generally admit that the system of conditional reduced penalties meets 
international standards on justice. Burbidge says that the rule of 5– 8 years 
of prison seems balanced, as excessive sentences or excessive leniency could 
affect the intention of the perpetrators to continue in the negotiation in one 
side, and in the other make peace fragile. He also considers that the fact that 
the Law was approved by the Congress, controlled by the Constitutional Court, 
and the accused were judged and punished in due form, regardless of the 
duration of the sentence, makes an icc intervention unlikely.214 On this point, 
Ambos argues that the requirements of the complementarity test set by Article 
17 of the icc Statute were met, since the mitigation of punishment did not 
preclude neither an investigation nor a prosecution.215
This law set up a high standard of criminal accountability in Colombia, 
owing to the relevant international legal norms and discourses brought to the 
discussion by different actors. However, even if expected by most people, it 
was not possible to apply the same system to the guerrilla. As noted, the para-
military groups demobilized under a framework of submission to justice in 
exchange for benefits. On the contrary, the guerrilla wanted a political deal, 
addressing the root causes of conflict, in which they defended the justness of 
their fight. As such, a new mechanism was necessary.
3.3.2 The Special Jurisdiction for Peace
In 2012 the Government and the farc agreed on a negotiation agenda, in 
which no reference to justice or accountability was included. In item 3.3 the 
agenda said that the government would review the situation of members of 
the guerrilla detained or sentenced, and in item 4 the parties agreed to dis-
cuss the rights of victims.216 Moreover, the guerrilla leaders openly rejected 
 212 Congreso de la República de Colombia, Ley 975 (Ley de Justicia y Paz), 2005 Article 29.
 213 Verdad Abierta, ‘¿Qué Nos Dejan 10 Años de Justicia y Paz?,’ Verdad Abierta, 2015, http:// 
www.verdadabierta.com/ especiales- v/ 2015/ justicia- paz- 10/ (accessed on 1 April 2018) .
 214 Peter Burbidge, ‘Justice and Peace?— The Role of Law in Resolving Colombia’s Civil 
Conflict,’ International Criminal Law Review 8, no. 3 (2008): 576.
 215 Ambos, ‘The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice,’ 80.
 216 Gobierno de Colombia and farc, ‘ Acuerdo General Para La Terminación Del Conflicto y 
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any notion of individual responsibility. They claimed collective responsibility, 
and that if any form of justice had to be applied it should be social justice.217 
However, the guerrilla’s position on this matter profoundly changed during the 
negotiation process. And it happened because of their understanding of appli-
cable international standards, a task in which different national and interna-
tional actors played a crucial role.218
As the guerrilla wanted an agreement grounded on international law, and 
even to be considered as an international legal accord, they finally understood 
that its content had to be substantially consistent with international legal stan-
dards. On this point, several elements and actors draw attention to relevant legal 
norms. First, the precedent of the Justice and Peace Law set up a high standard 
on criminal responsibility which was difficult to lower. Second, as noted above, 
the Office of the icc Prosecutor actively reminded Colombia of its obligations 
under the icc Statute to pursue international crimes. This pressure was reinforced 
by the fact that the Prosecutor has kept Colombia under preliminary examina-
tion since 2004.219 Third, the participation of a UN Secretary- General’s Special 
Representative during the negotiations should have brought to the table the UN 
position regarding the impossibility to grant amnesties for serious crimes, even in 
peace processes.220 Forth, several human rights organizations widely insisted on 
the obligation to ensure victims’ rights to truth, justice, and reparation.
As such, the Final Agreement developed a Comprehensive System of Truth, 
Justice, Reparation, and Non- Repetition, within its chapter on victims.221 
Regarding justice, a Special Jurisdiction for Peace was created. For that, the 
Agreement declared that according to international law, states emerging from 
armed conflict have the autonomy to adopt the mechanisms of justice that 
respond to the complexities of the context, provided that they respect inter-
national human rights parameters.222 Then, the Agreement affirmed that the 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace was inspired by a restorative justice approach.223
 217 Nelson Camilo Sanchez, ‘Could the Colombian Peace Accord Trigger an ICC Investigation 
on Colombia?,’ American Journal of International Law 110 ajil Unbound Symposium on 
the Colombian Peace Talks and International Law (2016): 110.
 218 A detailed analysis on the actors and discourses bringing international law elements to 
the peace process and its agreement will be offered in Chapter 3.
 219 The Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016’ (The 
Hague: International Criminal Court, 2016), para. 231.
 220 UN Secretary- General, ‘Report of the Secretary- General on the Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post- Conflict Societies,’ para. 64.
 221 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 132.
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Defining the content and scope of the Special Jurisdiction, the Agreement 
invoked international law as the jurisdiction’s main framework of reference.224 
The deal established that for the qualification and treatment of crimes under 
this jurisdiction, in addition to the Colombian Criminal Code, judges must con-
sider the applicable norms of ihrl, ihl, and icl.225 As such, the Agreement 
invokes article 6(5) of Additional Protocol ii restraining its application to con-
ducts for which international law does not prohibit amnesty;226 and following 
this line, the Agreement excluded from amnesty conducts defined as interna-
tional crimes by the icc Statute.227
The Special Jurisdiction for Peace has competence over guerrilla members, 
state agents, and civilians who directly or indirectly participated in the commis-
sion of crimes related to armed conflict.228 Regarding sanctions when amnesty 
is not possible, the Tribunal can define different types of punishments, accord-
ing to the accused’s admission of truth and responsibility. Only those who fully 
cooperate with the process, provide truth and acknowledge responsibility, will 
receive restorative sanctions— e.g. working in demining, substitution of crops 
of illicit use, and construction of public infrastructure— accompanied by 
restrictions on liberty of movement and residence for a period of 2 to 8 years, 
depending on their level of responsibility. Those who do not provide the truth 
or accept responsibility, and are found guilty, will receive prison sentences.
This model of criminal accountability is the result of adapting to the con-
text international legal norms, legal discourses, and related practices relevant 
to amnesty and criminal responsibility under international law. As seen in the 
Colombian case, no specific formula was taken as such from international law, 
but a particular model was designed interpreting and applying to the context the 
myriad of legal elements brought to the negotiations by several actors and con-
sidering the previous mechanisms of transitional justice adopted in the country. 
The frame in which such a normative process happens is jus post bellum.
 224 The Special Jurisdiction for Peace’s statutory law states that its main framework of refer-
ence is given by ihrl and ihl. Cfr. Congreso de la República de Colombia, Ley 1957 de 
2019, Art. 23: “[…] los marcos jurídicos de referencia incluyen principalmente el Derecho 
Internacional en materia de Derechos Humanos (didh) y el Derecho Internacional 
Humanitario (dih).”
 225 Government of Colombia and farc, 147.
 226 Government of Colombia and farc, 148, 150.
 227 Government of Colombia and farc, 151.
 228 A ruling of the Constitutional Court said later that civilians could be investigated and 
tried by this Special Jurisdiction only if they voluntarily decide so. Corte Constitucional, 
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4 Reparations for Victims
Reparation for victims is a critical component of transition from armed con-
flict to peace. At least two reasons explain the relevance of reparations in tran-
sition. First, the growing development of ihrl has provided a clear framework 
on reparations for serious violations of human rights, applicable to contexts of 
armed conflict. Second, the shift from a retributive to a restorative approach 
to justice in transitions to peace enhanced the role of reparations. While a 
retributive approach to transition is mainly rooted in the punishment of the 
offender, a restorative approach focuses on the redress of victims.229
Colombia has made significant efforts to provide reparations for victims 
of armed conflict, even without any peace process ongoing. Before the 2012– 
2016 peace talks with the farc, the government promoted, and the Congress 
adopted, the 2011 Law on Victims and Land Restitution, which is considered 
the most developed system of reparations ever conceived in the world.230 Now, 
the 2016 Peace Agreement adopted a Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, 
and Reparations, which incorporates the 2011 Law on Victims.231 Both instru-
ments are largely and explicitly based on international law.
In this way, this section is aimed at analyzing the role of international 
law regarding the development of a system of reparations for transition in 
Colombia. To this purpose, the section is divided into two parts. First, it pres-
ents the international legal framework on reparations for victims of armed 
conflict. Second, it discusses the Colombian system of reparations, and how it 
incorporates international standards notwithstanding the challenge of repair-
ing several millions of victims.
4.1 Legal Framework on Reparations for Victims of Armed Conflict
This item presents the international legal framework on reparations, show-
ing how reparations became an internationally- protected right for victims of 
violations of human rights and ihl, even in the context of damages occurred 
during armed conflict.
 229 Ilaria Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of Crimes under International Law (Leiden: Nijhoff, 
2004), 34.
 230 Unidad de Atención y Reparación a Víctimas, Universidad de Harvard destaca Política 
Integral de Reparación de Víctimas en Colombia, 2015, available at: http:// www 
.unidadvictimas.gov.co/ es/ valoraci%C3%B3n- y- registro/ universidad- de- harvard 
- destaca- pol%C3%ADtica- integral- de- reparaci%C3%B3n- de- v%C3%ADctimas- en.
 231 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 










4.1.1 The Right to Reparation in International Law
Since its paradigmatic decision in the Chorzów Case, the former Permanent Court 
of International Justice stated in 1927 that: “It is a principle of international law 
and even a general conception of law that any breach of an engagement involves 
an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form […] Reparation is the indis-
pensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity 
for this to be stated in the convention itself.”232
This notion of reparation was basically referred to restitution and compen-
sation and was historically seen as an inter- state measure.233 However, the 
progressive development of ihrl extraordinarily expanded the scope of repa-
rations and brought individuals to the international legal arena as subjects of 
reparation. Most international human rights treaties include reparation as a fun-
damental element of the state’s obligation to guarantee human rights. Article 8 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines the individual right to 
an effective remedy for any act violating the rights of the people.234 This pro-
vision was translated into a binding instrument through the iccpr,235 whose 
Article 2(3) establishes the right to an effective remedy, which has been inter-
preted by the Human Rights Committee as involving reparation.236 It has been 
similarly enshrined in Article 2(1) of the icescr,237 Article 6 of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (icerd),238 
Article 2(c) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women,239 Article 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other 
 232 Factory at Chorzów Case (Germany v. Poland), Jurisdiction, 1927, pcij, Ser. A, No. 9, p. 21.
 233 Christine Evans, The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 29.
 234 ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights,’ Pub. L. No. UN Doc. A/ 810 (1948).
 235 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
 236 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ccpr/ C/ 21/ Rev.1/ Add.13, 2004, para. 16.
 237 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This Article does not 
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the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has interpreted that 
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is the provision of judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, in accordance with 
the national legal system, be considered justiciable.” Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States parties’ obligations (Art. 2, 
par.1) (14 December 1900) UN Doc. E/ 1991/ 23.
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Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,240 Articles 15(2) and 
16(4– 5) of the International Labor Organization (ilo) Convention 169,241 Article 
13 of the European Convention on Human Rights,242 Articles 25 and 63 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (AmCHR),243 and Articles 7, 21, and 26 
of the African Charter on Human Rights.244
Following such norms, the obligation to provide individual reparation for the 
violation of human rights has been consistently reaffirmed by different interna-
tional courts and human rights bodies.245 The aim behind this duty is related to 
the state’s positive obligations regarding human rights. The violation of a human 
right entails the state’s responsibility towards the individual, because of the state’s 
obligation to respect, to prevent, and to ensure the rights of all people under its 
jurisdiction, including a remedy when respect and prevention have failed.
Based on human rights treaties and international practice, the UN General 
Assembly adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,246 which iden-
tified the existing legal obligations in the matter.247 According to these Basic 
 240 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.
 241 ‘Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries C169,’ 
§ General Conference of the International Labour Organization (1989).
 242 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
 243 American Convention on Human Rights.
 244 ‘African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1981).
 245 See generally, European Court of Human Rights, Case of Akkus v. Turkey, Judgment of 9 July 
1997; Case of Kurt v. Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction), Judgment of 25 May 1998; Case of 
Doğan and others v. Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction), Judgment of 29 June 2004. In the 
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Principles: “victims are persons who individually or collectively suffered harm 
[…], through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international 
human rights law, or serious violations of international humanitarian law.”248 
Additionally, said Principles state that: “A person shall be considered a victim 
regardless of whether the perpetrator of the violation is identified.”249 The 
Basic Principles also derivate the right to reparation redressing the harm suf-
fered by victims, from the general obligation to provide an effective remedy for 
violations of international law. Then, the Principles define reparation as com-
posed by five elements: restitution, seeking to restore the victim to the original 
situation whenever possible;250 compensation, through an economic assess-
ment of the damage;251 rehabilitation, including medical and psychological 
care as well as legal and social services;252 satisfaction, aimed at restoring the 
dignity of victims through measures such as public apologies, truth disclosure, 
search of missing persons, etc.;253 and guarantees of non- repetition, to prevent 
new violations.254
This comprehensive definition of reparation, developed through inter-
pretation and application of different ihrl instruments, was enshrined 
in a legally binding instrument in the 2007 Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.255 Under ihl, the obliga-
tion to provide reparations has been considered a customary rule both in 
international and non- international armed conflicts.256 The icc Statute 
also provided that the Court “shall establish principles relating to repara-
tions to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation, and 
rehabilitation.”257
As such, based on the recognition of the right to reparation under different 
branches of international law, some authors have even argued the customary 
the 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
adopted by the ILC, which embodied the obligation to reparation and its modalities and 
conditions (see Articles 30- 31 and 34- 36).
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character of reparations. For Evans, because of the “extensive recognition of 
the right of the individual to reparation in human rights and humanitarian law, 
as well as under general international law, it appears reasonable to state that 
this right has acquired a degree of recognition as forming part of customary 
law.”258
4.1.2 Reparations for Armed Conflict- related Violations of Human 
Rights and ihl
International human rights norms on reparation were primarily conceived to 
address individual violations of rights on a case- by- case basis.259 As noted by 
Carrillo, “they simply are not configured to deal with gross and systematic vio-
lations in the same way.”260 This is a major challenge faced by reparations in 
contexts of massive violations of human rights and ihl, such as during armed 
conflict. No state jurisdiction or international system would have the capac-
ity to redress all the victims of armed conflict- related human rights violations 
under a judicial mechanism for reparation.
There are several factors involved when defining the mechanisms of redress 
for victims of armed conflict. One could mention the number of victims, their 
proportion within the total population, the economic situation of the country, 
the priority given to other transitional justice measures, among other factors. 
Additionally, the fact of having different actors involved in the conflict, where 
at least one is a non- state actor, poses challenges as who is responsible for 
reparations.
Regarding that point, the obligation to pay reparations has been tradi-
tionally assigned to the state. Nevertheless, the current development of icl 
raised the responsibility of individuals for repairing the damages caused to 
their victims. It means that non- state armed actors in a niac should also pay 
reparations. The Basic Principles on Reparations establish that a state shall 
provide reparation to victims for acts or omissions which can be attributed to 
it, and that when a non- state actor is liable for reparation, such party should 
repair the victim or compensate the state if the state has already done it. But, 
again, the Basic Principles conclude that: “States should endeavour to estab-
lish national programmes for reparation and other assistance to victims in the 
 258 Evans, The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict, 39.
 259 Pablo De Greiff, ‘Justice and Reparations,’ in The Handbook of Reparations, ed. Pablo De 
Greiff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 454.
 260 Arturo Carrillo, ‘Justice in Context: The Relevance of the Inter- American Human Rights 
Law and Practice to Repairing the Past,’ in The Handbook of Reparations, ed. Pablo de 









event that the parties liable for the harm suffered are unable or unwilling to 
meet their obligations.”261
On this point, the Inter- American Court of Human Rights declared, in the 
case Mapiripan Massacre v. Colombia, that the State was obligated to provide 
reparation, even if the massacre was committed by a non- state actor. This con-
clusion was based on the State’s lack of due diligence to prevent the massacre, 
which was its positive obligation according to the AmCHR.262
Considering these particularities on reparation for victims of armed con-
flict, the Association of International Law adopted in 2010 a Declaration 
of International Law Principles on Reparation for Victims of Armed 
Conflict.263 This document provides general guidelines on the matter, 
defining the holder of the right to reparation, its content, and the parties 
responsible to pay reparations.264 On its Commentary to the Declaration, 
the Association stresses that the legal protection provided by international 
law to victims of human rights violations and breaches to ihl should not be 
reduced in contexts of armed conflict. However, the Association admitted 
that in case of massive violations of rights the conditions and amounts of 
reparations must regard the capacities of the liable state in post- conflict 
scenarios.265 Later, in 2014 the Association adopted a Draft on Procedural 
Principles for Reparation Mechanisms266 devoted to the access to effective 
redress mechanisms.
According to the elements discussed above, the victim’s right to repara-
tion must be ensured even when such a right emerges from violations caused 
within an armed conflict. However, the judicial approach to justice and repara-
tion for individual violations of human rights is not feasible in cases of massive 
violations of human rights occurred during and armed conflict. In such con-
texts, systems of reparations must be designed in a way in which international 
standards are observed, at the time that reparations play a role in a broader 
 261 UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, paras 15– 16.
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Judgment of 15 September 2005 (2005).
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political agenda, serving as a form of recognition to victims and helping to 
restore civic trust and reconciliation.267
4.2 Colombian Approach to Reparations
The international legal framework on reparations presented above has been 
developed in different ways in Colombia. From judicial to administrative sys-
tems of reparation, Colombia has assumed reparations as a victim’s rights that 
must be addressed, regardless of a peace agreement. Since 1997, Colombia set 
up a program for administrative reparation addressed to victims of terrorism 
and other facts related to armed conflict.268 In 2005 a judicial approach to 
reparation was incorporated into the Justice and Peace Law, which was later 
complemented with a norm on administrative reparations. Finally, a compre-
hensive system of reparations was implemented before the 2012– 2016 peace 
negotiations, which could be even considered as an element facilitating the 
process and the participation of victims in those negotiations. As such, three 
dimensions of reparation for victims of armed conflict in Colombia must be 
considered as follows.
4.2.1 Judicial Reparation: Justice and Peace Law
As presented above in the section on criminal justice, in 2005 Colombia 
adopted the Justice and Peace Law for the demobilization of paramilitary 
groups. This instrument created a special system of criminal responsibility, 
granting reduced penalties in exchange for cooperation with justice and rep-
aration to victims. According to Article 2 of this Law, all the system had to be 
interpreted and applied according to the Colombian Constitution and to inter-
national treaties duly ratified by Colombia.
Regarding reparations, the Law established a judicial mechanism of 
reparation in which reparation was addressed only to victims whose per-
petrators were submitted to this judicial system. A Reparations Fund was 
created, composed by the illegally obtained assets delivered by the demo-
bilized and limiting victim’s reparation to the budget of the Fund. However, 
the Constitutional Court introduced two important changes on this point. 
First, it said that both legal and illegally obtained assets should be avail-
able for the reparation of victims.269 Second, the Court ruled that no 
 267 De Greiff, ‘Justice and Reparations,’ 454.
 268 Congreso de la República de Colombia, ‘Ley 418’ (1997).










budgetary constraint could be used as a State’s excuse for giving reparation to a 
victim.270
Nevertheless, such a system of judicial reparation was insufficient for redress-
ing millions of victims affected by armed conflict. Only victims recognized within 
a criminal procedure were beneficiaries of reparation and it was to the judge to 
define forms and amounts on a case- by- case basis. For that reason, a program of 
administrative reparation was later created in 2008,271 aimed at repairing victims 
beyond the criminal process through an administrative procedure. The new pro-
gram allowed more victims to receive reparations. However, although the system 
predicated comprehensive reparation, it was focused on compensation.
4.2.2 Comprehensive Administrative Reparations: Law on Victims and 
Land Restitution
In 2011, with the presence of the UN Secretary- General, Colombia adopted an 
unprecedented Law on Victims and Land Restitution.272 The Law established 
a comprehensive system of administrative reparation addressed to all the 
victims of armed conflict since 1985, which integrated the previous systems. 
The Law was largely inspired by international law. Its Article 3 defines victims 
as people who individually or collectively have suffered damage as a conse-
quence of a violation of ihl or ihrl within the armed conflict.
Article 25 defines reparation in the same terms as the UN Basic Principles on 
Reparations. As such, the Law establishes measures of restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non- repetition, entirely assumed by 
the State. To that purpose, the Law created a unified register of victims integrating 
existing registers and programs of reparation. Up to 1 April 2019, 8.803.836 vic-
tims were registered.273 Additionally, a Unit for the Attention and Reparations of 
Victims was created, tasked to coordinate the implementation of the Law.
In 2014 the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy 
School compared this system of reparation with other 31 mechanisms adopted 
 270 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, paragraph 6.2.4.3.3.2. For an analysis on this point 
in the Colombian case, see Julian Guerrero and Mariana Goetz, ‘Reparations for 
Victims in Colombia: Colombia’s Law on Justice and Peace,’ in Reparations for Victims 
of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in 
the Making, ed. Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz, and Alan Stephens (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2009), 435– 58.
 271 Gobierno de Colombia, Decreto 1290 (2008).
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around the world since 1979.274 The study concluded that the Colombian sys-
tem is the most complete ever adopted for reparation of victims of armed con-
flict in the world, though the Center warned on the challenges to implement it, 
considering the high number of victims.275
4.2.3 Reparations in the 2016 Peace Agreement
Since its preamble, the Agreement states its victim- centered approach and the 
importance given to the right to reparation, according to international law.276 
There is a chapter on victims, in which a system of truth, justice, and repara-
tion was established. Regarding reparations, the Agreement considers them as 
a condition for peace, and adopts a comprehensive approach, following inter-
national standards on restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, 
and non- repetition.277
The Agreement recognized the existing system of reparations created by 
the 2011 Law on Victims. Nonetheless, the document proposed to adjust it in 
a participatory way, and according to the context and opportunities given by 
the end of armed conflict. Additionally, it stressed on the return of displaced 
people278 and collective reparations,279 where former guerilla members 
should contribute by doing community work, demining, and offering public 
apologies.280 The guerrilla also assumed the obligation to give its assets for the 
reparation to victims.281 On this point, reparation by the guerrilla, as a non- 
state actor, will be mainly related to the judicial procedures before the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace, which, as part of the sanctions, will impose measures of 
reparations under a restorative justice approach.
 274 Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, 2014.  Evaluation for the Unidad para las 
Víctimas: global and comparative benchmarking. Available at http:// wp.presidencia.gov.
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Colombia- lider- en- reparacion- victimas- revela- el- PresidenteSanto.aspx (accessed 20 
November 2015).
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people. Source: http:// www.dane.gov.co/ index.php/ estadisticas- por- tema/ demografia- y- 
poblacion/ censo- nacional- de- poblacion- y- vivenda- 2018/ cuantos- somos/ (accessed on 5 
May 2019).
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Here, the Agreement adopted the approach of the offender’s primary obliga-
tion to provide reparation, and the State’s subsidiary role when there is no full 
reparation from the actor who caused the damage. Regarding this approach, 
the Agreement explicitly invokes the positive obligations of the State under 
ihrl.282 However, on this point, the Colombian approach offers valuable 
insights on the growing discussion around the role of non- state armed actors 
regarding reparations in transitions from niac s. International law is still too 
general on this matter, but legal basis exists, as seen in the legal framework 
presented here. Then, practice such as the Colombian would certainly con-
tribute to better understand and apply the obligations of non- state actors on 
reparations, within and beyond judicial mechanisms.
Here, one can see how international law has framed the debate on repa-
rations for victims of armed conflict in Colombia since 2005. Again, as for 
criminal responsibility, international law does not provide a specific general 
formula, but the normative elements that must be addressed to find the appro-
priate mechanism for a given context. As it will be further analyzed in Chapter 
3, such a normative frame guiding the design of a concrete transitional mech-
anism is the display of jus post bellum.
5 Inclusive Transitions
Contemporary negotiations aimed at ending niac s are no longer a matter to 
be decided only by the parties directly confronted. In general, the agreement 
resulting from a peace negotiation has impacts over different groups, and soci-
ety at large. Thus, those groups should be heard, and their needs be addressed 
in a differential way in a peace deal. This inclusiveness is increasingly con-
sidered a condition of legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability of peace 
agreements.283
There are at least three reasons behind the need for inclusivity in transi-
tions to peace. First, just as armed conflict has differential impacts on certain 
groups— e.g. women and ethnic communities— peace also does so. Second, 
transition from armed conflict to peace represents an opportunity to address 
structural discriminatory situations in society, which are generally at the base 
of the conflict or are exacerbated by it. Third, since parties in a peace process 
 282 Government of Colombia and farc, 147.
 283 Jennifer Easterday, “Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum,” in Jus Post 
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discuss changes in the political and social order, it represents an opportunity 
for the incorporation of citizens into the polity, improving their engagement in 
the post- agreement scenario.284
Thus, given the importance of inclusiveness in peace processes, and the role 
of international law in peacemaking and peacebuilding, this section discusses 
if there is any normative obligation to hold inclusive transitions. On this mat-
ter, Kastner considers that the inclusion of social actors “is not only advisable 
from a pragmatic conflict resolution perspective; it has rather become part 
of the normative framework of peace negotiations and […] is increasingly 
being internalized as a legal obligation.”285 Similarly, discussing on jus post 
bellum, Turner pleads for a principle of inclusivity in peace processes, given 
the requirements of human rights law regarding differential participation and 
inclusion of certain groups.286
This search for inclusivity has been present in transition from armed con-
flict to peace in Colombia in different ways. Since the normative framework on 
internally displaced persons, the Constitutional Court requested State institu-
tions to adopt a differential approach in measures addressed to women, indig-
enous peoples, and Afro- descendants. Following this precedent, the 2011 Law 
on Victims incorporated a differential approach to women and ethnic commu-
nities. Finally, the 2012– 2016 peace process with the farc guerrilla developed 
unprecedented inclusive mechanisms, addressing different social groups.
This section analyzes to what extent Colombian practice reflects a legal 
obligation on inclusive transitions to peace, by associating international nor-
mativity related to inclusion and participation of certain social groups. For this 
purpose, it refers to international law provisions regarding both the general 
state’s obligation to promote participation of people on matters of their inter-
est, and the specific duty to include certain social groups in peace processes 
and agreements.
The section is divided into two parts. The first part presents the international 
legal framework to support inclusive peace transitions as a legal obligation, 
rather than a mere political choice. The second part assesses how Colombia 
 284 Catherine O’Rourke, ‘Transitioning to What? Transitional Justice and Gendered 
Citizenship in Chile and Colombia,’ in Gender in Transitional Justice, ed. Susane Buckley- 
Zistel and Ruth Stanley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 152; Colleen Murphy 
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Transitional Justice, ed. Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 317.
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has implemented its obligations on inclusiveness when defining attention to 
victims of armed conflict, and the role that participation and the differential 
approach played in the 2012– 2016 peace process.
5.1 Legal Framework on Inclusiveness
International law provides elements to support the demands of certain groups 
of people to be heard, and their concerns to be included, in peace processes 
and transitions. The most specific case is the legal regime related to the partic-
ipation and inclusion of women in peace processes and agreements. However, 
general provisions are also applicable regarding other social groups, victims, 
and civil society in general. The following items examine the normative frame-
work regarding these issues.
5.1.1 On Women and Gender Issues
Women suffer gender specific impacts because of armed conflict. Armed con-
frontation intensifies existing inequalities experienced globally by women and 
they are “specially affected by sexual violence, internal displacement, loss of 
family members, reinforced gender stereotypes, loss of social position and 
reduced access to essential supplies and services.”287 However, negotiating 
peace has been predominantly a male affair.288 According to the 2016 Yearbook 
of Peace Processes, only 10.3% of people officially participating in peace talks 
were women.289 This reality contradicts both the fact that women are one- half 
of the population, as well as that their gender- specific experiences and needs 
resulting from armed conflict are unlikely to be addressed without their partic-
ipation in peace negotiation processes.290
The discussion on the specific impact of armed conflict on women only 
came to the international arena in the 1990s.291 In 1992, the Committee 
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on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women adopted General 
Recommendation 19 related to violence against women. The Recommendation 
refers to the gender- based risks that women face in contexts of armed con-
flict and recommends states to take all necessary measures to protect them.292 
In 1995, the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, Action for Equality 
Development and Peace stated that “while entire communities suffer the con-
sequences of armed conflict and terrorism, women and girls are particularly 
affected because of their status in society and their sex.”293 Then, the Beijing 
Declaration issued from such a Conference noted that “the equal access and 
full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in 
all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the 
maintenance and promotion of peace and security.”294
Following the Beijing Declaration’s commitments, the unsc adopted 
the crucial Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security. This 
Resolution urges states to increase representation of women at all decision- 
making levels for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.295 
It also requests the Secretary- General to appoint more women as special rep-
resentatives in peace negotiations,296 and to incorporate a gender perspective 
into peace operations.297 Finally, the Resolution calls on all actors involved in 
peace agreements to adopt a gender perspective.298
This resolution introduced a specific international standard on women partic-
ipation in peace negotiations. According to Ellerby, such a standard is composed 
by four elements of inclusion: representation (decision- making, quotas), incorpo-
ration (gender balance in everyday activities and institutions), protection (safety 
and equality, gender- based violence, access to resources, anti- discrimination), and 
recognition (gender perspective, special rights and needs, legal changes).299
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For Bell and O’Rourke, Resolution 1325 provides a clear legal basis for 
addressing the role of women in the negotiation and implementation of peace 
agreements. For them, even though this resolution was adopted under Chapter 
vi of the UN Charter, “its legal authority has been accentuated by the fact that 
it was passed unanimously, and that the resolution uses the language of obliga-
tion.”300 Additionally, subsequent Security Council resolutions have followed 
and reinforced Resolution 1325’s mandates.301
This resolution brought to the international practice a growing awareness 
on women participation and inclusion in peace negotiations and peace agree-
ments. Anderlini notes that despite the difficulties in the implementation of 
Resolution 1325, “since it was passed, women’s demands for inclusion have been 
heard more often in formal channels.”302 Bell and O’Rourke have found a “sig-
nificant increase in references to women in peace agreements after Resolution 
1325 was passed.”303 A similar conclusion was reached by Ellerby in 2015.304
In 2005, the Updated Principles to Combat Impunity adopted by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights305 also called for the participation of women, 
minorities, victims, and civil society in peace processes. Principle 32 asked “to 
ensure that women and minority groups participate in public consultations aimed 
at developing, implementing, and assessing reparations programmes.” Similarly, 
Principle 35 affirms that “adequate representation of women and minority groups in 
public institutions is essential to the achievement” of guarantees of non- repetition.
 300 Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, ‘Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact 
of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and Their Agreements,’ International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 59, no. 4 (2010): 943.
 301 See, for example, Resolution 1820 (2008) encouraging all parties in peace talks “to facil-
itate the equal and full participation of women at decision- making levels” (para. 12); 
Resolution 1888 (2009) urges that “issues of sexual violence be included in all United 
Nations- sponsored peace negotiations agendas” (para. 17); Resolution 1889 (2009) point-
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“reiterates the importance of addressing sexual violence in armed conflict whenever rel-
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Finally, the 2008 Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice called for 
increased representation and active involvement of women in transitional 
processes. It recommends that “post- conflict legal orders should rectify legal 
and social discrimination based on gender.”306
5.1.2 On Ethnic Minorities Issues
Like women, ethnic minorities can suffer specific impacts by armed conflict 
because of their ethnicity and their social and cultural conditions. In countries 
facing niac  s, traditionally marginalized groups could be exposed to higher 
risks than the rest of the population. Regarding ethnic minorities, armed con-
flict can cause specific impacts on their culture, their dynamics, their organiza-
tion, and their territories.
However, unlike the case of women, there is not a specific international 
legal framework for the participation of ethnic minorities in peace processes, 
or for their specific needs to be included in peace agreements. Nevertheless, 
the rights of ethnic minorities have been addressed by several instruments of 
international law, which could be applied regarding peace processes.
In a general way, the icerd provides a basis for the integration of racial and 
ethnic groups to achieve their advancement and full enjoyment of their rights.307 
Then, the 2001 Durban Declaration recognizes that racial discrimination is 
among both the root causes and the consequences of armed conflict and calls 
for the inclusion and participation of traditionally discriminated peoples when 
deciding matters of their concern.308
Regarding indigenous and tribal peoples, the most relevant instrument is 
the 1989 ilo Convention 169.309 According to such an instrument, “the social, 
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cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be 
recognised and protected.”310 Additionally, indigenous and tribal peoples must 
be consulted and have the means to duly participate regarding “legislative or 
administrative measures which may affect them directly.”311 Lastly, the 2007 UN 
Declaration on Indigenous Peoples included some specific provisions regard-
ing the right to be consulted on measures of relocation and reparations.312
5.1.3 On the Participation of Victims and Civil Society in General
The participation of victims and civil society actors in peace negotiations is 
getting increased attention in research and practice.313 Since victims suffer 
the direct impact of armed conflict, they must have a voice, especially regard-
ing the treatment of crimes committed against them and the corresponding 
reparations. As noted by Ambos, victims’ “participation is indispensable to 
lend legitimacy to this process and make it socially acceptable.”314 Similarly, 
large participation of civil society, either directly— by public consultations or 
referendums— or through democratically- elected organs is essential to pave 
the way for national reconciliation.315
There is no specific legal basis for the participation of victims and civil soci-
ety in peace negotiations. However, some general norms provide elements in 
that sense. General human rights instruments enshrine the right of every per-
son to take part in public affairs (e.g., Article 25(a) of the iccpr, and Article 
23.1(a) of the AmCHR). A peace negotiation, whose outcome will have effects 
over people other than just the parties in talks, should be considered a public 
affair. According to Article 68.3 of the icc Statute, the Court shall permit the 
views and concerns of the victims “to be presented and considered” at the pro-
ceedings. The right of victims to be heard and participate when asking for rep-
arations can be found in the UN Basic Principles on Reparations.316 A similar 
 310 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries C169 
Art. 5.
 311 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries C169 
Art. 6.
 312 UN General Assembly, ‘United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,’ 
Pub. L. No. Resolution 61/ 295 (2007). Arts. 10, 28.
 313 Thania Paffenholz, ‘Civil Society,’ in Post- Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, ed. Vincent 
Chetail (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 64.
 314 Ambos, ‘The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice,’ 40.
 315 Ambos, 40; UN Secretary- General, ‘Report of the Secretary- General on the Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post- Conflict Societies,’ para. 16.
 316 UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
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view is found in the Updated Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, providing 
for the consultation of victims and other sectors of civil society when defining 
guarantees of non- recurrence of human rights violations.317 All those elements 
were gathered by the 2008 Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, whose 
Principle 3 promotes a victim- centered approach in peace negotiations and 
recommends broader consultations with victims, civil society, and women.318
The UN Secretary- General pointed out that inclusivity “increases the legiti-
macy and national ownership of the peace agreement and its implementation,” 
at the time that it “reduces the likelihood of excluded actors undermining the 
process.”319 This position is emphasized by Kastner, who sustains that the UN 
“has manifestly internalized an obligation vis- à- vis the participation of civil 
society actors in peace negotiations that involves normative considerations 
and that goes beyond merely reaching out and consulting civil society.”320
5.2 The Colombian Approach
This item presents three mechanisms by which Colombia has assumed and 
implemented an inclusive and differential perspective in its transition from 
armed conflict to peace.
5.2.1 Differential Approach for the Attention and Reparation of Victims 
of Armed Conflict
In 1997, Colombia adopted a law on internal displacement,321 which included 
some provisions on the special attention to internally displaced women. 
However, in 2008 the Constitutional Court found a gender gap in this Law 
and ordered a series of measures to address the special needs and risks faced 
by women victims of displacement. The Court referred to international obli-
gations applicable to the matter, with a special emphasis to cedaw General 
Recommendation 19 and unsc Resolution 1325. Under those elements, the 
Court ordered to different institutions a series of measures to meet the specific 
needs of displaced women ensuring their participation in the definition and 
implementation of those actions.322
 317 UN Commission on Human Rights, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity. Principle 35.
 318 UN General Assembly, Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice Principle 3 and 
Recommendation 1.3.
 319 UN Secretary- General, ‘Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution,’ para. 29.
 320 Kastner, Legal Normativity in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflict, 148.
 321 Congreso de la República de Colombia, Ley 387.
















A year later, the same gaps were found regarding indigenous peoples323 and 
Afro- descendants.324 For the Court, Colombia was internationally obligated to 
adopt specific measures regarding the protection of ethnic groups affected by 
armed conflict. As such, the Court invoked, among other instruments, Article 
26 of the icescr regarding ethnic minorities and ilo Convention 169.
The Constitutional Court opened a public follow- up system for those deci-
sions, in which the concerned institutions should inform the measures adopted 
for the differential attention to these groups of victims.325 This situation created 
a positive environment for women and ethnic organizations to promote a public 
agenda on their specific needs as victims of armed conflict, since they also have 
the possibility to submit reports to the Court and to participate in their discussion.
These jurisprudential standards were incorporated by the 2011 Law on 
Victims and Land Restitution. According to this instrument, differential 
approach regarding gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, and physical 
conditions is a central principle of the whole system for the attention and 
reparation of victims.326 As such, the Law created a unified register of victims 
including differential categories. Up to 1 April 2019, from a total of 8.803.836 
victims registered,327 4.218.519 were women, 4.211.087 men, 3.367 lgbti peo-
ple, 218.657 indigenous, 776.861 Afro- Colombians, and 41.838 Roma and other 
ethnic minorities.328 To address the conditions of these groups in a differen-
tial way, specific norms were adopted regulating special measures regarding 
ethnic minorities. Additionally, a differential approach subsystem was estab-
lished to coordinate the adoption of differential measures for victims at all 
the levels, in which representatives from each population group are present.
5.2.2 Participation of Victims and Civil Society in the Peace  
Negotiations
Armed conflict in Colombia has impacted more than eight million people. It 
represents around 18% of the country’s total population.329 Such an impact 
 323 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Auto 004/ 09 (2009).
 324 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Auto 005/ 09 (2009).
 325 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia T- 025/ 04 (2004).
 326 Congreso de Colombia, Ley 1448 (2011), Art. 13. Additionally, it is important to mention 
that the Law explicitly indicates that its provisions must be interpreted and applied 
according to ihl and ihrl treaties ratified by Colombia (Art. 27).
 327 Registro Único de Víctimas, https:// www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/ es/ registro- unico- de- 
victimas- ruv/ 37394 (accessed on 1 April 2019).
 328 Registro Único de Víctimas.
 329 The total population of Colombia up to May 2019 was estimated in 48.2 million people. 
Source: http:// www.dane.gov.co/ index.php/ estadisticas- por- tema/ demografia- y- poblacion/ 
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has made armed conflict a constant element in the life of millions of people 
and their communities. Thus, the participation of victims and civil society in 
general in the negotiation table and the inclusion of their interests and views 
in the peace agreement were a must.
The Agreement explicitly states its victim- centered approach.330 
Additionally, the preceding legal and jurisprudential developments on vic-
tims empowered them to claim a significant role in the process. As a result, 
60 victims representing different regions, groups, and victimizing facts, par-
ticipated in the negotiation table in Havana. Moreover, looking for the larg-
est social acceptation of the Agreement, the parties agreed on a mechanism 
of open participation, in which 3.000 people gave their opinions through 
UN- led forums around the country, and 17.000 proposals were received 
through the internet.331 These mechanisms and figures express a decisive 
openness of the parties, and their recognition of victims and civil society’s 
participation as a matter of rights; which is in contrast with the traditional 
approach to involve victims only after the agreement is reached, mainly 
before truth commissions.
5.2.3 Differential Gender and Ethnic Approaches in the Peace 
Agreement
The inclusion of a differential perspective to gender and ethnic minorities 
is considered as one of the major victories for human rights advocates in 
the Colombian peace process. The Agreement invokes the incorporation 
of a differential approach as an expression of the right to equality and non- 
discrimination enshrined by international law.332
Regarding gender, the preceding legislative and jurisprudential devel-
opments derived from international law inspired women and other 
gender- related groups to ask for their participation and inclusion during 
the negotiation process. In addition, the UN representatives explicitly 
called for all the Agreement to incorporate a gender approach and to 
ensure women participation.333 In this way, in September 2014 the 
parties set up a Gender Sub- commission whose purpose was to “pro-
vide recommendations to the Table in order to enable an appropriate 
 330 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 8.
 331 Government of Colombia and farc, 126– 28.
 332 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 3.











gender approach, particularly in relation with women and the lgbti 
community.”334
On this topic, the parties went beyond women issues and included a 
lgbti- gender related perspective in the Agreement, which is unprece-
dented in other processes. It was more a consequence of domestic develop-
ments on lgbti issues,335 and the acknowledgment of the specific impacts 
that lgbti people suffered because of armed conflict.336 As such, the par-
ties extended the international law appropriation of gender as related to 
women to a point in which other gender issues were covered. As Céspedes 
points out, during the negotiation “women’s issues were at the center and 
lgbt’s followed in their path.”337
In general, the Agreement includes equality, gender approach, and ethnic 
diversity as guiding principles;338 calls for the empowerment of women339 and 
the political participation of different identity groups;340 highlights the role 
of women as peacebuilders;341 establishes the necessity to ensure a differen-
tial approach regarding reincorporated women;342 looks for strengthening the 
administration of justice concerning gender- based violence;343 and defines 
the incorporation of a differential gender and ethnic approach over the system 
of truth, justice, and reparation.344
According to the parties, these measures aim to “create conditions for 
women, and people with diverse sexual orientation, to access in equal condi-
tions to the benefits of a country without armed conflict.”345 For the negotia-
tors, “the inclusion of a gender approach in a peace process such as this one 
 334 Gobierno de Colombia and farc, ‘Joint Communiqué,’ 11 September 2014, https:// www 
.ambitojuridico.com/ BancoMedios/ Documentos%20PDF/ comunicado11- 09- 14.pdf.
 335 See, for instance: Corte Constitucional, Sentencia SU- 617- 2014, C- 071- 2015, SU- 214- 2016.
 336 The Colombia’s National Centre for Historical Memory elaborated a report on the spe-
cific impacts of armed conflict on lgbt people. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 
Aniquilar la diferencia, Lesbianas, gays, bisexuales y transgeneristas en el marco del con-
flicto armado colombiano, 2015, available at: http:// www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov 
.co/ descargas/ informes2015/ aniquilar- la- diferencia/ aniquilar- la- diferencia.pdf (accessed 
on 20 January 2018).
 337 Céspedes- Báez, ‘Gender Panic and the Failure of a Peace Agreement,’ 186.
 338 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 12.
 339 Government of Colombia and farc, 31.
 340 Government of Colombia and farc, 54.
 341 Government of Colombia and farc, 55.
 342 Government of Colombia and farc, 69.
 343 Government of Colombia and farc, 79, 85.
 344 Government of Colombia and farc, 128.
 345 Gobierno de Colombia and farc, ‘Joint Communiqué No. 82,’ 24 July 2016, http:// es 
























International Law in the Colombian Transition 121
has no precedents in the world, and sets a milestone in the construction of the 
agreements already reached and yet to be reached.”346
Regarding ethnic issues, the parties heard a civil society ethnic commission 
providing recommendations to incorporate a differential ethnic approach into 
the Peace Agreement. As a result, the Final Agreement included an Ethnic 
Chapter,347 in which it recognizes the serious impacts that armed conflict had 
on indigenous and Afro- Colombian communities, and the necessity to assume 
a differential ethnic approach to reach peace. To this effect, the Agreement 
indicates that it must be interpreted and applied in a way that respects and 
incorporates the specific needs, concerns, and dynamics of ethnic minorities, 
according to international and domestic law. On this point, the Agreement 
invokes the icescr, the icerd, the ilo Convention 169, the Durban 
Declaration for Action, and the UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples.348
As such, the Agreement established measures as the fundamental right 
to previous, informed, and free consent regarding the implementation of 
the peace deal in matters related to ethnic groups; special consideration 
of ethnic communities’ needs on rural development; the restitution of col-
lective ethnic territories and return of displaced ethnic communities; the 
coordination of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace with the special indigenous 
jurisdiction;349 and a commission to follow- up the observance of the ethnic 
approach in the implementation of the Agreement.350
In all of these matters, the Colombian approach to inclusiveness in its dif-
ferent transitional instruments has consistently been inspired by international 
law, following legal norms and the discourses and requests of differential 
groups to ensure international legal standards. As Chapter 3 will analyze, such 
a normative landscape can be framed by jus post bellum.
6 Conclusions
This chapter examined how international law has shaped the Colombian tran-
sition in different matters and by different ways. At least three reasons explain 
 346 Gobierno de Colombia and farc, ‘Joint Communiqué.’
 347 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 206– 9.
 348 Government of Colombia and farc, 206.
 349 According to Article 246 of the Colombian Constitution, indigenous authorities can exer-
cise their own jurisdiction within their territories.
 350 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 














such an influence of international law in this case. First, the growing devel-
opment of ihrl, ihl, and icl has established standards to protect individ-
ual rights, even beyond domestic political decisions by states and parties in 
peace negotiations. As such, the legal developments explored in this chapter 
showed to the parties in negotiation their inescapable obligation to follow 
international standards, and it gave legal arguments to actors claiming for their 
rights and interests to be considered in the negotiations. Second, Colombia 
has a constitutional system particularly receptive to international law, estab-
lishing that duly ratified ihrl and ihl treaties have the same normative level 
as the Constitution. Thus, the negotiators knew that international law was a 
parameter to control the constitutionality of the mechanisms designed in the 
negotiation. For that reason, those mechanisms had to be in conformity with 
international law. Third, the involvement of international actors in the process 
and the parties’ intention to have an agreement internationally accepted, cre-
ated a favorable environment for the active role played by international law in 
the process.
In this way, legal obligations, discourses, and comparative practices created 
a normative framework in which parties moved to reach their own formulas.
Regarding the legal nature of the agreement, the parties showed a creative 
use of international law for shielding the accord from domestic political or legal 
changes. In this case, they framed the peace deal as a special agreement under 
ihl and through a unilateral declaration by the Colombian State before the UN.
Pursuing a sustainable peace, a broad set of socioeconomic, political, and 
institutional questions had to be addressed. On this matter, the parties treated 
the problems related to rural development, political participation, environ-
mental protection, and crops of illicit use under a human rights approach. 
As such, the parties used an international legal frame of reference, invoking 
instruments such as the iccpr and the icescr to delineate socioeconomic 
and political reforms as a matter of rights rather than mere political decisions.
On criminal responsibility, international legal obligations set up a frame-
work with clear conditions to be observed: no amnesty for international 
crimes, formal prosecution and trials were required, and effective restrictions 
on liberty had to be imposed as a part of the criminal sanctions. With those ele-
ments, the parties created a special system of justice, with formal judges and 
procedures, trials and sentences, imposing restorative sanctions but including 
effective restrictions on liberty. Here, the legal obligations enshrined by icl, 
ihl, and ihrl regarding amnesties and prosecution of international crimes, 
together with comparative practices and the discourses of actors such as the 
Office of the icc Prosecutor and the Inter- American System of Human Rights, 
defined a normative bargaining zone within which the negotiators created 
International Law in the Colombian Transition 123
their formula to deal with criminal responsibility for past crimes related to the 
armed conflict.
Similarly, regarding reparations, the Colombian case shows that it is pos-
sible to develop a comprehensive system of reparation even in the context of 
massive violations of human rights and ihl within an armed conflict. No pre-
vious transition from conflict to peace has recognized such a larger number of 
victims as Colombia did. Although victims of armed conflict represent around 
18% of the total population, the country assumed the comprehensive concept 
of reparation set by international law, which was defined by reference to inter-
national legal norms.
Finally, the participation and inclusion of different groups of people has 
been assumed not only as a political condition of legitimacy, but as a legal 
obligation. The parties in negotiation, and several social and institutional 
actors, have invoked international legal elements to support inclusiveness in 
transition in Colombia, both in the process of negotiation and in the content 
of the Agreement, leading to special provisions to address structural factors of 
discrimination and exclusion.
Therefore, as presented in this chapter, the international legal obligations 
binding both the Colombian State and the guerilla, the precedents regarding 
matters as amnesties in other contexts around the world, and the discourses 
of relevant actors (e.g., guarantor countries, UN agents, the icc, and other 
domestic and international institutional and civil society actors) were decisive 
for the way in which negotiations were conducted and for the very content of 
the Peace Agreement. In consequence, this chapter showed how practice in 
Colombia proves the existence of an international normative framework shap-
ing transition from armed conflict to peace. This framework is what the book 
considers jus post bellum.
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 chapter 3
Jus Post Bellum Viewed from the Colombian 
Transition
This chapter aims to connect the previous two. Chapter 1 explored the concept 
of jus post bellum as the analytical framework for framing the role of interna-
tional law governing transition from armed conflict to peace. Chapter 2 exam-
ined the role played by international law in different areas of the Colombian 
transition, identifying the relevant legal framework and how it has shaped 
several transitional instruments in the country. This third chapter assesses 
the concept of jus post bellum from the perspective of the Colombian expe-
rience to identify how theory is reflected in practice and how the Colombian 
practice offers new insights on the content and the scope of jus post bellum 
as the normative framework for transitioning from armed conflict to sustain-
able peace.
The main argument of this chapter is that the way in which international 
law has molded transition in Colombia reflects most of the theoretical elab-
orations on jus post bellum. As such, considering that no previous work has 
analyzed jus post bellum comprehensively through a case study, this chapter 
suggests empirical insights to delineate the definition, the content, the forma-
tion, the actors, and the functions of jus post bellum, contrasting the theoretical 
basis introduced in Chapter 1 to the Colombian case presented in Chapter 2.
This chapter thus refers back to the approaches to defining jus post bellum 
discussed in the first chapter to address whether they work in practice and 
what definition could be proposed in light of the experience in Colombia. 
Then, by using concrete examples in the Colombian process, the chapter 
analyses how jus post bellum is permanently built through practice, because 
of the dual process of application and creation of law occurring in negotia-
tions and transitions to peace. The chapter also readdresses the discussion on 
principles of jus post bellum presented in the first chapter to explain why they 
constitute the substantive content of the concept and to suggest a series of 
principles that can be identified in the Colombian case. The chapter thus ana-
lyzes how the variety of actors involved in the normative internationalization 
of the Colombian transition shows the broad spectrum of potential actors of 
jus post bellum, which are not limited to the parties in negotiation. Finally, the 
chapter assesses the functions played by international law in the Colombian 
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the normative framework guiding successful transition from armed conflict to 
sustainable peace.
1 A Definition of Jus Post Bellum from the Colombian Experience
Assessing the elements from theory and practice discussed in the previous 
chapters, it can be observed that, at present, jus post bellum is still a concept 
of scholarly use. It is not yet used in the official UN and state language and 
does not have a recognized normative standing on its own. At the time of writ-
ing only one mention to the concept was found in a UN document, consisting 
in the 2016 ilc’s Special Rapporteur Marie Jacobsson’s Third Report on the 
Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts.1 However, the 
Special Rapporteur mentioned the concept to mean that she was not going to 
address the “legal- political discussion” on jus post bellum in her report, because, 
in her opinion, “this concept is wider than positive law and has a clear connec-
tion to just war theories.”2 Even though her reasons are inaccurate, since tran-
sition to peace necessarily involves more than positive law and the concept of 
jus post bellum already has a legal development beyond its original conception 
within the just war theory,3 the Special Rapporteur’s statement not to address 
the concept in her report shows the challenges from bringing the concept into 
the official practice.
In that sense, it is clear that even if the parties in a peace process are aware 
of existing legal considerations shaping their negotiation and the resulting 
agreement, they do not identify these elements as belonging to or constituting 
a specific legal framework for transition. Nevertheless, though the concept of 
jus post bellum is not yet officially used in practice, it offers an effective frame-
work for designating the legal norms, discourses, and practices that apply to 
the transition from armed conflict to sustainable peace.
The different definitions discussed in Chapter 1 offer useful elements to 
build an integrative approach. As analyzed in that chapter, existing definitions 
can be grouped under three approaches to jus post bellum: 1) as a new legal 
regime; 2) as an ordering system; and 3) as an interpretative framework.4
 1 Marie Jacobsson Special Rapporteur, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in 
Relation to Armed Conflicts’ (Geneva: International Law Commission, 2016).
 2 Jacobsson, para. 10.
 3 See Introduction, Sections 3 and 8.












Regarding jus post bellum as a new legal regime, in addition to the criticism 
exposed in Chapter 1, practice in Colombia confirms that such a formal regime 
would not be possible nor consistent with the inner flexibility of peacemak-
ing. The negotiators and other actors involved in the process took norms from 
different international legal instruments and branches of law, based on the 
matters in negotiation. Those matters could be significantly different in other 
transitional contexts, and the relevant actors could even use or apply the same 
norms in a different way. Even in Colombia, the application of icl standards 
to sanctions for people responsible for serious armed conflict- related crimes 
was different in the 2005 Justice and Peace Law compared to the 2016 Peace 
Agreement. As such, jus post bellum must be open, flexible, and able to com-
bine different legal and political considerations according to the needs of the 
context.
However, the two other approaches to defining jus post bellum can be sup-
ported in practice. Jus post bellum can work as a framework ordering legal 
norms, discourses, and practices defining the normative bargaining zone in 
which parties can move to create their own transitional formulas. At the same 
time, such a framework can offer interpretative elements on how those norms 
should be understood and applied to the specific context. Two examples illus-
trate this argument in Colombia. One example is the way in which the system 
of criminal justice negotiated by the parties was influenced by ihl and icl 
norms regarding amnesties and prosecution for international crimes, by the 
icc Prosecutor’s discourses on how to ensure sanctions compatible with icl, 
and by comparative practices on transitional justice.5 A second example can 
be found in the way in which international standards on women’s participa-
tion in peace processes set by unsc Resolution 1325 came together with differ-
ent discourses on inclusiveness, leading to a broad approach to participation 
involving not only women but also lgbti and ethnic groups.6 In both cases, 
one can see that legal norms, discourses,7 and comparative practices framed a 
zone of negotiation showing the parties’ limits and possibilities in coordinat-
ing, interpreting, and applying the international legal framework relevant to 
their transition to peace.
Considering said ideas, a definition of jus post bellum from practice is based 
on four elements. The first is the possible content of jus post bellum. Here, a 
 5 See Chapter 2, Section 3.
 6 See Chapter 2, Section 5.
 7 Regarding the value of legal discourses, Kastner argues: “that discourse is not only illustrative 
but constitutive of the normative framework.” Kastner, Legal Normativity in the Resolution of 
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set of principles seems more appropriate than a formal legal regime. In the 
Colombian transition, legal norms from different branches of international 
law defined matters of the peace negotiation and of the previous transitional 
instruments. However, those norms were not applied in a linear process; rather, 
the parties took elements from legal discourses, comparative experiences, and 
the practical needs of the context to define a way to interpret and apply legal 
norms in a manner consistent with the pursuit of peace. Thus, the parties were 
guided by principles defining a framework on the legal and the political con-
siderations to be addressed.8
The second element is the object of jus post bellum, which, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, consists in contributing to establish a sustainable peace.9 This 
book has argued that sustainable peace requires at least two conditions: first, 
addressing the root causes of armed conflict, which is the only way to promote 
reconciliation and prevent the recurrence of violence; and second, observing 
adherence to relevant standards of international law, which are essential to 
ensure the rule of law, respect for human rights, democratic governance, and 
international legitimacy. In the Colombian case, transition has entailed not 
only ending armed confrontation but also building peace,10 seeking to remove 
the causes of the conflict, meeting victim’s rights, and encouraging reconcilia-
tion under an international legal framework.
The third element is a functional rather than a temporal approach. Jus post 
bellum is not a regime with starting and ending benchmarks. It is a framework 
providing guidance during any phase when efforts are put in place to end armed 
conflict and to establish sustainable peace.11 As seen in Chapter 2, Colombia is 
an example on the use of normative principles of criminal justice12 and repara-
tions13 even before having a peace process. Moreover, despite a comprehensive 
peace agreement in the country, armed conflict is still ongoing with another 
 8 Easterday, ‘Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum,’ 386.
 9 See Chapter 1, Section 4.
 10 It can be seen even since the name of the agreement, called Final Agreement to End 
the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. Government of Colombia and 
farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace.’
 11 At this regard, the book follows Larry May’s approach, who, as noted in Chapter 1, Section 
3, suggests that “jus post bellum refers to any principles that govern the mopping up 
efforts, namely the efforts at the end and after the end of war that lead into a position of 
peace.” May, After War Ends, 3.
 12 Congreso de la República de Colombia, Ley 975 (Ley de Justicia y Paz), 2005.















rebel group.14 Thus, the case study showed that jus post bellum applies because 
of the function it plays in the transition from armed conflict to peace, rather 
than to a specific moment of such a transition.15
Fourth, jus post bellum is a matter of international law, even regarding 
niac s.16 Jus post bellum has been mainly developed in relation to iac s, in 
which the norms involved are international. So far, the few works address-
ing jus post bellum in niac s17 have not analyzed the concrete application of 
legal norms. However, even though jus post bellum involves the interaction 
of international and domestic law,18 it is based on international law. There are 
at least three reasons explaining this argument in the context of niac s. First, 
the transition from armed conflict to peace became a matter of international 
legal interest because it relates to international values such as human rights, 
justice, and the rule of law. Second, in a global legal world, states are bound 
by several international obligations covering most of the matters treated in 
peace processes. Third, and possibly the most substantial reason, because of 
the intrinsic asymmetry between the state and the non- state actors involved in 
a niac, domestic law would hardly be seen as an impartial framework to hold 
peace negotiations, and non- state actors would be more reluctant to accept 
conditions derived from the institutional order they are fighting against.
In conclusion, considering the elements discussed above, jus post bellum 
can be understood as a normative framework of principles— grouping legal 
norms, discourses, and practices— that offers a space of contextualized inter-
pretation and application of relevant international law to the transition from 
armed conflict to sustainable peace. This framework offers guidance on the 
standards that should be observed, but its precise content is built through 
the practice of actors involved in transitional processes, in the way they inte-
grate, interpret, and apply international legal norms, discourses, and practices 
 14 As seen in Chapter 2, the eln guerilla keeps in armed confrontation in Colombia. See 
Chapter 2, Section 0.
 15 See Chapter 1, Section 3, on the discussion on the temporal or fuctional approach to jus 
post bellum.
 16 Even though existing definitions do not explicitly describe jus post bellum as being inter-
national law, all of them refer to international legal norms. However, in a literature review 
on peacebuilding, Chetail and Jütersonke refer to a previous Chetail’s article to define jus 
post bellum as “norms of international law that are applicable in a post- conflict environ-
ment.” Chetail and Jütersonke, ‘Peacebuilding: A Review of the Academic Literature,’ 5.
 17 See Introduction, Section 4.
 18 See, for instance, Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 2008, 102; Payne, ‘The 
Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post- Conflict Legal Regimes,’ 118. Easterday, ‘Peace 
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from other processes to their specific context. As such, the principles compris-
ing jus post bellum are in permanent evolution, incorporating new rules, dis-
courses, and practices according to the dynamics of the actors involved in the 
application and creation of law through peacemaking and peacebuilding.
2 The Formation and Operation of Jus Post Bellum
Jus post bellum is a framework in continual development. Sari sustains that 
conceiving jus post bellum as a normative process “rather than just as a set of 
norms, emphasizes that the legal standards applicable in post- conflict envi-
ronments are not static but evolutionary. This is both a factual and a norma-
tive claim.”19 Indeed, theory and practice coincide in demonstrating that the 
complexity and context- specificity of transition from armed conflict to peace 
require a level of flexibility that cannot be provided by an imperative legal 
regime. Instead, jus post bellum should offer a framework containing legal con-
straints, possible options, and guidelines for parties to make their own norma-
tive decisions. Thus, it is a process of continual construction involving both the 
application and creation of new norms.20
In Kastner’s words, “Law shapes peace negotiations, and peace negotiations 
generate legal normativity.”21 This is so since norms and obligations associ-
ated with transition “are rooted in the social interaction between the actors 
involved and are constantly reassessed and renegotiated.”22 In this sense, more 
than prescriptive, these norms are “purposive and aspirational in character.”23
This idea is expressed more generally by Brunée and Toope, who sustain 
that “law can help to shape interactions in international society, and is in turn 
modified by those interactions.”24 Following Fuller, this is due to the fact that 
law is a process, and legal norms are never a completed project.25 On this topic, 
Bell points out that,
 19 Sari, ‘The Status of Foreign Armed Forces Deployed in Post- Conflict Environments: A 
Search for Basic Principles,’ 500.
 20 Kreß and Grover, ‘International Criminal Law Restraints in Peace Talks to End Armed 
Conflicts of a Non- International Character,’ 46.
 21 Kastner, Legal Normativity in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflict, 182.
 22 Kastner, 2.
 23 Kastner, 3.
 24 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 354.
 25 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1969), 106, as referred 

















[P] eace agreements can be argued to have evolved and shaped the same 
international legal developments that promoted them as a conflict reso-
lution tool […] The relationship of international law to peace agreements 
cannot be simply pulled apart as one of cause and effect. […] [P]eace 
agreements as legalized documents shape not just particularized con-
flicts but also the international legal order itself.26
This double process of normative application and creation of law is given by the 
fact that the practice of peace negotiations involves taking elements from appli-
cable international law as well as from comparative practice in other processes, 
and adapting these elements to the concrete context, generating new forms of 
interpretation and application of the corresponding norms. Kastner notes that 
through their discourses and practices, “the respective actors constantly create 
and redevelop the legal- normative framework of peace negotiations. While 
crafted in a specific context, this framework is not entirely spontaneous or self- 
sufficient but influenced by international legal norms and the experiences and 
lessons from other peace negotiation contexts.”27
At least three examples from the peace negotiations in Colombia can 
illustrate the formative process of jus post bellum. One is the use given by the 
parties to the ihl’s mechanism of special agreements and to unilateral dec-
larations before the UN to provide legal certainty to the peace agreement. 
Given that there is no specific legal regulation on the normative status of 
domestic peace agreements, the parties took elements from international 
positive law and practice to declare the international legal character of their 
peace agreement. This will likely serve as a precedent for other peace pro-
cesses around the world.
A second example is the way in which the transitional justice model was cre-
ated, taking legal discourses and legal practices to interpret and apply relevant 
legal obligations. The statements by the Office of the icc Prosecutor, UN agents 
and civil society organizations, and previous rulings of the Constitutional Court 
created a framework on the scope, limits, and possibilities of interpreting and 
applying both the ihl’s provision on amnesties at the end of armed conflict 
and the icl’s prohibition on those amnesties regarding serious international 
crimes.
The third example is the inclusive approach of the peace process that 
expanded the mandate of unsc Resolution 1325 on women’s participation and 
 26 Bell, On the Law of Peace, 44– 45.
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inclusion to other groups such as lgbti and ethnic peoples, as the result of 
strategic advocacy by human rights organizations. This advocacy was based 
on international law, drawing on positive and soft law instruments to build a 
discourse defending inclusiveness as a legal obligation rather than a political 
choice.
All three examples illustrate how the confluence of legal norms, discourses, 
and practices, which involved different actors at different levels, formed and 
operated a framework to coordinate, interpret, and apply legal normativity 
that was not specifically designed for transitional contexts. Such a framework 
is jus post bellum.
Based on this logic, in the transition from armed conflict to peace inter-
national law does not work by imposing external imperative norms on the 
parties. On the contrary, it works as a framework providing guidance on 
the issues to address and the rights that must be respected, allowing the par-
ties to devise their own way of dealing with them. This process implies a new 
vision of the role of international law and its interaction with domestic transi-
tion. According to Kastner,
The still- prevalent emphasis on existing international law that is seen 
as imposing rigid standards and a certain conduct from ‘above’ should 
be supplanted by the view that law can also facilitate, offer guidance, 
reflect mutual commitments and serve to stabilize expectations. […] 
Recognizing the norm creative capacity of the actors involved in peace 
negotiations is one avenue to use legal norms more constructively and 
effectively in the context of the negotiated resolution of internal armed 
conflicts.28
Along this line, then, “the legal obligations operate, again, rather as ‘frame-
work’ obligations whose precise normative content must be specified in every 
context.”29 This is evident in the Colombian transition. General international 
legal obligations defined a framework on the fundamental issues that the 
parties had to consider, as well as the rights and conditions to be ensured.30 
Additionally, legal discourses and comparative practices on these matters 
demarcated the ways and conditions in which to apply those norms. However, 
such a framework was opened to the concrete requirements of the context. 
 28 Kastner, 83– 84.
 29 Kastner, 169.
 30 E.g.: the prohibition on amnesties for international crimes and victim’s rights, as pre-









The parties understood that they had to find a way to balance international 
legal obligations with the political needs of peace. In this way, such a process, 
in which the parties negotiated and defined formulas aimed at establishing 
sustainable peace in their concrete context, expresses how jus post bellum 
works in practice.
3 Principles of Jus Post Bellum Identified in the Colombian Case
As discussed in Chapter 1, most authors working on jus post bellum have pro-
posed principles as the way to define the content of the concept. For Stahn, 
jus post bellum should allow the identification of normative principles guiding 
“legal policy choices in situations of transition.”31 Easterday refers to overarch-
ing principles “focused on sustainable peace against which laws and policies 
can be interpreted.”32 De Brabandere understands the concept as “a normative 
set of principles” based on existing international law to interpret applicable 
“rules in function of the identified overarching principles.”33 And though Bell 
does not use the concept of jus post bellum, she advocates for a “set of pro-
grammatic standards that provide guidance […] as to how the dilemmas of 
peace […] can be resolved concomitantly with the requirements of interna-
tional law.”34
Following the above views, and as discussed in Chapter 1, it can be concluded 
that principles are the substantive content of jus post bellum. May suggests six 
principles: building and rebuilding, retribution, restitution, reparation, recon-
ciliation, and proportionality.35 His proposal is endorsed by the University of 
Leiden’s Jus Post Bellum Project as a solid basis for defining the content of the 
concept.36
Regarding this matter in niacs, Boon argues that there are at least two 
kinds of principles of jus post bellum.37 One kind entails principles guiding 
matters governed by ihrl, ihl, and icl, where international law establishes 
 31 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),’ 2008, 101– 2.
 32 Easterday, ‘Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum,’ 385.
 33 De Brabandere, ‘The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in International Law: A Normative 
Critique,’ 137.
 34 Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria: What’s in a Name?,’ 192.
 35 May, After War Ends, 5.
 36 Easterday, Iverson, and Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations of Jus Post Bellum: 
An Introduction,’ 1; Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum and the Justice of Peace: Some Preliminary 
Reflections.’
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more exigent standards to observe. Another kind referts to principles guid-
ing matters such as socio- economic reconstruction and institutional design, 
where international law provides only general elements, giving greater leeway 
to the parties in defining their own formulas.
Having these elements, this section explores the principles of jus post bel-
lum in the Colombian case. Toward this aim, we depart from May’s proposal 
(because they are the most widely accepted principles among scholars work-
ing in this field) but reformulate some of his principles, uses references to other 
authors’ principles, and adds new ones. Furthermore, this section will consider 
Boon’s proposal on the scope of these principles in the context of niac s. In 
any case, it is important to make clear that the principles referred to in this 
section are far from being exhaustive, and other matters are susceptible to be 
also considered as principles. However, this selection expresses the compo-
nents of the Colombian transition that were most influenced by international 
legal considerations, and, consequently, closer to the purpose of illustrating an 
international normative framework guiding transitions through general nor-
mative principles.
3.1 Reconstruction and Transformation
May argues that there is an obligation to rebuild the capacity to protect human 
rights and to promote the rule of law, as well as to build such a capacity where 
it did not exist prior to the conflict.38 In a similar approach, Patterson for-
mulates this principle as order, including the obligation to ensure security 
needs, the guarantee of rights, and reconstruction both in terms of infrastruc-
ture damaged by armed conflict and institutional capacities.39 Williams and 
Caldwell also discuss the restoration of order and economic reconstruction 
from a human rights perspective.40 For them, jus post bellum should lead to a 
peace where human rights “are more secure than they were before war.”41 Also 
on this topic, Orend proposes a principle of rehabilitation of the capacities 
affected by conflict,42 Coady a principle of rebuilding and reconstruction,43 
 38 May, After War Ends, 19.
 39 Eric Patterson, ‘Conclusion. Toward a Twenty- First Century Jus Post Bellum,’ in Ethics 
Beyond War’s End, ed. Eric Patterson (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 
221– 29.
 40 Williams and Caldwell, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of Just 
Peace,’ 318.
 41 Williams and Caldwell, 316.
 42 Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective,’ 38– 41.














and De Brabandere a principle of reconstruction for the benefit of the 
population.44
This principle embodies two kinds of obligations: first, the obligation to 
reconstruct physical infrastructure and institutional capacities affected during 
the hostilities; and second, the obligation to address the root causes of con-
flict and transform the conditions that led to armed confrontation. As such, 
the principle conveys the idea of both reconstruction and transformation. 
The principle calls for a certain level of restoration of the status quo ante,45 
but it also calls for transformation when that status quo was the very cause 
of the conflict, as it is often the case in niac s. On this line, Kastner sustains 
that internal peace “negotiations typically introduce novelty, seeking not to re- 
establish but to alter the status quo ante.”46
This principle is related to the notion of positive peace.47 Jus post bellum 
looks at integrating standards not only for ending conflict but also for creating 
or recovering the conditions to ensure an adequate level of living.48 As pointed 
out by Chetail, peacebuilding means “to free individuals not only from ‘fear’ 
but also from ‘need’,”49 and Benson refers to “post- conflict economic recon-
struction and development” as a central goal of jus post bellum.50 In that way, 
peace negotiations and peace agreements represent an opportunity for dis-
cussing and addressing structural issues in society,51 and then this principle 
embodies such an opportunity also as a legal obligation.52
In this way, this principle offers a space to integrate international legal obli-
gations into the political and socio- economic structure of transition. Looking 
at the Colombian experience, the principle is expressed in the way in which 
the parties conceived the agenda of peace negotiations. The objective was 
not only to end armed confrontation but also to address its structural causes. 
As seen in Chapter 2, Colombia comprehensively addressed matters such as 
 44 De Brabandere, ‘The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in International Law: A Normative 
Critique,’ 137– 38.
 45 Bass, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ 384.
 46 Kastner, Legal Normativity in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflict, 6.
 47 Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.’
 48 See Chapter 1, Section 4, on the object of jus post bellum.
 49 Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 8.
 50 Christina Benson, ‘Jus Post Bellum in Iraq: The Development of Emerging Norms for 
Economic Reform in Post Conflict Countries,’ Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business 
11, no. 4 (2012): 350– 51.
 51 Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights, 229– 30; Easterday, ‘Peace Agreements as a 
Framework for Jus Post Bellum,’ 401– 4.
 52 See Chapter 2, Section 2.1., on the legal framework related to socioeconomic and political 
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socioeconomic rural development, alternatives to crops of illicit use, political 
participation, and opportunities for new political expressions, among others.53 
The lack of these conditions has been considered a root cause of the conflict,54 
making clear that for the parties such an element was a departing point to 
envisage a sustainable peace.
Following Boon’s proposal, this is one of the principles of jus post bellum 
regarding which international law can only offer general guidelines, leav-
ing the parties enough margin of appreciation to define their own arrange-
ments. The 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement exhibits a deep grounding on 
international law in all its matters, including references to the international 
framework on economic, social, and cultural rights to adopt socioeconomic 
and political reforms,55 but the concrete formulas on this matter were mostly 
based on policy and domestic law.56
Here, one can see the parties’ understanding of the existence of interna-
tional legal obligations guiding socioeconomic, political, and institutional 
affairs, and their will to ground reforms on those matters on such an interna-
tional legal framework. However, unlike other components of the negotiation, 
in this matter the parties did not follow a clear legal standard but responded 
to the concrete causes and circumstances of armed conflict in Colombia. For 
example, the parties agreed on formulas on rural development or political par-
ticipation, framing them under international law, but the specific measures 
on land access, reintegration programs, or the conditions for the creation 
of a political party were primarily policy- based. However, it is worth to note 
how the references to international law as a framework for the negotiations 
on those matters gave a human- rights- based approach to socioeconomic and 
political reforms.
As such, the Colombian experience displays reconstruction and transfor-
mation as an authentic normative principle of jus post bellum. In this way, 
the political discussions around addressing the root causes of armed conflict, 
implementing socioeconomic and political reforms, and promoting reinte-
gration of former fighters and rural development, had an international legal 
framework of reference guiding relevant actors in their negotiation and defini-
tion of formulas according to the needs and conditions of their context. Then, 
 53 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.
 54 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 2.
 55 Government of Colombia and farc, 199.










this principle offers a normative space of discussion on matters that by their 
nature are more a question of policy and socioeconomic debate.
3.2 Criminal Accountability
May refers to this principle as retribution, denoting criminal justice for wrong-
doings during armed conflict.57 However, since retributive justice is not the 
most common form of justice in contexts of transition, this principle can be 
better named as criminal accountability. This principle is proposed by most 
authors in the field, even though different terms are used. Stahn talks about 
individual responsibility for wrongs committed during the conflict.58 Orend,59 
Coady,60 and Willians and Caldwell61 refer to the principle as punishment for 
human rights violations. Gallen,62 De Brabandere,63 and Boon64 refer to a prin-
ciple of accountability.
As pointed out by May, trials constitute a fundamental step in restoring 
the rule of law.65 However, in transitions from conflict to peace, this principle 
should be understood as the exigency of a certain form of justice, though not 
necessarily a retributive one.66 Affirming this idea, May later sustained that 
“the justice of jus post bellum is secured not through giving to people what is 
their due in the short run, but in securing what is good for societies that seek 
to return to a lasting peace.”67
This perspective expresses the nature and function of jus post bellum prin-
ciples. Though criminal accountability is a fundamental component of tran-
sition from conflict to peace, the levels and forms of criminal justice must 
be determined through balancing this duty with other principles of jus post 
bellum. On this point, Peperkamp claims that the moral and legal obligation 
of punishment should not prevail over the concrete needs of peace, even if 
there is no agreement on what should be the outcome of this collision of 
 57 May, After War Ends, 20.
 58 Stahn, ‘ “Jus Ad Bellum”, “jus in Bello” … “Jus Post Bellum”?— Rethinking the Conception of 
the Law of Armed Force,’ 938– 41.
 59 Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective,’ 38– 41.
 60 Coady, ‘The Jus Post Bellum.’
 61 Williams and Caldwell, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of Just Peace.’
 62 Gallen, ‘Jus Post Bellum: An Interpretive Framework.’
 63 De Brabandere, ‘The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in International Law: A Normative 
Critique,’ 137– 38.
 64 Boon, ‘Legislative Reform in Post- Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary 
Occupant’s Law- Making Powers.’
 65 May, After War Ends, 78.
 66 May, ‘Reparation, Restitution, and Transitional Justice,’ 39.
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values.68 May warns that one of the problems of this principle “is that since 
retribution is backward- looking and most of the other jus post bellum princi-
ples are forward- looking, pursuit of a just and lasting peace tends to favor the 
forward- looking principles.”69 Bass and Walzer even claim that the duty of 
peace and reconciliation prevails over the duty of justice.70
Looking at those elements, it is here where principles offer a space of 
coordination and balance for interpreting and applying legal obligations 
consistently with respect to the exigencies of peace. As seen in Chapter 
2, criminal justice is one of the most sophisticated components of the 
Colombian Peace Agreement.71 Since 2005 Colombia developed a system 
of transitional justice for the demobilization of paramilitary groups, which 
offered an innovative way to reconcile the requirements of international 
law with the practical needs of peace. The Justice and Peace Law balanced 
the prohibition on amnesties for serious violations of human rights and ihl 
against the fact that members of armed groups in negotiation would not 
accept regular criminal sanctions.72 Thus, such a law established a system 
of justice in which those responsible for the most serious crimes were tried 
and sentenced, but given reduced penalties in exchange for their contribu-
tion to peace.
In the 2012– 2016 peace negotiations, the conditions were more complicated. 
Unlike paramilitary groups, the guerilla claimed the political character of their 
fight, and as such they were not willing to accept the same conditions that 
were offered by the 2005 Justice and Peace Law. As seen in Chapter 2, the guer-
rilla was even resistant to including an item on justice in the agenda of negoti-
ations.73 However, as they accepted a chapter on victims, they understood that 
criminal justice was a victim’s right and an exigence of international law. Here, 
again, a discussion on the balance between peace and justice emerged. And 
this is where jus post bellum offers a space of coordination and interpretation: a 
principle of accountability, including criminal responsibility, exists in interna-
tional law and is a necessity in peace negotiations; however, the conditions of 
the context require it to be interpreted and applied according to the specific 
needs of peace.
 68 Peperkamp, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Case of Minimalism versus Maximalism?,’ 261.
 69 May, After War Ends, 79.
 70 Bass, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ 405; Walzer, ‘The Aftermath of War. Reflections on Jus Post 
Bellum,’ 45.
 71 See Chapter 2, Section 3.3.
 72 See Chapter 2, Section 3.3.1.
















In this case, new elements emerged for the interpretative balance. Colombia 
had the precedent of the 2005 system of reduced penalties. As examined in 
Chapter 2, the final version of that law was the result of different actors’ claims 
around the international legal prohibition on amnesties for serious crimes. 
The parties in the 2012– 2016 peace process departed from the fact that no 
amnesty was possible for those crimes. However, the guerilla was not willing 
to accept any kind of prison sanctions. At the same time, the Office of the icc 
Prosecutor insisted on the obligation to prosecute serious crimes committed 
during the conflict. Furthermore, the Prosecutor added a new element speci-
fying that even if restorative sanctions were possible in the context of a peace 
process, they should include effective restrictions on liberty. All these elements 
finally carried out a Special Jurisdiction for Peace tasked with investigating 
and trying people responsible for the most serious crimes. These individuals 
should fully cooperate with truth and reparation, and in exchange they will 
receive restorative sanctions accompanied by effective restrictions on liberty 
as defined by their judges.
As such, compared to the other principles, for the principle of criminal 
accountability international law sets stronger standards and exigences that 
must be observed in the transition from armed conflict to peace. This is in 
accordance with Boon’s argument that in matters dealing with past human 
rights and ihl violations, principles offer a lower margin of appreciation to 
the parties.
Therefore, in the way this principle worked in Colombia, we can see a clear 
example on the role of international law as a framework offering to the parties 
limits and possibilities, expressed in legal norms, discourses, and practices, in 
which they moved to create a transitional justice model concilitating the exi-
gences of international law with their practical needs of peace.
3.3 Reparation
Contemporary armed conflicts occur in a way such that civilians suffer most 
of the damages caused by the confrontation. niac s usually entail degradation 
of violence, where forced displacement, killings, sexual violence, enforced 
disappearance, and many other violations of human rights and ihl occur. 
This situation evinces the state’s failure to fulfill its international obligation of 
respecting and guaranteeing the rights of its people. Therefore, the legal obli-
gation to provide reparation for these damages emerges.74
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On this issue, May proposes the principles of restitution and reparation, 
while Stahn75 and Coady76 propose just reparation, and Orend compensation.77 
For May, “restitution is the restoring to the rightful owner what has been lost or 
taken away,” whereas “reparation is the restoring to good condition of something 
that has been damaged.”78 In any case, both concepts are grounded in the idea 
of restoration, which he defines as “a kind of rectification or compensation.”79 
However, such a distinction appears unnecessary as restitution is a modality of 
reparation. This is the view of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims, Principle 18 of which states:
In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking 
account of individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of 
international human rights law and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity 
of the violation and the circumstances of each case, be provided with 
full and effective reparation […], which include the following forms: res-
titution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of 
non- repetition.80
The victim’s right to reparation is enshrined in several instruments under ihrl, 
ihl, and icl.81 However, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, reparations 
must take consideration of the specific circumstances in which the violations 
of human rights or ihl have occurred. This is especially the case in the con-
text of armed conflict, where victimization is widespread and is committed by 
different state and non- state actors.82 This principle thus offers the space and 
 75 Stahn, ‘ “Jus Ad Bellum”, “jus in Bello” … “Jus Post Bellum”?— Rethinking the Conception of 
the Law of Armed Force,’ 938– 41.
 76 Coady, ‘The Jus Post Bellum.’
 77 Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective,’ 37– 42.
 78 May, After War Ends, 183.
 79 May, ‘Reparation, Restitution, and Transitional Justice,’ 32.
 80 UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.
 81 See Chapter 2, Section 4.1., for the international legal framework on reparations.
 82 At this regard, the International Law Association has proposed two resolutions on the 
specific conditions of reparation for victims or armed conflict, in an effort to advance 
the discussion on the issue both in substantive and procedural terms. International 
Law Association, Draft Declaration of International Law Principles on Reparation for 

















the elements to coordinate and interpret international standards vis- à- vis the 
concrete circumstances of a given transitional scenario.
The principle of reparation has been a core element in the Colombian tran-
sition. As seen in Chapter 2, in 2011 the country adopted what is internation-
ally considered the most developed system of comprehensive reparations to 
victims of armed conflict.83 Such a milestone imposed on the parties involved 
in the 2012– 2016 peace process the duty of placing victims at the center of 
the negotiation.84 The awareness regarding this principle of reparation in 
Colombia has been a significant element in developing the negotiations and 
is reflected in the Final Agreement. Additionally, the aim to grant remedies to 
victims led the parties to include other elements in the Agreement, through the 
development of a comprehensive system of truth, justice, and reparations.85
The principle of reparation in Colombia has played a vital role in transition, 
and this case offers insightful elements for other transitional contexts around 
the world. Reparation for victims of armed conflict is a must not only as a legal 
duty under international law, but as a condition to make peace sustainable 
and reconciliation effective. From this case, one can conclude that the norma-
tive principle of reparation has a solid international legal basis as well as valu-
able comparative practice showing to actors involved in trasitions the way to 
make reparation possible and effective, following international standards and 
considering the limits and conditions imposed by their context. Additionaly, 
an important contribution of the Colombian approach is given by the way in 
which it addresses reparations by non- state actors. As seen in Chapter 2, inter-
national law and legal scholarship are increasingly discussing this matter, and 
practice from Colombia will certainly offer new insights, mainly regarding the 
role of reparation by those actors whitin the judicial process before the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace, as well as beyond judicial mechanisms through acts of 
public apologies and contribution to truth and reconciliation.
3.4 Reconciliation
The principle of reconciliation expresses the main political challenge of 
peacemaking and peacebuilding. It is aimed at bringing people together to 
 83 Unidad de Atención y Reparación a Víctimas, Universidad de Harvard destaca Política Integral 
de Reparación de Víctimas en Colombia, 2015, available at: http:// www.unidadvictimas.gov.
co/ es/ valoraci%C3%B3n- y- registro/ universidad- de- harvard- destac a - pol%C3%ADtica- 
integral- de- reparaci%C3%B3n- de- v%C3%ADctimas- en (accessed on 1 April 2018).
 84 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
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live peacefully, which is an expression of sustainable peace.86 Reconciliation 
seeks “to create relationships of respect, trust, and friendship,”87 as well as to 
“bring emotional healing to the victims of war.”88 However, as May argues, “the 
jus post bellum principle of reconciliation is often one of the hardest things to 
achieve,” as it involves a modus vivendi in which people are able to not only 
respect each other but also reach cooperation.89 This principle is equally pro-
posed by Stahn90 and by Patterson.91
Due to its highly political content, this principle is the most difficult to 
delineate in a legal perspective. May says that reconciliation is often viewed as 
“too amorphous a category to count as jus post bellum normative principle.”92 
Nonetheless, the principle of reconciliation can find different legal bases. First, 
it is an expression of the state’s general obligation to promote peaceful societies 
and ensure respect for people’s rights.93 Second, reconciliation is a condition 
to guarantee the non- repetition of human rights violations, which embodies 
the positive obligations of prevention and reparation.94 And, third, reconcilia-
tion is closely related to the right to truth, both for victims and society.95
Based on these considerations, the principle of reconciliation attains legal 
value. Although reconciliation seems more a goal of transition than a princi-
ple guiding the coordination and interpretation of legal norms, such a goal 
 86 See Chapter 1, Section 4, for the discussion on the role of reparations as part of the object 
of jus post bellum in building a sustainable peace.
 87 Peperkamp, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Case of Minimalism versus Maximalism?,’ 269.
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War Justice (New York: Orbis, 2010), 102.
 89 May, After War Ends, 75.
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is present in the process of balancing legal obligations against the political 
needs and aims of peace. In other words, if reconciliation is a condition neces-
sary for building sustainable peace, it becomes a crucial consideration for the 
application of the normative framework of jus post bellum, and any measure or 
instrument designed for transition should contribute to that aim of social rec-
onciliation. Therefore, reconciliation is a principle of jus post bellum.
Reconciliation has been a vital principle in the Colombian transition. In the 
recent peace process, this principle is expressed in several ways. Addressing 
the root causes of the conflict related to inequality and political exclusion con-
tributes to reconciliation.96 The search for truth is a measure aimed at heal-
ing people and rebuilding the social fabric. The reparation of victims is also a 
reconciliation- oriented measure, including actions of reparation by non- state 
armed actors.97 Similarly, the mechanism of restorative sanctions for those 
responsible for serious crimes— which included contributing to rural devel-
opment and demining as well as participating in social programs— is aimed 
at integrating former fighters into their communities to foster peaceful coex-
istence.98 All of these aims could be considered to be playing a role in balanc-
ing international legal requirements with the interests of the parties and the 
expectations of victims and society as a whole.
Nevertheless, the political dimension of this principle does not allow inter-
national law to define specific conditions or standards, but general elements 
for guiding parties in the transition. Here, in accordance with Boon’s proposal, 
there is a general obligation for states to promote peaceful coexistence and 
rebuild the social fabric after armed conflict, responding to the jus post bel-
lum’s objective of attaining sustainable peace, but it must be met in accor-
dance to the concrete conditions of the context. However, from the case study 
one can see how this principle has a normative standing to be integrated not 
only as a goal, but also as component of the normative framework guiding the 
legal and political decisions for transition to peace.
3.5 Proportionality
This principle has the larger consensus among authors. Alongside May, Orend, 
Gallen, De Brabandere, and Boon include proportionality as a principle of jus 
 96 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2. on socioeconomic and political reforms included in the Peace 
Agreement in Colombia for addressing the root causes for armed conflict.
 97 See Chapter 2, Section 4.2. on the approach to reparations in the Colombian transition.
 98 See Chapter 2, Sections 2.2 and 3.3 on the mechanisms of transitional justice in Colombia, 
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post bellum.99 May describes proportionality as a “meta- principle” over the 
others. In his words, proportionality “urges that we think about the harm that 
is caused by the post war application of the other normative principles. In this 
way, the proportionality principle could be written into each of the principles 
as a modification of them.”100 The idea behind proportionality is “to consider 
whether the operation of these other post bellum principles might not do more 
harm than good.”101
Proportionality is a general requirement of international law that can be 
considered to be implicit in the other principles of jus post bellum. However, 
it has relevance in jus post bellum as long as it guides the parties’ balances 
and decisions within the bargaining zone defined by the other principles. 
For instance, proportionality plays a role in defining the balance between the 
retributive dimension of criminal responsibility required by icl and the need 
to adopt a restorative approach in a transitional process.102 On this point, the 
following analysis presented in a concurrent opinion of an Inter- American 
Court of Human Rights’ judgement is relevant:
38. Thus, in certain transitional situations between armed conflicts and 
peace, it can happen that a State is not in a position to implement fully 
and simultaneously, the various international rights and obligations it has 
assumed. In these circumstances, taking into consideration that none of 
those rights and obligations is of an absolute nature, it is legitimate that 
they be weighed in such a way that the satisfaction of some does not 
affect the exercise of the others disproportionately. Thus, the degree of 
justice that can be achieved is not an isolated component from which 
legitimate frustrations and dissatisfactions can arise, but part of an ambi-
tious process of transition towards mutual tolerance and peace.103
This principle of proportionality is expressed in different components in 
the Colombian transition. For instance, regarding criminal responsibility, 
 99 Boon, ‘Legislative Reform in Post- Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary 
Occupant’s Law- Making Powers’; Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective’; 
May, After War Ends; Gallen, ‘Jus Post Bellum: An Interpretive Framework’; De Brabandere, 
‘The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in International Law: A Normative Critique.’
 100 May, After War Ends, 22.
 101 May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, and Meionexia,’ 18.
 102 See Chapter 2, Section 3.3.
 103 Inter- American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and nearby 
places v. El Salvador, Judgement of 25 October 2012 Concurrent Opinion of Judge Diego 












the parties balanced icl’s exigences and the icc Prosecutor’s messages on 
the need to impose effective restrictions of liberty, on the one hand, against the 
practical need of offering restorative rather than retributive sanctions after a 
peace negotiation, on the other. As a result, the parties found an intermediate 
formula that established formal trials and judicial sanctions alongside restor-
ative measures accompanied by restrictions of liberty. This was the result of 
a proportional balance between legal standards, values, and political require-
ments of peacemaking. Another example can be seen in the component of 
reparations, for which international legal standards needed to be measured 
against the extensive number of victims requiring reparation.104 A propor-
tional balance was thus required that took into account the comprehensive 
approach to reparations established by international law, the number of vic-
tims, and the State’s financial constraints, giving as a result an administrative 
system of comprehensive reparations offering standard measures according to 
the kind of damage suffered by the victims. In this way, balances of proportion-
ality from the case study offer elements and examples on how this principle 
works as a component of the normative framework for transition and how it 
could be applied in other contexts.
3.6 Inclusiveness
The broad participation of different social sectors, as well as the consideration 
of their particular needs in peace processes and agreements, is gaining increas-
ing importance around the world. As presented in Chapter 2, international law 
enshrines the right of traditionally marginalized groups to be consulted on 
issues of their interest, as it is the case of indigenous and tribal peoples.105 
Similarly, the UN has consistently advocated for women’s participation and 
inclusion in peace processes and agreements.106 Although this principle was 
not envisaged by May, practice provides elements for considering participa-
tion and inclusion as a principle of jus post bellum.
Stahn refers to this principle as “fairness and inclusiveness of peace settle-
ments,” arguing that sustainable peace requires all interests to be represented, 
including those of “groups and minorities protected by international law.”107 
Along the same line, Turner highlights that inclusion of groups such as women 
 104 See Chapter 2, Section 4.2.
 105 See Chapter 2, section 5.1.2.
 106 See Chapter 2, section 5.1.1.
 107 Stahn, ‘ “Jus Ad Bellum”, “jus in Bello” … “Jus Post Bellum”?— Rethinking the Conception of 
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and indigenous peoples is being considered by parties in peace negotiations as 
a legal obligation.108
Ensuring specific participation in peace processes to certain groups is based 
on the idea that armed conflict does not impact all people in the same way. 
Different affected sectors should have a voice in peace negotiations and be dif-
ferentially included in the resulting agreement. For this reason, this principle 
involves both a procedural and a substantive dimension. It is not just about 
granting participation in the peace negotiation process but also about ensur-
ing that the specific needs of the involved sectors are adequately addressed in 
the peace agreement.
On this idea, Ní Aoláin and Haynes sustain that “countries emerging from 
conflict provide multiple opportunities for transformation on many different 
levels, opportunities uncommon in stable and non- transitional societies.”109 For 
them, this opportunity is especially important for social groups traditionally 
“marginalized, underrepresented, and discriminated against.”110 Transitional 
moments have great transformative potential, and this is why they must be 
made an opportunity to evaluate the situation of marginalized groups in society.
In this sense, this principle should be understood in a broad sense, as 
including the participation of victims and civil society as well as the specific 
interests of differential groups. Building sustainable peace after a niac does 
not only depend on the parties in conflict or the state. It must be the result of 
social dialogue involving a broad participation of different sectors. This is a 
crucial element for reaching lasting peace,111 increasing societal acceptance, 
and reducing the likelihood of excluded actors undermining the process.112 As 
such, it must be considered a jus post bellum principle guiding transition.
A principle of inclusiveness is notable in the Colombian peace process 
and its Final Agreement. As analyzed in Chapter 2, inspired by the unsc 
Resolution 1325 on women’s participation and inclusion in peace processes, 
Colombia devoted significant attention to women and gender issues in the 
 108 Catherine Turner, “Mapping a Norm of Inclusion in the Jus Post Bellum,” in Just Peace 
After Conflict. Jus Post Bellum and the Justice of Peace, ed. Carsten Stahn and Jens Iverson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 130– 146.
 109 Ní Aoláin and Haynes, ‘The Compatibility of Justice for Women with Jus Post Bellum 
Analysis,’ 161.
 110 Ní Aoláin and Haynes, 161.
 111 Anthony Wanis- St. John and Darren Kew, ‘Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: 
Confronting Exclusion,’ International Negotiation 13 (2008): 14.
 112 Strengthening the Role of  Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of  Disputes, Conflict 
Prevention and Resolution, Report of  the Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/ 66/ 811 (25 June 













negotiations.113 Following this path, the parties extended the gender dimen-
sion to lgbti people, who also participated in the process and are referred 
to in the Agreement. Regarding ethnic minorities, the negotiators accepted 
the participation of indigenous and Afro- Colombian representatives, invok-
ing ilo Convention 169 and other related instruments, and an ethnic chapter 
was included in the Agreement.114 Finally, under a victim- centered approach, 
a large delegation of victims participated in the negotiations, while other 
civil society actors were heard in different scenarios.115 In all of these cases, as 
exposed in Chapter 2, these social groups invoked international law to support 
their claims for participation and inclusion in the process. In this way, they 
were able to present the discussion on inclusiveness as not merely a question 
of legitimacy but an international legal requirement.
The experience in Colombia shows the normative power of this principle 
and it creates precedents for other processes around the world. Inclusiveness is 
a condition to make peace effective, sustainable, and transformative. As such, 
it cannot be left to the leeway of the parties, but it must be embodied as a 
normative principle for transition. Insightful elements are offered by this case 
study, and this principle can be considered as one of the most promising com-
ponents of jus post bellum.
3.7 Environmental Protection
Armed conflict usually impacts the environment in different ways. In some 
cases, natural resources are exploited as a means to finance war, and in oth-
ers, armed confrontation has direct or collateral effects on the environment.116 
Thus, restoring and ensuring a healthy environment is a condition for building 
sustainable peace.117 Since 2014 Stahn has affirmed that jus post bellum needs 
to “encourage fresh thinking” on environmental damage related to armed 
conflict,118 which Easterday describes as a matter typically “ignored or superfi-
cially treated in peace agreements.”119 Accordingly, Payne proposes a principle 
of environmental integrity as a component of jus post bellum,120 and the 2017 
publication of the University of Leiden’s Jus Post Bellum Project was devoted to 
 113 See Chapter 2, Section 5.2.3.
 114 See Chapter 2, Section 5.2.3.
 115 See Chapter 2, section 5.2.2.
 116 Gillett, ‘Eco- Struggles: Using International Criminal Law to Protect the Environment 
During and After Non- International Armed Conflict,’ 223.
 117 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum and the Justice of Peace: Some Preliminary Reflections,’ 16.
 118 Stahn, ‘R2P and Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Polycentric Approach,’ 118.
 119 Easterday, ‘Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum,’ 409.
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the question of environmental protection and transition from armed conflict 
to peace.121
For Payne, the principle of environmental integrity ensures the soundness 
of natural resources, including human life and certain properties such as reli-
gious and cultural objects.122 She claims,
Three intertwined elements of jus post bellum are necessary to realizing 
environmental integrity. One is reparations, which provide means for 
reconstruction, create a record of what happened, and may provide dis-
incentive for repetition of unlawful acts. A second is collective concern, 
which is a basis for community action on several fronts to contribute to 
reconstruction of war- torn states. The third is reconstruction itself.123
As analyzed in Chapter 2, damages to the environment can affect reconcilia-
tion,124 reconstruction, and socioeconomic development in post- conflict sce-
narios,125 making “environmental protection and the sustainable management 
of resources […] important pathways to consolidate peace and promote long- 
term development.”126 For that reason, a principle of environmental protection 
must be part of jus post bellum, both in terms of the restoration of damages 
caused by armed conflict,127 and the promotion of the sustainable manage-
ment of natural resources as a condition for lasting peace and development.
Regarding this issue, the ilc designated a Drafting Committee on the 
Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, which 
 121 Stahn, Iverson, and Easterday, Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to 
Peace: Clarifying Norms, Principles, and Practices.
 122 Payne, ‘The Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post- Conflict Legal Regimes,’ 506. This 
broad view of environmental protection looks at overcoming the traditional anthropo-
centric frame given to environmental concern. Such an idea was later sustained by Payne 
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ed. Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson, and Jennifer Easterday (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), 62.
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elaborated a Draft Principles on the matter in 2016. Draft Principle 14 states 
that: “Parties to an armed conflict should, as part of the peace process, includ-
ing where appropriate in peace agreements, address matters relating to the 
restoration and protection of the environment damaged by the conflict.”128 
This principle is drawn from different branches of international law related to 
environmental protection.129 It includes provisions from ihl,130 ihrl,131 and 
icl.132
Having such a normative reference, the principle of environmental protec-
tion can be seen in different aspects of the Colombian Peace Agreement.133 
As analyzed in Chapter 2, in its preamble the Agreement relates peace to 
sustainable development and the protection of the environment, natural 
resources, and biodiversity.134 Then, in the component on rural development, 
the Agreement discusses the “environmental rights of the rural population,”135 
and offers special land access and other benefits to communities who work 
to protect the environment, substitute crops of illicit use, and improve food 
production.136 Similarly, the Agreement establishes the protection of areas 
of special environmental interest, seeking a sustainable development involv-
ing rural and ethnic communities.137 Furthermore, there are environmental 
protection- related provisions regarding the substitution of crops of illicit use 
and demining.
In this way, the Colombian case shows the negotiators’ awareness on the 
duty to address environmental protection in their peace talks and to include 
related provisions in the Final Agreement. As such, this practice constitutes 
an expression of a jus post bellum principle of environmental protection in the 
 128 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Seventy- first ses-
sion, 2 May- 10 June and 4 July- 12 August 2016, UN Doc. A/ 71/ 10, http:// legal.un.org/ docs/ 
?path=../ ilc/ reports/ 2016/ english/ a_ 71_ 10.pdf&lang=EFSRAC, 309.
 129 Fleck, ‘Legal Protection of the Environment. The Double Challenge of Non- International 
Armed Conflict and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding,’ 203.
 130 See, for instance, Henckaerts and Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law. Volume i: Rules. Rule 44.
 131 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating 
to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, A/ hrc/ 31/ 53, 28 
December 2015.
 132 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 8(b)(iv).
 133 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.
 134 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 3– 4.
 135 Government of Colombia and farc, 199.
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transition from armed conflict to peace, in which international law is attract-
ing increasing attention, evident in the recent work by the ilc138 and legal 
scholarship.139 Then, this experice offers new elements from practice that con-
tribute to the legal grounding of a principle of environmental protection in 
transition for future processes around the world.
4 The Actors of Jus Post Bellum in Colombia
Both jus ad bellum and jus in bello have relatively clear addressees. In jus ad 
bellum, the UN Charter defined the conditions and actors to allow the legal use 
of force. In jus in bello, ihl is addressed to the fighting parties in armed con-
flict. However, the transition from armed conflict to peace is a complex process 
involving a variety of actors at all levels, both domestically and internationally.
For Patterson, defining who is an actor of jus post bellum means identifying 
“who has the obligation to do what?”140 In this sense, jus post bellum would 
involve any actor with obligations in the transition from armed conflict to 
sustainable peace. Thus, it would go beyond merely the parties in conflict or 
in negotiation. As May argues, the addressees of jus post bellum are not only 
the parties in the peace negotiations and the political leaders, but also all the 
citizens.141
Under the understanding of jus post bellum proposed in this chapter, its 
actors cannot be limited to the direct addressees of legal obligations, but 
involve all actors invoking, interpreting, or applying legal norms, discourses, 
and comparative practices with a view to achieve a sustainable transition from 
armed conflict to peace. This standpoint is clear in the Colombian case. In 
addition to the parties’ commitment to international law during peace nego-
tiations, a broad range of external and domestic actors has played a role in 
the normative internationalization of transition in the country. This section 
presents these actors and their contribution to incorporating principles of jus 
 138 Jacobsson, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts.’ And, Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 
Seventy- first session, 2 May- 10 June and 4 July- 12 August 2016, UN Doc. A/ 71/ 10, http:// 
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post bellum in the Colombian transition, offering insights for understanding 
the variety of actors that can play a role in jus post bellum in general.
4.1 The Parties in Negotiation
Within the context of a peace process, the parties in negotiation are the main 
actors of jus post bellum. In the case of a niac, the state has the primary duty 
to observe its international obligations applicable to matters in negotiation. 
However, non- state actors could also have an interest in following those obliga-
tions, pursuing international acceptability and legal grounding for the result-
ing agreement.
Unlike most peace processes, where negotiators are rarely preoccupied with 
international law and want to be free of legal restraints,142 in Colombia the 
parties in negotiation deliberately seized international law as a parameter for 
their talks and for their agreement. Even though the negotiation agenda did 
not include any specific reference to international law, the development of 
negotiations, the regular joint communiqués, and the Final Agreement con-
sistently involved several international legal references. In this way, the parties 
showed their acknowledgment of international law, accepting the existence of 
unavoidable international legal obligations as well as the opportunity to frame 
the negotiation and the agreement under such a regime.
Indeed, both the Colombian government and the farc wanted an agree-
ment that would be internationally accepted. The government was responsible 
for ensuring the conformity of the peace deal with the State’s international legal 
obligations. The farc wanted to obtain legal certainty beyond the domestic 
order. Those elements not only eased their acceptance of external guidelines 
but also their search for reconciling international legal standards with the polit-
ical needs of peace. Thus, in the Agreement the parties explicitly affirmed their 
determination to reach peace within the parameters of international law,143 
which is then reflected in many aspects of the document, as analyzed in the 
Chapter 2.
4.2 External Guarantors
As noted by Bell, external backing and mediation in peace negotiations and 
agreements is the rule rather than the exception.144 Such a rule has been 
present in the 2012– 2016 peace negotiations in Colombia. However, rather 
 142 Kastner, Legal Normativity in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflict, 68– 69.
 143 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
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than mediation, the parties assigned to external actors the role of guarantors 
(Cuba and Norway) and partner states (Chile and Venezuela).145 A similar role 
was assigned to the UN, which participated in the talks through a Secretary- 
General’s Special Representative and received a monitoring mandate for the 
implementation phase.146
In normative terms, these external actors have played an essential role 
in bringing international law standards to the negotiation process and to 
the Agreement. Regarding this topic, Kastner highlights that external actors 
“not only assist the negotiation parties in generating their proper normative 
framework but are also norm promoter and norm creators who may introduce 
predominantly external norms into the negotiations.”147 This was the case in 
Colombia.
During the negotiations, Norway, as a guarantor, offered and sponsored a 
group of experts in international law and transitional justice to counsel the 
parties during the process. The group was chaired by Morten Bergsmo, a pres-
tigious professor of international law and former advisor to the icc and the 
icty. The group was tasked with advising on the legal limits that the peace 
agreement could have vis- à- vis Colombia’s international legal obligations.148
Because of the confidentiality of the negotiations, it is difficult to know 
the terms in which that external legal advice was presented and assumed by 
the parties around the table. However, considering the international legal 
consistency of the Final Agreement, one could deduce that the role played by 
those external actors was vital for such an outcome. In addition to the techni-
cal legal advice provided by the experts in the negotiation, the external guaran-
tors likely claimed for the observance of international standards. It is difficult 
to imagine that the same result could have been achieved without an indepen-
dent party advising on the legal limits of the agreement. If those limits had 
been brought to the table only by the government, the guerrilla would have 
shown more resistance to accept them.
Finally, regarding the role of the UN Representative for the negotiations, his 
influence could be measured in terms of the inclusion of relevant UN guide-
lines in the Final Agreement. In particular, the 2004 Secretary- General Report 
 145 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and 
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on Transitional Justice149 recommended a series of measures to be incorpo-
rated in peace agreements, especially those regarding victims’ rights, the 
prohibition on amnesties, and the safeguard of the rule of law.150 Something 
similar could be said regarding unsc Resolution 1325 and the participation 
and inclusion of women in the negotiation process and the Agreement. It 
is because of these elements that one can conclude that the UN considered 
the Agreement to have satisfied international and UN standards, and that the 
Security Council not only welcomed the deal but also assumed its monitoring 
and verification.151
4.3 The Colombian Constitutional Court
Colombia has a very influential Constitutional Court, which has the mandate 
to control the constitutionality of constitutional reforms and of any law. To 
do so, in addition to the Constitution, the Court must use ihrl and ihl as a 
parameter of constitutional control. It is because according to Article 93 of the 
Constitution, international human rights treaties duly ratified by Colombia are 
prevalent in the domestic order. This provision has been interpreted by the 
Court to mean that these international norms integrate a constitutional block 
that has the same legal status as the Constitution itself.152
As such, all the transitional norms adopted in Colombia are under the con-
trol of the Constitutional Court, both under the Constitution and under ihrl 
and ihl. For this reason, the Court has played an essential role in bringing 
international law to the discussion around the transition to peace in the coun-
try. This can be observed in at least three instances.
One instance is the constitutional exam of the 2005 Justice and Peace Law 
created for the demobilization of paramilitary groups. In its main decision 
regarding this Law, the Court used several international instruments to assess 
 149 UN Secretary- General, ‘Report of the Secretary- General on the Rule of Law and 
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the negotiations. At this point, he noted that: “It is quite clear in the international legal 
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Press International (13 September 2012), available at: https:// www.upi.com/ Top_ News/ 
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its constitutionality regarding reparation and justice. In an extensive reference 
to international law, the Court invoked the iccpr, the American Convention 
on Human Rights, the International Convention on Enforced Disappearance, 
the Geneva Conventions and their Protocol Additional ii, the Genocide 
Convention, the icc Statute,153 and several sentences of the Inter- American 
Court of Human Rights.154 The Court used all these references to frame the 
State’s international legal obligation to ensure victims’ rights to truth, justice, 
and reparation, especially regarding the prohibition on amnesties for grave 
violations of ihrl and ihl. Based on this legal framework, the Court modified 
some aspects of the Law, increasing the perpetrators’ measures of accountabil-
ity and responsibility with respect to reparations for victims.155
Another instance is the constitutional exam of the 2012 Legal Framework 
for Peace.156 This instrument was adopted, before the peace negotiations with 
the farc began, with the purpose of providing a legal basis for the future 
transitional mechanisms that could be required. In its judgement, the Court 
extensively examined relevant international treaties, international human 
rights jurisprudence, and international practice on transitional justice. Using 
those references, the Court defined the international standards that the Legal 
Framework for Peace should have observed in terms of reparation to victims157 
and justice for international crimes.158
In the third instance, the Court has been a fundamental actor for the nor-
mative development of the 2016 Peace Agreement, and its previous decisions 
had clear influence during the negotiations. In the same way that the threat of 
a possible intervention by the icc influenced matters of criminal justice, the 
parties’ knowledge that any norm developing the Agreement would be submit-
ted to the Court’s control caused them to carefully follow its previous jurispru-
dence on transitional justice. In this sense, the Court indirectly influenced the 
normative internationalization of the Peace Agreement because of the inter-
national legal background of its previous jurisprudence on this matter. This 
was especially the case for the incorporation of international standards on the 
right to reparation and the prohibition of amnesties for international crimes.
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4.4 The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
Under current international law, the icc should be considered a part of any 
transitional justice process, and the parties in conflicts should take seriously 
the possibility of an icc intervention in cases where negotiation terms do 
not meet the Rome Statute’s standards.159 This question has been present 
in Colombia since the very beginning of the icc’s mandate. Indeed, when 
Colombia deposited its instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute in 2002, 
a declaration was made in the sense of deferring the competence of the icc 
for war crimes for seven years.160 The declaration was made with the purpose 
of facilitating peace negotiations with armed groups in the country during the 
meantime.
In 2003, Colombia initiated a negotiation for the demobilization of paramil-
itary groups. A year later the icc Prosecutor put the country under preliminary 
examination,161 which she has kept open until now. During these years, the 
Rome Statute and the examination by the icc Prosecutor have been invoked 
by different actors as a reminder of the international legal obligation to ensure 
justice for crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction. The consideration of the icc 
was reflected in the discussion of the Justice and Peace Law for that demo-
bilization. When the Constitutional Court examined the constitutionality of 
this law, most interventions invoked the icc Statute to claim greater account-
ability, and the Court used such an instrument as a parameter to support its 
decision to modify some aspects of the Law.162
In 2012, Colombia adopted a constitutional reform developing a Legal 
Framework for Peace that included the possibility of granting alternative pen-
alties or the suspension of sentences for members of armed groups.163 This 
norm was examined by the Constitutional Court in 2013, and the icc Prosecutor 
intervened in the process through two letters expressing her concern regard-
ing these benefits. In the first letter she argued that since the suspension of a 
prison sentence means that the accused does not spend time imprisoned, it 
would be manifestly inadequate in the case of those most responsible for com-
mitting international crimes.164 In a second letter, sent a few weeks later, the 
 159 Ambos, ‘The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice,’ 67– 68.
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 161 The Office of the Prosecutor, para. 231.
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Prosecutor emphasized that the icc maintains its competence over individu-
als who committed crimes enshrined by the Rome Statute, even if they have 
received judicial benefits under domestic law.165
In 2015, in a conference on transitional justice and the icc in Colombia, 
the icc Deputy Prosecutor explained the Prosecutor’s position in a more 
moderate way. In his opinion, criminal sentences can adopt different forms 
in transitional contexts: absolute suspension of sentences is not possible, but 
prison time is not an indispensable punishment.166 This statement supported 
the idea that in contexts of transition, alternative measures offering effective 
restrictions of liberty were enough to meet the icc’s standards on punishment.
All of these elements have played a significant role in the transition in 
Colombia. The mechanism of criminal responsibility and prison sentences 
applied to paramilitary groups under the 2005 Justice and Peace Law were 
possible owing to the potential threat of an icc intervention.167 This was also 
the case in the 2016 Peace Agreement with the farc. Indeed, even though the 
guerrilla did not accept the same prison sentences as those applied to para-
militaries, the negotiators understood that the icc Prosecutor would not 
accept simple restorative sanctions for individuals responsible of the most 
serious crimes. In this sense, the Final Agreement incorporated the Deputy 
Prosecutor’s perspective, introducing effective restrictions of liberty as a part 
of the restorative sanctions agreed by the parties.
As such, the icc Prosecutor welcomed the terms of the Peace Agreement.168 
In a subsequent visit to the country, the Prosecutor declared herself “impressed 
by the commitment, invaluable experience and high standards of Colombian 
courts,” and reaffirmed the disposition of her office to keep “as a good faith 
partner of the Colombian government and the Colombian people in this jour-
ney towards sustainable peace.”169
 165 Letter of 7 August 2013, sent by the Prosecutor of the icc to the Colombian Constitutional 
Court. Corte Constitucional de Colombia, paragraph 3.16.2.
 166 James Stewart, Deputy icc Prosecutor, ‘Transitional Justice in Colombia and the Role of 
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 168 Office of the icc Prosecutor, ‘Statement of icc Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the 
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These statements reflect the Prosecutor’s satisfaction with the way in which 
the parties in negotiation accepted and applied her recommendations, show-
ing the influence of the icc in the Colombian transitional justice mechanisms 
since 2005. This Prosecutor’s support plays a very positive role in giving legit-
imacy and legal certainty to the Agreement. On this point, one can conclude 
that if criminal accountability is effectively ensured in the agreed terms, a 
future icc intervention would be unlikely in this case.170
4.5 The Inter- American System of Human Rights
Both the Inter- American Commission and the Inter- American Court of Human 
Rights have made significant contributions to the development of ihrl regard-
ing truth, justice, and reparation, and they have influenced its incorporation 
into domestic law and practice.171 As discussed in the previous chapter regard-
ing the prohibition on amnesties for serious violations of human rights, the 
Commission and the Court developed a consistent jurisprudence on the State’s 
obligation to investigate and prosecute those crimes, as well as to provide rep-
aration for victims of dictatorial regimes and armed conflicts in the continent. 
The Court has even rejected the validity of domestic laws involving impunity 
in those cases.172
The Inter- American System of Human Rights’ jurisprudence has been 
invoked by several organizations and by the Constitutional Court during the 
constitutional control for the norms on transitional justice in Colombia. ngo s 
and academia’s interventions before the Constitutional Court during the exam 
of the Justice and Peace Law and the Legal Framework for Peace invoked the 
Inter- American jurisprudence on human rights as a reference for the State’s 
international obligations. And, indeed, the Constitutional Court extensively 
referred to several Inter- American Court sentences as parameters of con-
stitutional control.173 Such decisions were mainly related to positive obli-
gations to prevent, investigate, and sanction human rights violations;174 the 
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inadmissibility of amnesties for those violations175 and the invalidity of laws 
granting such amnesties;176 the victim’s right to an effective remedy, including 
reparation;177 and the right to truth.178
Considering these elements, the Constitutional Court made significant adjust-
ments to the 2005 Justice and Peace Law, which were expressly welcomed by the 
Inter- American Commission. The Commission issued an official statement ana-
lyzing the Law and the Constitutional Court’s judgment under the Inter- American 
standards on human rights. For the Commission, the Court’s decision substan-
tially improved the Law’s balance between the need to grant judicial benefits in 
exchange for contributions to peace with the international standards on truth, 
justice, and reparation. On this matter, the Commission affirmed that the Court’s 
decision constituted an essential tool to interpret and apply the Colombian 
transitional legal framework according to the State’s international human rights 
obligations.179 Therefore, the precedents of the Inter- American System became 
crucial considerations for the parties during the 2012– 2016 peace negotiations.
4.6 Victims and Civil Society Organizations
ngo s working on human rights and other related sectors are fundamental 
actors in the process of transition to peace. As noted by Davis, “their experi-
ence in litigation and political incidence have contributed for example to the 
development of a strong jurisprudence on victims’ rights in Latin America.”180 
At the same time, ihrl has played a fundamental role in legitimizing differ-
ent civil society’s claims and discourses. ngo s have used international law “in 
advocacy, campaigning, fact- finding reports, complaints to international bod-
ies, briefs to courts, and to develop the scope and efficacy of the international 
human rights institutional framework.”181
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As such, civil society organizations have also contributed to the interna-
tional legal background of the transition to peace in Colombia. Besides their 
general advocacy in media and political scenarios, they have held a concrete 
role in the discussion of transitional justice norms before the Constitutional 
Court. During the examination of the 2005 Justice and Peace Law and the 2012 
Legal Framework for Peace, the Court considered the interventions and briefs 
submitted by several local ngo s and think tanks, as well as international ones 
like the International Commission of Jurists,182 the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International.183 In 
all of their interventions, these organizations invoked international law ask-
ing the Court to ensure international standards on justice and reparations to 
victims.
Those legal discourses in media and before the Court have impacted the 
way in which the legal mechanisms were designed and adapted. On the Justice 
and Peace Law, Evans highlights that “the consistent pressure by international 
and regional human rights mechanisms, as well as by national civil society 
organisations, has played a major role in highlighting concerns relating to rep-
arations.”184 Similarly, one could consider the influence of human rights advo-
cacy on matters such as victims’ participation during the peace negotiations 
and the broad gender dimension of the 2016 Peace Agreement. These issues 
were not present in the initial agenda of negotiations, but they were intro-
duced and accepted by the parties during the process owing to the pressure by 
victims, ngo s, and other related actors.
On this line, the role of victims during the peace negotiations in Colombia 
expressed their potential to bring legal standards and discourses to the discus-
sion on matters involving their rights. Victims played a fundamental role both 
through their public advocacy and through their direct participation in the 
table of negotiations for having a Peace Agreement observing international 
legal standards on victim’s rights.
4.7 Insights on the Type and Role of Actors of Jus Post Bellum
From the variety of actors and functions played by them in the Colombian 
transition, one can find relevant insights for understanding the type and role 
of actors of jus post bellum in general. As suggested in this section, an actor of 
jus post bellum is everyone playing a role in defining, bringing, interpreting, 
 182 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia C- 370/ 06 paragraph 3.
 183 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia C- 579/ 13 paragraphs 3, 4.
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and applying relevant international law as a frame for transitioning from 
armed conflict to sustainable peace.
If jus post bellum is a normative framework that guides the contextualized 
interpretation and application of international law for the transition to peace, 
the way in which this framework operates and the principles that define its 
substance, as seen in this chapter, mean that the range of actors that can play 
a role in this process is wide and open. This section offered a varied list of 
domestic and international actors in Colombia, without being exhaustive. The 
common element among them was their contribution to define a normative 
framework in which the formulas for transition were built on different matters, 
having as a goal addressing the root causes of armed conflict and observing 
international standards on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Thus, 
according to the conceptual and empirical analysis presented here, playing a 
role on such a task can be considered as the distinctive element to identify the 
actors of jus post bellum in any given context.
As such, the Colombian experience shows at least four kind of relevant 
actors that could be generally seen as the basic categories to classify actors of 
jus post bellum in other contexts.
First, direct parts in negotiation are the main actors of jus post bellum. 
Regardless of the efforts made by other institutions or actors, the parties 
directly involved in finding a solution to their armed conflict are at the center 
of decisions, and their understanding and commitment to the normative legal 
framework guiding transition is a condition to make possible a successful tran-
sit from armed conflict to peace under the parameters of jus post bellum.
Second, external actors such as mediators, guarantors, the UN, and other 
relevant international institutions are essential to facilitate the incorporation 
of international legal norms, discourses, and practices into the specific tran-
sitional process. As seen in Colombia, the guarantor countries, the UN rep-
resentative, the icc Prosecutor, and even the Inter- American human rights 
institutions played a role at bringing to the table and to the institutional and 
public discussions international standards as derived from the State’s inter-
national obligations and from the comparative practice on the matter. This 
external contribution was essential to make the parties aware on the legal 
limits and possibilities shaping their negotiation. The specific actors relevant 
for other contexts will depend on different conditions but that support by 
international actors is essential to facilitate transition from a niac to peace 
under the vision of jus post bellum.
Third, domestic institutions are also key actors for a successful observance 
of jus post bellum in transitions from niac s. This section only referred to the 
Constitutional Court in Colombia, but other actors such as the parliament and 
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other courts, for example, have played a role in the normative internationaliza-
tion of the Colombian transition. In other contexts, those actors will depend 
on the institutional design or the institutional situation of the country, but 
experience from this case study shows how relevant is to have domestic insti-
tutions ensuring compliance with international legal standards both for the 
design and for the implementation of transitional mechanisms.
Fourth, experience in the case study shows how the active involvement 
of victims and other civil society actors is a fundamental component of jus 
post bellum. As discussed on the principle of inclusiveness, the normative 
dimension of inclusion is getting increased attention in international law and 
it plays a vital role for making peace legitimate and sustainable. Then, the 
participation of victims and other civil society actors not only ensures their 
involvement in the peacebuilding process but those actors can also bring to 
the discussion international standards to be observed in the protection of 
their rights and those of society.
5 The Functions Played by International Law in the Colombian 
Transition: Possible Functions of Jus Post Bellum?
Considering the significant role played by international law in the Colombian 
transition, this case offers important insights on the possible functions of jus 
post bellum as a framework involving the application of international law to 
transitions from armed conflict to peace. Based on that view, this section pres-
ents some functions played by international law in the transition to peace in 
Colombia, and how they could be more generally understood as functions of 
jus post bellum.
5.1 Increasing International Legitimacy of Transitional Mechanisms
In a global world, the international acceptance of peace agreements and other 
transitional mechanisms can be a condition for their successful and sustain-
able implementation. Such acceptance is largely dependent on the conformity 
of those mechanisms with international law.
In the Colombian case, the adherence of the peace negotiations and the 
Peace Agreement to international law is at the basis of their broad interna-
tional support. It is evident, for instance, in the extensive involvement of 
the unsc in monitoring implementation, and in the welcoming messages 
by the icc Prosecutor regarding transitional justice mechanisms. It creates 
a favorable environment for donors and external agencies supporting the 
implementation of the agreement and can also have effects on the domestic 
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level, increasing the credibility of the process and encouraging all actors 
around its compliance.
5.2 Offering Legal Certainty to the Peace Agreement
One of the main reasons why the parties based the Colombian Peace Agreement 
on international law was to lend it legal certainty beyond domestic law. This can 
be identified in at least two instances. One is the legal shielding of the Agreement 
as an international legal accord, which was a purpose shared not only by both 
parties but also by other actors of civil society and external guarantors facing 
the threat of future modifications to the Agreement by its opponents. This func-
tion is very relevant in the case of niac s, as usually there are sectors opposing 
the peace agreement that could have the power to modify what was agreed. 
Here, the shielding function attributed by the negotiators to international law in 
the Peace Agreement expresses a creative use of international legal norms and 
mechanisms, and it constitutes a significant contribution to the debate on the 
functions that jus post bellum as normative framework can play.
Second, the international acceptance of the Peace Agreement, specially by 
the Office of the icc Prosecutor and the unsc, creates an expectation that the 
deal will be respected by international legal institutions. For instance, in the field 
of criminal responsibility for international crimes, one could reasonably expect 
that individuals responsible for such crimes who are duly submitted to the tran-
sitional justice system created by the Agreement would not later be prosecuted 
by those facts in Colombia or abroad. It is an important expression of legal cer-
tainty, in view of the risk of any re- opening of criminal processes if the icl’s 
exigences are not met, and the fact that the icc keeps competence regardless of 
the domestic benefits granted by the State. Here, the guidance of international 
law for the definition of the system of criminal justice was essential to reaching 
a formula designed to satisfy the icc’s complementarity test. Similarly, it would 
be expected that the adherence to international standards on truth, justice, and 
reparation could shield the Agreement from situations like the annulation of 
domestic laws because of their incompatibility with ihrl standards, as it has 
occurred in Latin America in some cases following recommendations of the 
Inter- American System of Human Rights.185
 185 Some examples include Argentina (La Nacion, Diputados derogó la obediencia debida, 
25 March 1998, https:// www.lanacion.com.ar/ politica/ diputados- derogo- la- obediencia- 
debida- nid91500, accessed on 10 March 2017); Chile (Publico, Chile deroga el decreto 
ley de amnistía aprobado por la dictadura, 12 September 2014, https:// www.publico.es/ 
internacional/ chile- deroga- decreto- ley- amnistia.html, accessed on 10 March 2017); El 





5.3 Delimitating a Bargaining Zone for Negotiations
In peace negotiations, international law helps to delimit the parties’ expec-
tations within a framework external to them. It is particularly important 
considering that in niac s non- state armed groups generally reject the state’s 
institutions and norms. Thus, framing the negotiations under international 
law places state and non- state actors in a certain position of parity regarding 
their obligations and expectations. In such cases, it would be easier for non- 
state actors to accept conditions that the state cannot ease on in negotiation 
because it is constrained by its international obligations.186
In the Colombian case, this is especially visible in the field of justice. 
On the one hand, if the parties wanted the Agreement to be protected 
and governed by international law, they had to accept that the Additional 
Protocol ii’s provision on amnesties needed to be balanced with the State’s 
duty to prosecute international crimes. On the other hand, the fact that the 
State’s margin of decision is limited by its international obligations implies 
that even if the government wanted to accept lower standards, it cannot 
ensure that they would be respected domestically and internationally. The 
icc’s competence, the preceding reopening of domestic judicial processes 
against beneficiaries of amnesties in Latin America, and the possibility of 
prosecutions by foreign courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction 
caused the guerrilla to accept that criminal responsibility was a neces-
sary condition under international law rather than a mere exigence of the 
government.
5.4 Creating Confidence among the Parties
In a niac, at least a non- state actor is fighting the institutional system, includ-
ing its legal order. Such an actor is likely to distrust a negotiation conducted 
exclusively under the domestic normative framework it is fighting against. 
In the Colombian case, framing the negotiation under an international legal 
angle increased trust among the parties, as they felt backed by norms, actors, 
and institutions beyond mere domestic law.
https:// www.elnuevoherald.com/ noticias/ mundo/ america- latina/ article89949847.html 
(accessed on 10 March 2017).
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On this matter, Kastner argues that “international law may offer a ‘shade’ 
under which peace negotiations can take place in a more legitimate, and as a 
result more effective way, by pulling the actors involved towards this shade and 
spurring compliance.”187 This confidence can be enhanced by the fact that an 
international framework offers a certain impartial language in which parties 
can find common and reconcilable points, at the time that international law 
recognizes in neutral terms the status of the non- state actors in negotiation.188
5.5 Empowering Traditional Marginalized Actors
International law empowered different groups in Colombia in their demands 
for participation and inclusion in the design of transitional mechanisms and 
in the peace process. This function of international law is described by Kastner 
as a legal empowerment allowing vulnerable groups not only to be aware of 
their rights and the use of law to protect them but also, in the context of tran-
sitional processes, “to contribute to forming the legal- normative framework of 
peace negotiations.”189
International law gave force to victims’ discourses and demands during the 
peace process and in the Agreement in Colombia. Since 2005, international 
law has backed victims’ claims to increase the exigences of truth, justice, and 
reparation in the initial Alternative Penalties Law, which caused the govern-
ment and the Congress to move towards a more comprehensive Justice and 
Peace Law.190 Victims’ demands had true impact because they were grounded 
on international law. In this way, their discourse transcended a political 
dimension and attained a normative power.191 On this point, the 2016 Peace 
Agreement declares that it seeks to respond to the expectations of the vic-
tims and society in general, as well as to the State’s national and international 
obligations.192
When people can invoke international legal obligations to support their 
demands in a context of transition, they receive greater visibility and interna-
tional support, a result that consequentially improves their chances of being 
heard and included. This occurs because of international pressure to negotiate 
 187 Kastner, Legal Normativity in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflict, 16– 17.
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according to international law and the negotiators’ growing interest to have an 
agreement internationally accepted. This is particularly visible with respect to 
the increased attention paid to women in peace negotiations around the world 
after unsc Resolution 1325.193
Additionally, the Colombian experience shows that the international legal 
development on women’s participation and inclusion in peace processes can 
serve as an example for approaching other identity groups, which are equally 
essential to achieving peace.194 This is especially the case for lgbti people, 
whose rights are receiving increasing legal attention at the international 
level.195 Similarly, for ethnic communities, their international legal protection 
through ilo Convention 169 and UN declarations can be enhanced with the 
communities’ specific participation and inclusion in peace processes, follow-
ing the example of the framework created for women by unsc Resolution 1325.
5.6 Promoting Comprehensiveness in the Guarantee of Rights
Following international standards, the Colombian Agreement integrates jus-
tice, truth, and reparation as an indivisible whole. The Agreement states that 
these three components are all aimed at ensuring victims’ rights with no one 
component prevailing over the others.196 This system looks at accomplishing 
the State’s positive obligations under ihrl, a regime under which states have 
the responsibility not only to investigate and punish violations of human rights 
but also to prevent them, search for the truth, repair the victims, guarantee 
the non- repetition of violence, and maintain public order.197 This combined 
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Building Peace: What They Do, What It Matters, 126.
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orientation and gender identity, through Resolution 32/ 2 (2016), UN. Doc. A/ hrc/ res/ 
32/ 2.
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approach is the best way to comprehensively satisfy victims’ rights in contexts 
of transition, which is unlikely to be achieved through only criminal retribu-
tion for past violations.198 On this point, it is important to remember that such 
a comprehensive approach was not envisaged in the agenda of negotiations, 
in which the guerilla was reluctant to accept any form of justice but agreed 
to include a component on victims’ rights. It was here that, owing to the com-
prehensive approach to victims’ rights in international law, all components on 
truth, justice, and reparation were finally developed during the peace process.
5.7 Encouraging the Transformative Role of Transition
As discussed above, jus post bellum looks for a positive transformation of 
the status quo ante rather than simply its restoration, especially in contexts 
of transition from niac s to peace. In the Colombian case, the ways in which 
international law has shaped transition strengthened the transformative role 
of transitional mechanisms to build peace. This effect can be seen in at least 
three components.
First, the establishment of a reparation system, even during the ongoing 
armed conflict, shows that reparation can also play a transformative role capa-
ble of creating conditions for peace. In addition to the five measures of repara-
tion defined by international law, the 2011 Law on Victims established a system 
of institutions and mechanisms to empower victims and ensure their partici-
pation at different levels. It paved the way for the significant victims’ support to 
the 2012– 2016 peace negotiations with the guerrilla. Reparation thus assumed 
a dual role, both correcting violations of human rights and fostering transfor-
mation and reconciliation in a broad sense,199 which definitively helped to cre-
ate conditions for peace.
Second, by empowering groups to participate and be included in peace talks 
and agreements, international law can contribute to the openness of societies 
in transition. If the participation and inclusion of different groups is seen as 
a legal standard rather than a mere political choice, transitions will be bet-
ter used as an opportunity to address structural discriminatory dynamics in 
society.200 On this point, Kastner claims that “an agreement may not only 
 198 Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 23.
 199 On this idea, see: Marco Sassòli, ‘Reparation,’ in Post- Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, ed. 
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symbolize a concerted attempt to end an armed conflict but may also aspire to 
solve structural problems and generate fundamental changes in a post- conflict 
society.”201 In the Colombian case, no previous attempt to negotiate peace has 
had a similar approach. And though the effects of this inclusiveness are to be 
seen in the coming years, the fact that different groups were heard during the 
negotiations and their demands included in the Agreement represents a prom-
ising opportunity for shaping a more inclusive country.202
Finally, the Colombian peace negotiations gave a central role to the dis-
cussion on the root causes of armed conflict. The objective of establishing 
a sustainable peace requires not only ending armed confrontation but also 
addressing its causes. On this point, the Peace Agreement looks at improv-
ing rural development and political participation in Colombia, ensuring 
all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. A successful imple-
mentation of those measures would bring positive transformations in the 
quality of life of millions of people in the regions most affected by armed 
conflict.
5.8 Insights for the General Functions of Jus Post Bellum
This section explored the functions played by international law in the 
Colombian case suggesting how they could reflect possible functions of jus 
post bellum. The seven functions discussed here show the contributions of 
international law in the Colombian transition, from facilitating negotiations 
and increasing confidence among the parties to promoting comprehensive 
transformations and the participation of traditionally marginalized groups. All 
those functions certainly express the purposes of jus post bellum.
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In that way, even if the above- mentioned functions are presented as serv-
ing specific features of the Colombian context, most of them are also relevant 
to other cases. However, to summarize their content towards suggesting more 
general functions of jus post bellum in transition from niac s to peace, they 
could be gathered into three possible global functions.
First, helping to delimitate the matters to be addressed in peace negoti-
ations or any other transitional mechanism, by looking to comprehensively 
address the causes and the consequences of armed conflict under interna-
tional legal standards. Even though each context has its own conditions, a pro-
cess conducted under the framework of jus post bellum must include matters 
as reconstruction and transformation, reparations for victims, and criminal 
accountability for crimes committed during the conflict, among others. Here, 
as seen in the section on principles, a framework of jus post bellum brings to 
the discussion the international legal norms, discourses, and practices guiding 
the treatment of the specific matter, delimiting the negotiation and the con-
clusion of the corresponding mechanisms.
Second, a framework of jus post bellum shows the actors that must be 
involved in transitional processes, giving legal grounds for traditionally mar-
ginalized groups to be included in order to make transition to peace legitimate, 
sustainable, and socially supported. This is an essential component on current 
peacemaking and peacebuilding, where the more people can participate and 
their concerns be considered the more accepted and effective can be the con-
struction of sustainable peace.
Third, the framework of jus post bellum conveys international legal mech-
anisms and institutions to facilitate negotiations, the conclusion of peace 
agreements, and their successful implementation. A normative framework exter-
nal to the parties in a niac helps to create confidence, and the participation of 
international actors as mediators or guarantors in the negotiation or in the imple-
mentation facilitates the discussion on complex matters and secures the effective 
monitoring and verification in the implementation phase.
6 Conclusions
This chapter developed a comprehensive analysis of jus post bellum through 
the lens of the Colombian case, offering empirical insights for understanding 
the definition, formation, principles, actors, and functions of this normative 
framework. The conclusions can be summarized into five components.
First, from the proliferation of theoretical definitions presented in Chapter 




Colombian case. To this effect, the chapter delineated four basic features of jus 
post bellum: (i) its content is given by principles; (ii) its object is to help estab-
lishing a sustainable peace; (iii) it holds a functional rather than a temporal 
approach; and, (iv) its legal nature is a matter of international law. Thus, by 
referring to empirical elements from the case study, this chapter defined jus 
post bellum as a normative framework of principles offering a space of con-
textualized interpretation and application of relevant international law in the 
transition from armed conflict to a sustainable peace. Such a framework con-
tains normative standards and possibilities, which, rather than being restric-
tive, are aimed at guiding choices in transition.
Second, jus post bellum is a dynamic normative framework permanently 
constructed through the practice of parties involved in transition. Such parties 
must apply international legal norms that were not meant to regulate transi-
tional processes, and in doing so they interpret and adapt those norms to their 
specific context. It implies a dual process of application and creation of law, 
regarding which the chapter provided concrete examples from Colombia.
Third, principles are the constituent substance of jus post bellum. They cre-
ate the normative framework allowing parties to move within a set of relevant 
norms, discourses, and practices to balance international legal obligations 
with the political conditions raised by their transitional process. This chapter 
explored some principles present in the Colombian case, assessing their legal 
value and their configuration in the transition to peace in the country. Even 
though such a list is not exhaustive, the principles discussed offered a concrete 
illustration on the content of jus post bellum in practice.
Fourth, the chapter explored how different external and domestic actors 
played a role in bringing international legal considerations to the Colombian 
transition. The chapter sustained that the potential actors of jus post bellum 
go beyond the parties directly involved in peace negotiations, and that they 
concern all the potential actors that have an interest in or a responsibility for 
ensuring compliance with international law with a view to make transition to 
peace sustainable. From there, the chapter suggested some basic categories 
that could identify actors in other contexts.
Fifth, analyzing the functions played by international law in the Colombian 
transition, the chapter outlined the potential functions of jus post bellum. Here, 
it examined how the normative framework provided by jus post bellum can help 
transition in different ways, as delimiting the bargaining zone of possible agree-
ment in peace negotiations, offering legal certainty to peace deals, increasing 
confidence among the parties, empowering traditionally marginalized groups, 
and encouraging the transformative role of transition. Here, the chapter also clas-
sified some general functions that could guide jus post bellum in other contexts.
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General Conclusions
1 A Summary of the Study
This book explored the role of international law in the transition from armed 
conflict to peace under the analytical framework of jus post bellum, using the 
Colombian transition as a case study. Analyzing this question through three 
chapters, the study assessed how the theory of jus post bellum works in prac-
tice, providing new empirical insights for understanding the content and 
scope of the concept.
Chapter 1 analyzed jus post bellum as the concept framing the role of interna-
tional law in the transition from armed conflict to peace. Different approaches 
to a definition of the concept showed the complexity of the debate. However, 
some common points emerged. First, jus post bellum is a solid concept whose 
potential as a framework on the role of law in transitions to peace is evident in 
the significant literature in this field. Second, although jus post bellum has been 
approached differently as a new legal regime, as an ordering system of norms, 
and as an interpretative framework, no consensual definition exits for the 
concept. Nonetheless, each approach unveils features of the concept and can 
help to build an integrative definition, such as understanding jus post bellum 
as a normative framework of principles guiding the coordination and inter-
pretation of international legal norms applicable to the transition from armed 
conflict to peace. Third, although the usefulness of jus post bellum has been 
contested, it is a more comprehensive framework for the variety of legal mat-
ters involved in transition compared to related concepts: transitional justice, 
being focused on dealing with past human rights abuses, is narrower than jus 
post bellum, which covers the broad spectrum of aspects involved in peace-
building; and lex pacificatoria is essentially a different name for the same 
object of jus post bellum but has little reception in the scholarship in the field. 
Fourth, jus post bellum is built around its functional approach to guiding transi-
tions toward sustainable peace, which entails both addressing the root causes 
of the conflict and observing international legal standards on human rights 
and the rule of law.
Chapter 2 offered an extensive test case on the role played by international 
law in the transition in Colombia. The parties openly recognized the existence 
of an international legal framework for their negotiations and applied it in a 
creative way. First, they subscribed the peace agreement as constituting an 
international legal accord, seeking to shield it from eventual domestic modifi-






the root causes of the conflict, following a human rights- based approach 
through the relevant ihrl instruments on civil, political, economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Third, a sophisticated system of criminal justice was estab-
lished by using international law as its main framework. It excluded amnesties 
for international crimes, establishing that people responsible for those crimes 
will be judged under a formal system of justice granting restorative sanctions 
and restrictions on liberty in exchange for contributions to peace. Fourth, a 
comprehensive system of administrative reparations was adopted according 
to relevant international standards. Fifth, a broad approach to inclusiveness 
in the peace negotiations and in the agreement was applied following interna-
tional guidelines on participation for women and ethnic communities, which 
was extended to other social groups.
Finally, Chapter 3 assessed the elements from theory presented in Chapter 1 
against the elements from practice explored in Chapter 2, offering new insights 
on the content and scope of jus post bellum. This chapter suggested a definition 
of jus post bellum as a normative framework of principles guiding the legal and 
political choices in transition under the parameters of international law. These 
principles consist of legal norms, discourses, and practices, offering a bargain-
ing zone with normative constraints and possibilities within which parties in 
transition can define their own transitional formulas. Through concrete exam-
ples from Colombia, the chapter analyzed how jus post bellum is a process in 
permanent development, whose content and scope are continually formed 
through the practice of actors involved in the transition, in the way they inter-
pret, adapt, and apply relevant international legal norms in relation to their 
concrete context. Lastly, the chapter explored the multiplicity of potential 
actors of jus post bellum by referring to those involved in the Colombian case 
and how they brought international normative elements to shape the transi-
tion to peace, providing an analysis of the functions that such an international 
legal influence played in the process. As a result, the chapter found that jus 
post bellum effectively works in practice, and that the Colombian case offers 
invaluable insights for understanding the concrete content, formation, actors, 
and functions that jus post bellum can play as the normative framework for 
transition.
2 The Main Contributions of the Colombian Transition to 
International Law and to Jus Post Bellum
From an international legal perspective, the main lesson of the Colombian 





the transition from armed conflict to peace. Since 2005, the country has been 
developing transitional instruments according to international standards, and 
in the 2012– 2016 peace negotiations the parties intentionally appealed to inter-
national law as a parameter for their talks and the agreement.1 Because of this, 
as analyzed in Chapters 2 and 3, the Colombian transition offers a fairly full 
picture of how international law can facilitate, protect, and legitimate internal 
peace processes and agreements.
The parties’ decision to reinforce the legal certainty of the peace agreement 
through its enactment as an international legal accord shows their faith in 
international law. It reveals how international law can enhance confidence 
among parties in a niac, offering an external framework in which both state 
and non- state actors can trust. This fact also shows that parties in negotia-
tion can make creative use of international norms according to the specific 
needs and conditions of their context. This point offers important lessons on 
the flexibility that international norms must have in order to be applied to 
internal contexts, especially in transitional periods, as well as on the role of 
domestic actors applying and creating international law through their practice 
in transition.
Regarding criminal justice, the Colombian process showed, as no other 
transition had before, that judicial criminal accountability is not an obstacle to 
agreements for peace. Unlike preceding negotiated transitions, in which truth 
and justice were sought through non- judicial mechanisms, the Colombian 
peace agreement introduced a domestic judicial system framed under icl, 
in which people responsible for the most serious crimes will be tried before 
judges with formal judicial processes and sentences, with the opportunity to 
receive restorative sanctions if they cooperate to truth and reparations. This 
approach provides new insights on the uneven practice relating to justice 
and accountability in peace agreements,2 offering an innovative way to com-
bine the retributive elements required by icl for international crimes with 
the restorative approach necessary to achieving peace and reconciliation, all 
toward ensuring victim’s rights.3
 1 Government of Colombia and farc, ‘Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build 
a Stable and Lasting Peace,’ 2, 154.
 2 Considering the variety of approaches to justice and criminal accountability in peace pro-
cesses practice, see: UN Secretary- General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post- Conflict Societies,’ para. 12.2.
 3 On this point, Chetail points out that in contexts of transition, victim’s rights and reconcili-










On reparations to victims of armed conflict, Colombia adopted in 2011 
an innovative system of comprehensive reparations based on the UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on Reparations. As noted by Evans, despite the inher-
ent difficulties associated with the shortage of resources and the high number 
of victims, the transitional debate in Colombia has “set focus on international 
legal obligations in an unprecedented manner and resulted in recognition of 
the right of victims to receive reparation.”4 This case shows that it is possible 
to develop a comprehensive system of reparation following international legal 
standards, even in the context of extensive violations of human rights and ihl 
within an armed conflict. Additionally, this case also offers new insights on the 
obligations and role of non- state armed actors contributing to victims’ repara-
tion both as part of the restorative sanctions and as measures of social reinte-
gration and reconciliation.
Similarly, the search for an inclusive transition in Colombia has been 
marked by a consistent reference to international law. From the Constitutional 
Court to the negotiators in the peace process, including victims, civil society 
organizations, and international community, the discourse for inclusiveness 
was grounded in international law. In this way, the Colombian experience 
offers important lessons on how inclusive transitions are embedded in inter-
national law, and how inclusiveness contributes to a more legitimate, effective, 
and sustainable peace. International law empowers traditionally marginalized 
groups in society, allowing their participation and inclusion in peace processes 
to function as an opportunity to address structural discriminatory factors. On 
this point, the Colombian process demonstrated that the international legal 
developments regarding women’s participation and inclusion in peace pro-
cesses can also serve as an approach in relation to other identity groups whose 
participation is equally essential to achieving peace. It is especially the case 
for lgbti people, whose rights are attaining increasing legal attention at the 
international level, and ethnic communities, whose international legal pro-
tection can be enhanced through their specific participation and inclusion in 
peace processes, following the example of the framework created for women 
by unsc Resolution 1325.
All these contributions of the Colombian transition to international law 
offer new insights on the concept of jus post bellum as the normative frame-
work for transition from armed conflict to peace. However, in addition to the 
elements referred in these general conclusions, four specific contributions to 
the development of jus post bellum are worth mentioning in this section.
 4 Evans, The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict, 222. 
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First, analyzing the concept of jus post bellum in the context of niac s, the 
Colombian case showed that the normative framework guiding transition to 
peace is about international law. Even though most elements of the Agreement 
are based on and developed through domestic law, the analysis conducted in 
this book demonstrated how international law defined the common frame of 
reference in which both the State and the rebel group found a space of mutual 
understanding.
Second, practice in Colombia showed that despite the parties’ common 
acceptance of international standards, such an international legal framework 
needed to be adapted to the conditions of the context. Toward this, the nego-
tiators considered legal discourses, interpretations, and practices (e.g. the icc 
Prosecutor’s statements, ngo s’ and victims’ advocacy, and the previous tran-
sitional instruments in Colombia) to apply international norms in a way com-
patible with their pursuit of peace. As such, the Colombian case indicates that 
jus post bellum can offer the framework to integrate all relevant legal elements 
applicable to transition into flexible principles that will guide parties in their 
transitional choices. In turn, this approach recognizes the norm- creating pow-
ers of parties involved in transition, as one could conclude that the formulas 
designed in Colombia to adapt international standards into its context will 
likely serve as a reference for future transitions in the world.
Third, the Colombian case unveils the broad set of actors and functions 
involved in jus post bellum. In addition to the direct parties, guarantors, and 
international delegates for the negotiations, several other actors can play a 
role in referring to and creating the normative framework for transition. In 
Colombia those actors included international and domestic institutions, 
ngo s, victims, and diverse social groups. As analyzed in Chapter 3, all of these 
actors invoked international law to support their suggestions and demands 
related to the peace negotiations and the design of transitional instruments 
in Colombia. From there, one can suggest at least four kind of actors of jus 
post bellum in niac s: the direct parties in negotiation, domestic institutions, 
external mediators and guarantors, and victims and other identity and social 
sectors. Similarly, the normative framework used and developed for transition 
in Colombia served multiple functions, including facilitating negotiations, 
increasing legitimacy and legal certainty, and improving the overall quality of 
mechanisms aimed at building sustainable peace.
Fourth, the Colombian case illustrates the functional rather than temporal 
approach of jus post bellum proposed by most scholars. As argued in this book, 
jus post bellum serves as a normative framework guiding the negotiation and 
design of mechanisms aimed at transitioning to peace, regardless of the very 
existence of a peace process or the effective end of armed conflict. As such, 
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transitional efforts undertaken in Colombia since the 2005 Peace and Justice 
Law, the 2011 Law on Victims, and the 2012 Legal Framework for Peace were 
all conceived and designed in the perspective of jus post bellum, even though 
they were not developed within a peace negotiation. Additionally, despite the 
2012– 2016 peace process and the 2016 peace agreement, armed conflict is still 
ongoing in the country with other armed groups. Thus, no temporal approach 
could frame the application of jus post bellum in Colombia but its function to 
help to establish sustainable peace.
3 Jus Post Bellum from Theory to Practice: Challenges and 
Opportunities
As noted since the Introduction, despite the significant literature on jus post 
bellum in recent years, at the time of writing only four studies devoted to ana-
lyzing the concept in practice were identified. This can be explained by several 
factors: the concept is still recent in legal scholarship, its usefulness has been 
contested, and its very definition and content have not reached academic con-
sensus. However, the mentioned studies have been conducted in 2005 and 2012 
regarding Iraq,5 in 2009 on the Afghan case,6 and in 2011 on Uganda.7 Almost a 
decade has passed, and new and important developments have been achieved 
by the legal scholarship on jus post bellum. As such, the Colombian case is a 
remarkable example with which to conduct a new empirical analysis, testing 
theory in practice in order to offer new insights to continue the conceptual 
development of jus post bellum.
Previous case studies on jus post bellum have only addressed specific mat-
ters, such as military occupation (Iraq) and the role of icl in the context of a 
peace process (Uganda), or they were conceived from the perspective of the 
just war theory (Afghanistan). Here, the book offered a comprehensive legal 
analysis of jus post bellum from the perspective of the Colombian transition. As 
a result, the study was able to exemplify and propose new elements regarding 
 5 Daniel Thürer and Malcom MacLaren, ‘ “Ius Post Bellum” in Iraq: A Challenge to the 
Applicability and Relevance of International Humanitarian Law?,’ in Weltinnenrecht: Liber 
Amicorum Jost Delbrück, ed. Klaus Dicke, and et al. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005), 
753– 82; Christina Benson, ‘Jus Post Bellum in Iraq: The Development of Emerging Norms for 
Economic Reform in Post Conflict Countries,’ Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business 11, 
no. 4 (2012): 315– 55.
 6 Labonte, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Peacebuilding and Non- State Actors : Lessons from Afghanistan.’
 7 Ryngaert and Gould, ‘International Criminal Justice and Jus Post Bellum: The Challenge of 







the definition, principles, object, functions, and actors of jus post bellum based 
on practice.
In this way, some remarks can be made on the challenges and opportunities 
of carrying the concept from theory to practice. First, jus post bellum is still per-
ceived as too closely associated with its moral and philosophical foundations 
within the just war theory, which has been considered by some authors as an 
obstacle for its development as a legal concept.8 In 2012 May proposed the 
most accepted series of principles of jus post bellum, though he sustained that 
those principles are normative because “they are moral norms” but “not legal 
principles themselves.”9 In 2015 Kastner developed a comprehensive analysis 
on the legal normativity for the resolution of internal armed conflicts that 
advanced many elements of jus post bellum, but he decided not to use the con-
cept, arguing that it is more linked to iac s, and it “heavily relies on just war tra-
dition.”10 Then, in 2016, the ilc’s Special Rapporteur Marie Jacobsson did not 
address the concept of jus post bellum in her Report on the Protection of the 
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, affirming that “the legal- political 
discussion on this concept is wider than positive law and has a clear connec-
tion to just war theories.”11 These examples illustrate the challenges ahead to 
bringing jus post bellum from its original moral conception to the legal realm, 
and how analyzing the concept in practice, as this study did, can offer new 
insights on its legal background and function.
Second, offering a legal framework for a fundamentally political matter as 
peacemaking and peacebuilding is a challenging task in practice. The search of 
sustainable peace involves many elements traditionally not seen as law, such 
as addressing root causes of armed conflict, building positive peace, reach-
ing reconciliation, and promoting inclusiveness. However, as analyzed in this 
study, all these matters can be seen from an international legal perspective if a 
broad understanding of law is assumed. Jus post bellum as a normative frame-
work requires viewing law as a social and dynamic process,12 involving positive 
 8 De Brabandere, ‘The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in International Law: A Normative 
Critique’; Vatanparast, ‘Waging Peace: Ambiguities, Contradictions, and Problems of a Jus 
Post Bellum Legal Framework.’
 9 May, After War Ends, 5.
 10 Kastner, Legal Normativity in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflict, 17.
 11 Jacobsson, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts,’ para. 10.
 12 On the idea of law as a social process in the context of jus post bellum: Pierre Allan and 
Alexis Keller, ‘The Concept of a Just Peace, or Achieving Peace Through Recognition, 
Renouncement, and Rule,’ in What Is a Just Peace?, ed. Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller 












and soft law norms as well as legal discourses and practices from actors par-
ticipating in transition. Thus, practice in transitioning to peace permanently 
offers new normative elements to build jus post bellum, recognizing the role of 
the relevant actors interpreting, applying, and creating law through their own 
practice.
Third, the variety of definitions and principles around jus post bellum com-
plicates the application of the concept in practice. However, practice is the 
only way to delimitate the content and scope of the concept. The 2014 pub-
lication of the University of Leiden’s Jus Post Bellum Project concluded that 
many aspects of jus post bellum “need to be specified inductively, i.e. through a 
systematic look at practice.”13 Here, the Colombian case offered invaluable ele-
ments, as analyzed in Chapter 3, testing theory in practice to better understand 
the content and functioning of jus post bellum as the normative framework for 
transitions. As such, this study reveals why more cases and comparative prac-
tices should be analyzed in order to identify “what is systematic about the law 
that applies to the process of achieving a sustainable peace.”14
4 The Future of Jus Post Bellum
Despite roughly two decades of scholarly development of jus post bellum, in 
2017 Iverson referred to “the newness of the term,”15 and Bruch argued that “the 
effort to articulate and elaborate jus post bellum is valuable and necessary” but 
that it “is still early in the process.”16 These views convey the significant chal-
lenges and opportunities entailed in the future of the concept that only can be 
handled, as noted above, through a systematic look at practice.
This study advanced basic elements showing how jus post bellum can find 
a content and applicability in practice. However, as sustained in Chapter 3, 
the concept is still limited to academic scholarship, and Special Rapporteur 
Jacobsson’s argument for not addressing jus post bellum in her Report to the 
ilc in 2016 is an example of the challenges ahead to bringing the concept into 
 13 Iverson, Easterday, and Stahn, ‘Epilogue: Jus Post Bellum— Strategic Analysis and Future 
Directions,’ 545.
 14 Iverson, ‘Contrasting the Normative and Historical Foundations of Transitional Justice 
and Jus Post Bellum: Outlining the Matrix of Definitions in Comparative Perspective,’ 101.
 15 Iverson, ‘The Function of Jus Post Bellum in International Law,’ 12.
 16 Carl Bruch, ‘Considerations in Framing the Environmental Dimensions of Jus Post 
Bellum,’ in Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to Peace: Clarifying 
Norms, Principles, and Practices, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson, and Jennifer Easterday 













official use. Unlike transitional justice, for example, which has expanded its 
academic foundation to achieve broad usage in legal and political practice, 
jus post bellum still requires significant development before reaching a similar 
status. The good news, as showed by this study, is that the concept has the 
capacity to embody international legal values for building peace under the rule 
of law, human rights, and positive peace, constituting an effective normative 
framework for transitions from armed conflict to peace. Additionally, as noted 
in the 2017 publication of the Jus Post Bellum Project in reference to the Draft 
Principles on Environmental Protection in Relation to Armed Conflicts pro-
posed to the ilc in 2016, many of those principles “may not be formally labeled 
as post bellum principles, but reflect arguments that have been made in jus post 
bellum scholarship.”17
The main challenge for the development of the concept is posed by its 
context- specificity. Although some authors have considered that a universal 
instrument of jus post bellum would be possible through a convention regu-
lating transitions from armed conflict to peace,18 this study analyzed how the 
inner flexibility and context- specificity of jus post bellum make such a task 
neither possible nor desirable. On this matter, Chetail argues that jus post 
bellum must facilitate the “contextualized interpretation” and the “contex-
tualized application”19 of norms relevant to transition, which, according to 
Easterday, means offering “a space for devising a context- specific, comprehen-
sive, and coordinated approach to post- conflict peacebuilding.”20 Similarly, De 
Brabandere highlights that transitional instruments “vary widely from case to 
case according to the expectations in the territories,”21 which Stahn supports 
with his remark that “each post- conflict engagement requires a situation- 
specific response.”22 Likewise, defining jus post bellum as an interpretative 
framework, Gallen concludes that “each transitional society will interpret its 
own practices, its own jus post bellum.”23
The future of jus post bellum will therefore be determined by a systematic 
analysis of practice to find what is common in different contexts, assuming 
 17 Stahn, Iverson, and Easterday, ‘Introduction: Protection of the Environment and Jus Post 
Bellum: Some Preliminary Reflections,’ 24.
 18 Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just- War Theorist’; Österdahl and van Zadel, 
‘What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New Wine and Old Bottles.’
 19 Chetail, ‘Introduction,’ 18.
 20 Easterday, ‘Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum,’ 385.
 21 De Brabandere, ‘The Responsibility for Post- Conflict Reforms: A Critical Assessment of 
Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept,’ 145.
 22 Stahn, ‘R2P and Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Polycentric Approach,’ 105.
















that this is a framework in permanent construction. Even though the formu-
las developed in Colombia offered significant lessons on how law can guide 
choices for transition to peace, they are not automatically replicable in other 
contexts. As examined in Chapters 2 and 3, there are many context- specific 
factors explaining why the country had such receptiveness to international law 
and to integrating several principles of jus post bellum. Then, a systematic anal-
ysis on practice from other contexts could led to general guidelines or policy 
documents on jus post bellum to guide relevant actors on the matter while it 
helps advancing the concept in theory and practice.
In short, this book departed from the theoretical background on jus post bel-
lum and analyzed the concept in practice, within the context of niac s and by 
using the Colombian transition as a case study. This work offered new insights, 
which in turn point to the need to delve into the empirical analysis of the con-
cept if we want jus post bellum to fully develop its potential.
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